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Summary
This thesis examines continuity and change and the role 
of trade unions in state industrial relations policy in 
Britain in the period 1910-21.
Contrary to orthodox interpretations which point to a 
watershed during World War 1, it is argued that state 
industrial relations policy remained remarkably 
consistent in this period.
To a significant extent this consistency was due to the 
scale and character of worker organisation. The influence 
of syndicalism and industrial unionism added a new and 
threatening dimension to worker organisation because of 
the emphasis these movements placed on empowering the 
rank and file rather than trade union leaders. This shift 
was perceived as a threat to the national interest- which 
forced the state to intervene but limited the forms which 
intervention could take.
The form of intervention with the fewest repercussions 
was conciliation which involved the promotion of 
"responsible" trade unionism. This policy was based on 
the idea that responsibly led trade unions acted as a 
discipline and control on their members. They could 
prevent industrial conflict from reaching the point where 
repressive state intervention became inevitable.
This view of trade union leadership is a central theme in 
an influential body of literature in industrial relations 
known as "rank and filism". The thesis highlights the 
problems with this approach between 1910 and 1921 notably 
that the actions of trade union leaders' were less 
significant than those of the rank and file. It argues 
for a more sophisticated and qualified version of rank 
and filism.
1Introduction
This thesis examines continuity and change and the role 
of trade unions in the British state's management of 
industrial conflict in the years 1910-21. It explores 
the constraints placed on state and trade union action 
by industrial conflict in this period. It develops a 
detailed sociology of industrial relations drawing on 
primary archive sources. I have chosen this period as 
the focus for the study because it has been freguently 
portrayed as 'the last great revolutionary period in 
British history characterised by the sheer growth of 
numbers in the unions; by the working days lost through 
strikes; by the upsurge of socialist organisation, 
campaigning, ideas; by the intensity and range of 
debate over tactics and strategy of the struggle for 
socialism ... these years mark a climax of class 
conscious self activity among the workers which, in 
Britain, has not been surpassed.'1 The unprecedented 
outburst of industrial unrest in this period was 
accompanied by an unprecedented increase in state 
intervention in industrial relations.2
The great increases in industrial conflict, in trade 
unionism and in state intervention have made this 
period the subject of many studies in industrial 
relations and it is generally agreed in the literature 
relating to this period that the First World War marked
2a turning point in the state's management of industrial 
relations although there are many contradictory 
interpretations of the character of state intervention, 
the reasons for its growth and its impact.
With a few notable exceptions (upon which the thesis 
builds) accounts of industrial unrest during 1910-21 
have tended to emphasise the penal and military aspects 
of the state's response and have neglected 
conciliation, no doubt because analyses of the latter 
cannot compete with emotionally charged accounts of 
strikes, riots, murder and arson. It is the argument of 
this thesis however that a different view of the 
state's management of industrial conflict and the role 
of trade unions, emerges when an analysis of the 
origins and development of its policy of conciliation 
is added. This policy originated well before the period 
under study and continued to expand throughout it.
Three influential approaches have been developed which 
offer varying accounts of labour unrest at this time. 
These accounts say something distinctive about the 
machinery of industrial relations which developed in 
this period including the role of trade unionism and 
collective bargaining systems. The rest of the 
introduction will outline these different 
interpretations and set out my alternative account, the 
specific contribution which my thesis makes and the set 
of questions I will address.
3The Revolutionary School
The first of these interpretations belongs to what is 
commonly referred to as the 'revolutionary' school. 3 
Representatives of the revolutionary school include 
Hinton, Price, Burgess, Holton and Hyman.4 These 
authors develop a critigue of orthodox interpretations 
of the evolutionary development of British industrial 
relations systems.5 Whilst these analysts do not 
represent a coherent body, they all direct attention to 
the importance of informal workplace struggles and 
organisation in the study of industrial relations in 
this period. This interpretation arose in response to 
the reappearance of unofficial organisations based on 
the workplace during the 1960s.6
In a broad ranging reassessment of the changing 
structure of the working class and the implementation 
of collective bargaining, the revolutionary school 
produced what has come to be regarded as the dominant 
account of the determinants of and the role of trade 
unions in industrial relations labour policy between 
1910 and 1921.
For Hinton, state labour policy during this crisis was 
determined by the need 'to reinforce the disciplinary 
functions of the employer'7 assisted by trade union 
officialdom leaving the unofficial labour movement to
'resist the wartime offensive of the state and the 
employers against traditional working class rights.'8 
Hinton argues that the outbreak of the war allowed the 
state to increase its powers of surveillance and 
coercion and by appearing to concede to the demands of 
organised labour it was able to co-opt trade union 
leaders into the 'Servile State'.9 This increase in 
state compulsion, the acceleration of changes in 
working conditions and the 'betrayal' of skilled 
workers by their elected leaders led to the 
transmutation of forms of rank and file organisation 
from a response to the problems of craft regulation 
into a radical challenge to the industrial and 
political status quo which was severely repressed by 
the state on the employers' behalf. The leaders of 
organised labour were however only recognised by the 
Government so long as this recognition served the 
Government's purposes. The trade unions had become 'a 
part of the social machinery of the State' but only in 
the most subordinate capacity, and without tenure ... 
the primary result of this collaboration was not to 
extend working class power into the state machine but 
to complete the process, already well advanced before 
the war, by which the leaders of the organised workers 
were divorced from their members.'10
Burgess argues that the increase in trade unionists at 
the outbreak of war gave their organisations an 
official presence with government that had not existed
before the war. This prompted government efforts to 
• cultivate friendships with trade union leaders, to
. agree to separate negotiations with them and to
"manage" the implementation of government policy in a 
way that would win the unions' active cooperation. This 
incorporation of trade union leaders was an essential 
part of state manpower policy designed to smooth the 
working of industrial relations during the emergency.
It achieved the opposite effect by driving a wedge 
between the trade union leadership and the rank and 
file and weakening the control exercised by union 
leaders over it. This gave unrest an increasingly 
workplace orientation which became more menacing 'as 
the institutions of "civil society" were steadily 
embraced beneath the umbrella of government tutelage.
In consequence, the scope of social unrest became 
circumscribed to attacks on state power itself.'11
Price, Holton and Hyman focus attention on how the 
state's recognition of trade union leaders enabled 
employers to use union leaders to moderate the demands 
of their members and enforce unpopular settlements on 
the rank and file. Trade union leaders became part of 
the machinery designed to subordinate organised labour. 
For Price the involvement of union bureaucracy in the 
collective bargaining process increased discontent and 
was the essential stimulus to labour unrest.12 Union 
leaders exchanged traditional trade union practices for 
collective bargaining rights and this loss of power in
6the workplace intensified militancy amongst the rank 
and file.
Holton argues that in this period the state began to 
favour incorporation as a form of social control in 
response to the extension of labour movement 
strength.13 Moreover the incorporation of union 
officials into state sponsored conciliation schemes 
furthered the syndicalist cause since union leaders 
distanced themselves from rank and file agitation and 
direct action seemed the only alternative. Sabel14 also 
argues that during WW1 the subjugation of labour 
resulted from the manner in which union leaders 
collaborated with the state in administering the war 
economy.
Hyman offers a more sophisticated analysis in arguing 
that rather than there being a clearly defined 
bureaucracy separate from a coherent and self conscious 
rank and file membership intra - union relations were 
highly complex with shifting interest groups and 
bureaucratic tendencies at many levels. He nevertheless 
reinforces Trotsky's view that class collaboration has 
been a long run feature of trade unionism in Britain 
'it was not a case of workers' control over capital but 
of the subserviency of the labour bureaucracy to 
capital'.15
7In summary, this approach argues firstly that state 
policy sought to incorporate the trade unions. Secondly 
that trade union bureaucracy defuses the radical 
aspirations of the rank and file imposing, unpopular 
settlements upon them. Thirdly that participation in 
national collective bargaining machinery by trade union 
leaders was a major cause of industrial unrest.
Corporatism
The second influential interpretation of this period is 
the corporatist view implicit in the work of Marwick16 
and explicit in Middlemas.17 Middlemas takes a view of 
industrial events virtually identical to that of the 
revolutionary school but portrays the state in more 
neutral colours. Middlemas's central point is that in 
the period 1916-21 'a new form of harmony in the 
political system was established which changed the 
governance of the country quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively'18. Middlemas's idea of 'corporate bias' 
states that a triangular pattern of cooperation was 
established between government, labour and capital 
which led to the elevation of trade unions and 
employers' associations to a new sort of status, from 
interest groups they became governing institutions. 
Trade unions' new role was premised on their acceptance 
of the need to manage discontent and abandon the 
ideology of class conflict. By 1921 therefore, trade 
unions had crossed a threshold which had never existed
8before the war and behaved thereafter as estates of the 
realm.19
Middlemas argues firstly that trade unions were not 
incorporated in a collaborationist sense but came to 
share some of the political power and attributes of the 
state itself. Secondly, that the Great War was a 
watershed in British politics - there were no 
significant continuities in the state's management of 
industrial unrest before and after the war.
Revisionist Interpretations
The third major approach purports to offer a 
thoroughgoing revision of these conventional views and 
is represented by the work of Reid, Zeitlin, Wrigley 
and Adams.20 The revisionists argue against the 
revolutionary school's incorporation thesis. Reid for 
instance argues that the importance of independent shop 
floor organisation has been exaggerated. Only a very 
small minority of unionists accepted the radical 
critique of officialdom and during the war the 
representatives of workers' grievances still came from 
official trade unionism.21 There was, he argues 'no 
serious revolutionary crisis,' no significant 
'revolutionary impulse towards independent rank and 
file organisation,' and 'no sustained government 
strategy to contain it.'22 Zeitlin notes that in 
industries where labour was weak, conciliation
machinery brought tangible gains for the unions which 
would not have been conceded had individual employers 
been given a free hand.23 Revisionists thus suggest 
that incorporation was not a main cause of industrial 
unrest between 1914 and 1921. Adams argues that the 
importance of conciliation machinery as a cause of 
unrest has been greatly overstated. He substitutes the 
view of the revolutionary school with the notion that 
where workers rebelled against conciliation they 
desired its reform or extension into new areas rather 
than its destruction. The revisionists also pour scorn 
on the idea that trade union bureaucracy defused the 
radical aspirations of the rank and file. Reid and 
Zeitlin deny that the interests of the rank and file 
and the trade union leadership were necessarily 
divergent. Zeitlin questions the juxtapostion of a 
theoretically militant membership and a theoretically 
conservative leadership emphasising the passivity and 
conservatism of the rank and file.24
These views about the relationship between trade union 
officials and their members represent a critique of an 
influential body of literature which is central to this 
thesis, known as "rank and filism"25.
Rank and Filism
Building on the ideas of Michels26 and the Webbs 27, 
rank and filist literature emphasises the fundamental
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division between the interests of the official trade 
union leadership and those of the membership. In this 
view the process of collective bargaining and the 
contradictory role of trade unions in capitalism are 
seen as the sources of the division. Broadly it is 
argued that, since trade unions' long term survival 
depends on bargaining with employers over the wages and 
conditions of their members, they must to some extent 
make themselves acceptable to employers. This 
acceptance is premised on their prior agreement on 
market criteria for wage settlements and managerial 
authority in the workplace. These compromises 
inevitably involve the unions in moderating the demands 
of their members, discouraging struggles for control at 
work and restricting demands to wage issues which are 
acceptable to employers. The need to uphold collective 
agreements, particularly where they are the result of 
formal procedures such as conciliation and arbitration, 
'ultimately leads them to adopt an active role in 
sustaining managerial discipline in the factory.'28
Adherents of the rank and file interpretation however 
take the analysis further by arguing that workers 
unlike trade union leaders, have no vested interest in 
the capitalist order and their exploitation in the 
workplace periodically leads them to struggle against 
managerial authority and the trade union structures and 
collective bargaining procedures which stifle 
autonomous action. For Zeitlin the logical conclusion
11
of this argument is that 'under propitious 
circumstances, as during and immediately after the 
First World War, such insurgent movements can come to 
challenge not only the structure of factory authority, 
but also the stability of the state itself.'29 While 
acknowledging differences of interpretation among the 
"rank and filists" as to the relationship between 
workplace militancy and politics, Zeitlin finds that 
they broadly subscribe to two underlying but highly 
problematic assumptions. Firstly that trade unions as 
organisations have an inherent interest in 
accommodation with capitalism and their members do not 
and secondly that workers have a vast reservoir of 
latent power which is contained by trade unions. 
Although few rank and filists explicitly endorse this 
second assumption, Zeitlin notes that without it there 
would be no reason why the supposed caution of trade 
union leaders should become a point of criticism or why 
autonomous regulation and informality should always be 
considered as rational and natural.
For Zeitlin there are empirical as well as conceptual 
difficulties which present major problems for the rank 
and filists. Firstly there is the difficulty of 
separating the "bureaucracy" and the "rank and file" 
when there is no clear line of demarcation between 
them. Price in particular understates the heterogeneity 
of trade union leaders and grossly exaggerates the 
homogeneity of "ordinary workers" and the "rank and
12
file". Industries like building and engineering were 
deeply riven with sectional divisions whether based on 
occupation, skill, locality, ethnicity or gender. 
Secondly, even if we could differentiate clearly can we 
confidently identify trade union officialdom with 
moderation and the rank and file with militancy when 
there is much evidence that leaders were often more 
militant than their members? Thirdly he argues, recent 
historical research has shown the importance of central 
coordination in sustaining job controls and the 
responsiveness of even the most authoritarian unions to 
pressure from below. Fourthly, conciliation and 
arbitration procedures have been taken by rank and 
filist historians (Burgess and Price) to represent the 
nadir of union accommodation to the rules of the 
capitalist game; pegging wages to market criteria and 
subjecting workers to unchallenged managerial authority 
in the workplace. Several recent studies of the 
practical operation of these procedures are cited by 
Zeitlin as evidence that these procedures were opposed 
by employers and once they were in place they operated 
to safeguard workers' control over production.
Zeitlin notes that the various authors who adopt this 
approach are aware of these difficulties and have 
consequently hedged their positions with significant 
qualifications but, he argues, in so doing they have 
not accounted for these difficulties within the 
framework of rank and filism, only expanded the
paradigm's empirical reference at the expense of its 
explanatory power.
This debate looms large in studies of industrial 
conflict before, during and immediately after WW1 which 
was marked by widespread unofficial strike activity led 
by the shop stewards' movement. It is therefore central 
to this thesis which takes up some of these issues by 
focusing on the role of trade unions and their leaders 
in the state's management of industrial conflict in 
this period. The thesis examines the role of trade 
unions in industrial relations policy through an 
analysis of the sources from which it derived at this 
time. This is necessary because the recent and 
extensive discussions have lacked detailed empirical 
work based on these sources for the whole of the 
period. Addressing the role of the state in industrial 
relations policy can throw light on the rank and filist 
debate by illuminating the assumptions the state made 
about the relationship of leaders and the rank and 
file.
How Should We Research State Policy
It could be argued that Keith Middlemas's 'Politics in 
Industrial Society '30 has already met this 
requirement. This could be claimed, firstly, because 
this popular and influential account of the development 
of state intervention in industrial relations in this
crucial period draws on primary archive sources for the 
whole of the period. Secondly, because it is 
'formidably well researched' and 'took the state as its 
explicit object of study,31 not only repudiating the 
quaint swingometer episteme of mainstream political 
studies (and thus converging with the proliferation of 
Marxist theories of the state which appeared at this 
moment) but also bringing to this analysis a welcome 
commitment to historical and concrete explanation' thus 
'diverging from the unmediated abstraction which 
characterised the greater proportion of this ouevre.'32
Contrary to Middlemas's 'watershed' thesis however, my 
research reveals significant continuities in the 
state's response to unrest before, during and after 
WW1. These continuities in state labour policy become 
apparent when the origins and development of the 
state's policy of conciliation and the theory of trade 
unionism which underpins it are analysed. This policy 
originated well before the period under study and 
continued to expand throughout it, making it more 
accurate to view the early 1890s as a more significant 
watershed in state industrial relations policy than 
WW1. My argument has important implications which 
prompt a reassessment of the nature of the political 
consensus which Middlemas argues existed until the
1960s
Secondly a focus on the state's policy of conciliation 
reveals a major defect of Middlemas' analysis at the 
methodological level. His account rests largely on a 
mixture of Cabinet papers, the private papers of 
prominent figures of the time and secondary sources. 
However, while I agree that Cabinet papers are a 
formidable authority in that they consist of documents 
which are 'not written with a view to informing 
historians or sociologists, they are in fact secreted 
for the purpose of action. They are in a sense facts in 
themselves not merely the representation of facts,'33 I 
would argue that this focus leads Middlemas to confuse 
political talk with administrative action and a clearer 
understanding of the state's response to industrial 
conflict in these years must include an analysis of the 
papers of the Board of Trade.
In this respect my work takes seriously Davidson's 34 
observation that although many social, economic and 
labour historians have concentrated on analysing the 
development of state policy towards labour unrest in 
the period 1880-1914 they have neglected the role of 
the Board of Trade. Davidson regards this as a serious 
omission for several reasons. Firstly because the 
ability of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade 
(established 1893) to supply the relevant data and 
expertise made it 'the recognised information bureau on 
all that pertained to industrial conflicts, possessing 
systematic data on strikes and lockouts, trade
16
combinations, employment and wage rates, easy access to 
more general economic data and an establishment which 
included several experienced negotiators.'35 Secondly 
because government measures relating to industrial 
relations were largely determined by departmental 
ministers in conjunction with their permanent 
officials. There is no evidence to suggest that labour 
unrest was ever discussed in any systematic fashion by 
the Cabinet before 1911 - after 1911 it was freguently 
debated in Cabinet but the lack of consensus among 
Cabinet members as to the correct strategy to adopt in 
the face of widespread industrial conflict meant that 
the initiative in formulating labour policy remained 
with the Board of Trade. Lastly, the social and 
economic objectives of the Board were seen by both 
employers and labour leaders as the prime determinant 
of state industrial relations policy.36
While Davidson's analysis provides valuable insights 
however, his emphasis, like that of Middlemas, is 
largely on the personalities who populated the pre war 
BOT. In this thesis I will extend the analysis up to 
1921 to include those institutions, the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Ministry of Labour, which inherited 
the task of formulating and implementing industrial 
relations policy from the BOT. From this it will become 
clear that regardless of the changing incumbents and 
seemingly new departures in industrial relations policy 
the latter remained remarkably consistent. This was
17
because what was possible in industrial relations was 
circumscribed to a significant extent by the degree and 
character of worker organisation and the state's 
ability to influence it without appearing to do so. It 
was this realisation which first engendered the state's 
attempt to permanently manage industrial conflict 
through conciliation in 1896 when the Labour Department 
of the Board of Trade was designated the agency for the 
implementation of this policy.
Resume of Themes
In analysing the role of trade unions in industrial 
relations policy in this period from the perspective of 
the policy making agencies themselves I aim to assess 
the limits of this policy in practice and address the 
points raised by critics of the rank and filist 
perspective.
Throughout the thesis the term 'state' will be used in 
preference to 'the government' since the former draws 
attention not only to the Cabinet but also to the 
institutions of the permanent Civil Service.
Industrial conflict is taken to be that expressed 
through strike activity, collective bargaining and
18
arbitration since analyses of these formed the body of 
knowledge amassed by the state about the underlying 
determinants of industrial conflict which underpinned
. the formulation and implementation of labour policy.
The state combined this information with the views 
about the attitudes and mood of workers expressed by
those directly concerned with industrial conflict.
i
|
The concept of the 'working class' has been a major 
preoccupation and a source of controversy among 
sociologists for more than a hundred years and there is 
an extensive sociological literature on the subject.37 
It is important to be aware however, that for the state 
in the period under study the term had a precise 
meaning. A good illustration of this precision is to be 
found in the report by the Labour Department of the 
Board of Trade to the Royal Commission on Labour in 
1894. In this report the term "working class" refers to 
'the industrial class ... especially that portion of 
the five and a half million males (in England and 
Wales) who are adult workmen (over ten years of age) 
and engaged in productive as contrasted with 
distributive enterprise. The class engaged in transport 
adds an appreciable but very vague and fluctuating 
contingent and the industrial population of Scotland 
and Ireland has to be taken into account.'38 
No modern day sociologist would sanction such a narrow 
definition of class, not least because of its blindness 
to gender and ethnicity. Nevertheless this is what is
meant in discussions of the working class in state 
papers at this time, even during the First World War 
when women formed an appreciable proportion of the 
"industrial class".
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is organised in the following way. The first 
chapter provides the theoretical context for the study. 
It analyses the contradictory role of trade unionism 
and examines some of the theoretical concerns which 
shape the questions which are posed in the field and 
underpin my interpretation of industrial relations 
policy in the period.
Chapter two outlines the development of trade union 
organisation from the late 19th century in Britain with 
particular reference to the impact of syndicalism and 
industrial unionism. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a basis for understanding the strategies and 
tactics adopted by workers and the state's 
deliberations on industrial unrest in the period.
Chapter three examines the origins of conciliation and 
arbitration in Britain and the process by which the 
state came to favour conciliation. Here special 
consideration is given to the conception of industrial 
conflict and trade unions which led the state to adopt
20
conciliation and arbitration and to set up and 
participate in machinery for the management of 
industrial conflict based on this.
Chapter four examines the 'Great Unrest' and takes up 
some of the themes raised in chapters one and two in 
relation to the revolutionary potential of trade 
unions. It analyses the state's interpretations of 
industrial conflict and of trade unionism. This 
analysis reveals the key parameters of the state's 
perception of union organisation and working class 
interest representation and highlights the constraints 
on industrial relations policy, on trade unionism and 
on trade union officials imposed by strong worker 
organisation. The experience of the Great Unrest 
resulted in the setting up of the first of a series of 
structures to address industrial conflict - the 
Industrial Council -in which the participation of trade 
unions was enlisted at what are generally regarded as 
key points in the development of the state's management 
of industrial conflict during the period 1910-21.
Chapter five focuses on the Munitions Of War Act and 
its implementation by the Ministry of Munitions. Here 
the emphasis is on the extent to which worker 
resistance firstly contributed to this legislation then 
modified its impact and finally strengthened worker 
organisation and led to state initiatives - the 
creation of the Ministry of Labour and the
21
implementation of the Whitley Scheme - which were based 
on expanding its policy of conciliation.
Chapter six looks at industrial conflict in the years 
1916-18 from the perspective of the Ministry of Labour. 
The Ministry paid particular attention to the ways in 
which the policy pursued by the Ministry of Munitions 
hampered the management of industrial conflict. Here 
again the focus is on the relationship between the 
state and trade unions and between trade unions and 
their members.
Chapter seven takes as its focus the National 
Industrial Conference set up in response to the 
resurgence of large scale industrial conflict. This 
chapter centres on the Ministry of Labour's detailed 
analysis of the limits and possibilities of both state 
and trade union action and the notion of the National 
Industrial Conference as the engine of a peaceful 
British revolution.
Finally a concluding chapter draws together the major 
themes within the thesis. An appendix provides a 
discussion of the status of the most heavily used and 
cited government records in studies of this period 
which suggests that these should be looked at more 
critically.
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Chapter 1
Interpretations of the Role of Trade Unions in 
Industrial Relations
introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse those theories of 
trade unionism which inform the accounts of the role of 
trade unions in this period which influenced the 
thesis. This will provide the theoretical context for 
the empirical examination of trade unions and their 
role in industrial relations policy between 1910 and 
1921. It could be argued that industrial relations 
covers more than simply trade unionism and of course it 
does but the core of industrial relations is trade 
unionism. The thrust of the thesis is in accord with 
the view most clearly expressed by Allen1. This view 
holds that industrial relations arise out of the prime 
economic relationship in society which is the buying 
and selling of labour power and that there is perpetual 
interaction between the buyers and sellers for three 
reasons. Firstly because there is an enormous imbalance 
of economic power between the two classes - there are 
many sellers and relatively few buyers and the latter 
are dominant over the former in every sphere of 
activity through their ownership of the means of 
production. Secondly this imbalance is accentuated 
because members of the labour market possess varying
degrees of freedom to exploit this power position for 
their own advantages and lastly because there are 
unremitting pressures on buyers and sellers to use this 
freedom. The sellers or workers depend on the price of 
labour power for their own subsistence and are 
therefore forced to maximise it while the buyers or 
capitalists treat that price as a cost and so 
constantly try to minimise it. The result is a dynamic 
conflict situation - class struggle. Trade unionism is 
the manifestation of this conflict - it constitutes an 
attempt by otherwise relatively powerless individuals 
to redress the power imbalance. Trade unions' essential 
function is to overcome individual workers' weakness by 
substituting a collective bargain for separate 
individual bargaining.2
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section outlines the contradictory role of trade unions 
in capitalism and shows how internal and external 
pressures undermine their effectiveness as a power for 
their members. The second section explores the extent 
to which these obstacles can be overcome and whether 
trade unions can become the vehicle of social 
transformation. The chapter argues that analyses which 
confine themselves to measuring trade union 
organisation and action in terms of class consciousness 
are misplaced and that the correct focus for analysis 
of the revolutionary potential of the working class is 
worker organisation generally. In the period under
study industrial conflict constituted a threat to the 
established order because of the scale, unity and 
lawlessness of the worker organisation which 
underpinned it. Among the mass of workers there was no 
evidence of any widespread, consistent and informed 
commitment to any body of ideas whether conservative or 
radical.
Part One
Trade unions may be defined as representative 
organisations of workers which are based upon but 
transcend the collectivism of particular workplaces and 
localities. This wider formal organisation transforms 
the possibilities of shop floor representation and 
action by mobilising support, providing organisational 
resources and framing united policies - a feature which 
has been appreciated by state agencies as well as 
social commentators.
Firstly, as Hyman3 emphasises, united collective 
organisation for workers also implies 'power over' 
workers, to concert activity and ensure unity. Hyman 
accepts that collective organisation allows workers to 
create social power much greater than their power as 
individuals but points out that the organisation of 
conflict also makes conflict manageable by employers 
and by governments. It does this by ensuring that 
'grievances are brought into the open, channelled to
the appropriate authorities, expressed in a form which 
makes compromise possible and articulated by a 
bargaining partner with whom an agreement can be 
reached which employees will feel some committment to 
observe. Thus an inescapable function of trade union 
action is, in Mills' terms, "the management of 
discontent".'4
Secondly, it is important to note that although workers 
organised in trade unions have objective common 
interests, 5 the most fundamental of which is their 
common relationship of opposition and antagonism to 
capital and the owners of capital, consciousness of 
this class identity is obscured in reality by the 
immense variety of work contexts and work relations 
which characterise capitalism.6 The latter may foster 
an inward looking unity among workers such that they 
see themselves primarily as boilermakers, shop 
assistants, employees of a particular firm or workers 
in a particular industry rather than in class terms.7 
They may be more conscious of those interests which 
divide them from other workers than of those which 
unite them. When workers organise in trade unions these 
divisions are naturally expressed in the organisational 
boundaries which shape the lines of demarcation within 
and between trade unions.
Other major sources of division which have debilitating 
effects on worker organisation are those of gender and
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ethnicity.8 Historically trade unions have made use of 
two main strategies, firstly that of excluding women 
and ethnic minorities from paid employment and secondly 
that of confining women and ethnic minorities to jobs 
which are graded lower than those of white men in order 
to raise the price of their members'labour power.9
The historical development of trade unionism in Britain 
is also a limiting factor. The aims of early trade 
unions or craft societies were sociability and the 
provision of friendly benefits. Their role in 
industrial relations was secondary and they developed 
an industrial relations role primarily as defenders of 
traditional working rules and practices against either 
employers or other groups of workers. It was rare for 
them to initiate action to change working conditions. 
Effective craft unionism was based on the principle of 
unilateral control whereby the union reserved the right 
to determine the rules of the trade and the rates of 
pay and to enforce these through its own members who 
would boycott or leave employers who did not respect 
union conditions. Unions could do this because they had 
a monopoly of labour supply - they controlled entry to 
trades through apprenticeship and the enforced 
demarcation of their own area of work and benefit funds 
allowed them to support workers who could not find work 
on union conditions.
The barriers erected by craft unionism were only 
decisively breached when shifts in the labour process 
in the 1890s facilitated the discovery of bargaining 
leverage by key groups of unskilled workers and 
encouraged a reorientation of some craft unions towards 
a wider membership in the context of deskilling. 
Although this was a form of unity, it tended to 
consolidate sectionalism by virtue of embracing a 
diverse membership with varied interests. In the 
following decades mass offensive unionism influenced by 
syndicalist ideas and with considerable instability of 
membership demonstrated that mass organisation and 
centralised administration did not automatically denote 
conservatism. However while these general unions acted 
as mobilising organisations responsive to rank and file 
pressure during their initial phases of formation, 
recruitment and mobilisation (and often during periods 
of prosperity when the confidence of unskilled workers 
was boosted) they developed rapidly into oligarchic 
"bossdoms" under the impact of employers' associations, 
war administration and later the depression.11 There 
were also limits to the "general" character of the 
unskilled organisations and they did not encroach on 
the craft societies' territory or on that of the 
industrial type unions - coal, cotton, railways. They 
confined themselves to filling the gaps left by the 
earlier structure of trade unionism. Their open 
character tended to decline once they had established 
effective organisation and they tended to become
conscious of having sectional interests and to operate 
by excluding other sections of workers. Furthermore 
large scale organisation created a structure of 
organisers with distinctive experiences and priorities 
which posed issues of accountability and control.
These issues have usually been addressed in terms of 
arguments about the oligarchic and democratic features 
and tendencies of trade unionism though they are also 
intimately connected with competing notions of the 
whole rationale of unionism and differing strategies of 
organisation and recruitment. Several classic positions 
on these issues were developed by analysts of the 
labour movement who were also participants in the early 
period of mass working class unionism and political 
organisation during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.
The Webbs12 offered a relatively "optimistic'' account 
of the institutional resolution of a conflict between 
democracy and "efficiency" in the development of 
British trade unionism. They emphasised that as unions 
became involved in extended and centralised collective 
bargaining, they confronted the limitations of the 
traditional pattern of "primitive democracy" 
characteristic of the early craft societies (identified 
with mass meetings, referenda on policy issues, annual 
elections and rotating headguarters). With this 
development, they argued, unions faced the dilemma of
dictatorship by experts or parochialism and 
inefficiency. However this dilemma could be 
circumvented through a formal apparatus of 
representative democracy. Elected representative 
assemblies could be substituted for "primitive 
democracy" as controllers of union executives allowing 
unions to advance as efficient democracies.
Michels 13 builds on the Webbs to provide the classic 
"pessimistic" account of the domination of ostensibly 
democratic trade unions and labour parties by an 
oligarchy of union and party leaders. In his view 
oligarchy and conservative union policies were the 
outcome of professionalisation and bureaucracy. For 
Michels, trade unions must organise on a mass scale and 
become sophisticated in negotiations to be effective. 
The resulting complex of bureaucratic tasks requires 
specialist officials. Union moderation then becomes the 
norm since the need for tangible results through trade 
offs prompts officials to adopt a conciliatory 
bargaining stance. This moderation is reinforced by 
their concern with their new found status and by 
concern to recruit less committed workers into unions 
to maintain and increase membership. Organisational 
survival becomes central. 'Uncontrolled dominance' he 
argued, was therefore inevitable and trade union 
leaders' power allowed them to impose their 
conservative policies even where these were 
'disapproved of by the majority of workers they are
supposed to represent.' This abuse of power - 
oligarchic control - provoked little resistance 
because, in the absence of adequate information or 
experience, members accepted that their leaders 
possessed a "customary right" to their positions and 
were willing to allow them to speak for them.
Historical and contemporary analyses of British unions 
have qualified and contextualised the Michelsian 
diagnosis of oligarchy.14 They have shown that the 
relation between leadership and rank and file is more 
complex than he implies. Hyman 15 has pointed out 
firstly that if members are assumed to be subject to 
the informed official leadership, this implies that 
workers' orientation to trade unionism is instrumental 
and hangs on the latters' ability to deliver a 
satisfactory level of benefits. The frustration of 
these expectations may lead to a rank and file revolt. 
This is an important constraint on leadership autonomy. 
Secondly the generally accepted view that unions ought 
to act democratically and ensure the support of their 
members restricts the scope of leaders' activity. 
Thirdly the fact that union leaders were often lay 
activists before they became officials ensures that the 
extremes of cynical manipulation are usually avoided. 
Fourthly although Michels is right to emphasise the 
difficulty of direct membership control at national 
levels of decision making in unions this does not 
exclude membership participation and control at other
levels. For Hyman16 other weaknesses of Michels 
argument include his neglect of the constant 
interaction between unions and the oligarchic 
organisations of capital which puts pressure on them to 
become similarly oligarchic. Employers and the state 
are often irritated by union leaders who want to 
consult their members before making decisions. There is 
also the external influence of capitalist organisations 
on workers which socialise them into anti-democratic 
values. This is reinforced by workers' direct 
experience of the uniformly oligarchic organisations 
and institutions of capitalist society and compounded 
by the mass media which projects anti- democratic ideas 
on specific issues. Lastly unions vary considerably in 
the extent to which they are subject to the pressures 
which Michels emphasises. Nevertheless critics of 
Michels have recognised that the growth and scale of 
trade union organisation means that unions certainly 
confront tensions between such priorities as survival, 
mobilisation, representation, participation, 
accommodation and discipline and that 'the only way to 
successfully defeat the oligarchic tendencies of trade 
unionism is to overthrow capitalism itself.'17
Given the divisions within trade unions and the 
conflicting priorities with which trade unions are 
faced a fundamental question arises for these writers - 
what part if any can trade unions play in the struggle 
for the revolutionary transformation of society?
Contrasting views linked to different analyses of the 
practical objectives of unions and the interests of 
trade unionists are examined below.
Part Two
Pluralist analyses, from the Webbs onwards, focus on 
the role of trade unions as key participants in the 
process of collective bargaining and not as agencies of 
social transformation. In this context unions are seen 
as agencies of mobilisation, representation and 
discipline through which workers gain a significant 
though subordinate role in the joint regulation of 
employment conditions and substantive improvements in 
wages and working conditions within the established 
framework of (capitalist) employment relations. Such 
pluralist diagnoses go beyond the perspectives of 
"business unionism" by emphasising that the first of 
these objectives represents a form of "industrial 
citizenship", but they also define the relationship 
between unions and politics as strongly circumscribed 
by the priorities of collective bargaining.
Flanders'18 analysis remains indicative of some central 
assumptions of industrial relations pluralism. He 
argues that the centrality of joint job regulation 
underwrites a clear division of labour between trade 
unionism and labourist politics. Since trade unions are 
primarily bargaining institutions they should not
prioritise politics above effective bargaining either 
by attempting to substitute for the specific political 
role of the Labour Party or by subordinating themselves 
to the claimed reguirements of "national efficiency". 
Within this framework, however, Flanders explicitly 
recognises that unions must retain some sense of being 
a social movement and not merely an institutional 
structure if they are to effectively mobilise active 
support. This may mean championing the cause of the 
unorganised or advocacy of an egalitarian incomes 
policy. Pluralism takes an optimistic view of 
industrial relations assuming a roughly egual balance 
of power between employers and workers organised in 
trade unions, that workers have a responsibility to 
observe agreements and that any outstanding differences 
between them are resolved by the procedures of 
collective bargaining.
As Fox points out however, collective bargaining does 
not restore the balance of power between employers and 
workers because it is concerned with restricted issues 
and not the fundamental disparity of power between the 
propertied and the propertyless. Trade unions aim at 
marginal improvements for their members and to defend 
them against arbitrary management action. They do not 
attack management on the basic principles of the social 
and industrial framework such as private property, the 
extreme division of labour and the massive inequalities 
of financial reward, status, control and autonomy in
work or try to secure a foothold in the majority of 
decisions on management objectives, markets, capital 
investment and rate of expansion. They rarely seriously 
challenge the treatment of labour as a commodity to be 
hired or discarded at management's convenience. The 
reasons why the trade unions do not challenge the 
status quo are to be found in their understanding of 
the magnitude of employers' power supported by 
government and the relative passivity of the rank and 
file.19
In contrast to pluralist analysis stands the 
"optimistic" marxist tradition which emphasises the 
potential for radicalisation and a class based 
oppositional or revolutionary politics which may arise 
out of union activity and experience. This view focuses 
on the instabilities and contradictions built into 
processes of collective bargaining and the manner in 
which substantive gains are circumscribed by the power 
of private capital and the state. It is argued that the 
very process of struggle, involving solidarity among 
workers and confrontations with employers and the state 
may produce "explosions of class consciousness".20 
Other writers have questioned the view that trade union 
activity can escalate almost automatically into a 
radical social movement characterised by mass 
mobilisation and a highly politicised class 
consciousness. Hyman notes the long standing tension 
between the "pessimistic" and "optimistic" marxian
analyses of the unsettled relationship between trade 
unions, social mobilisation and politics.21
This tension stems from the ambiguous legacy left by 
Marx and Engels in their treatment of trade unions. 
Engels saw trade unions as 'the military school of the 
working men in which they prepare themselves for the 
great struggle which cannot be avoided.' Marx later 
qualified this view in arguing that although unions 
'work well as centres of resistance against the 
encroachments of capital' they should guard against 
restricting themselves to a 'guerilla war against the 
effects of the existing system instead of 
simultaneously trying to change it.'22 Later both Marx 
and Engels were scathing about the co-option of union 
leaders and the bourgeoisification of elite sections of 
the organised workers. In spite of their criticism 
however, Hyman suggests that Marx and Engels were 
optimistic about the emergence of a mass politics out 
of union struggles.
The "pessimistic" view is apparently codified by Lenin 
23 in his famous contrast between trade union economism 
and revolutionary class consciousness. Lenin argued 
that trade unions were primarily concerned with 
economic and sectional interests and fostered only a 
"trade union consciousness" subservient to bourgeois 
ideology which is older, more developed and has many 
more resources available for its diffusion than its
socialist rivals. For Lenin revolutionary class 
consciousness could not develop spontaneously out of 
trade union economism and would have to be brought to 
the working class via the revolutionary party.
It could be argued that classical marxist theorists (in 
their concern to establish the need for a revolutionary 
party to organise and politically motivate the working 
class (to those "economist" intellectuals who adhered 
to Marx's early work in believing that capitalism's 
contradictions alone would engender revolutionary 
change) tended to neglect the relationship of 
consciousness to workers' experience of exploitation, 
the fact that the power base of trade unionism is the 
working class and not capital and it can reflect but 
not impose workers' patterns of consciousness.
Attempts to explore how far revolutionary class 
consciousness grew out of workers' experience of their 
exploitation gained momentum in Britain in the late 
1960s when Goldthorpe et al 24 found that workers' 
experience outside work determined their orientations 
to it and this engendered a fragmentary consciousness 
which displayed no notion of common interest as a 
working class. Later research modified these 
conclusions and found little evidence of orientations 
of any sort as an organising principle of workers' 
lives. Instead it was argued that workers had multi - 
stranded priorities but were primarily concerned with
pay, job security and work content and the relative 
importance of these varied with life cycle factors and 
economic conditions. This focus produced a pattern of 
consciousness based on a rudimentary sense of class 
antagonism "them and us" overlaid with fatalism, 
cynicism and acceptance - "contradictory 
consciousness."25
These arguments gave rise to marxian analyses which 
capture important features of the patterns and 
mechanisms of consciousness and the potential for 
radicalisation in workplace struggle. Beynon 26 found 
that this contradictory consciousness was sometimes 
transcended and developed into a volatile "factory 
consciousness" in the course of struggle but it stopped 
short of revolutionary class consciousness because of 
trade union intervention. 'In all of these struggles 
the role of trade unions has been to de - escalate 
rather than extend the struggle between capital and 
labour. '
In another version of rank and filism Mann27 points out 
that this union response is not a betrayal of the 
working class by its leaders. Instead it is rooted in 
workers' experience of exploitation. Through unions 
workers bargain on a terrain defined by capital which 
is characterised by the ideological separation between 
economics and politics, production and consumption, 
though not without struggle. This struggle teaches them
that economic demands sometimes get results but control 
issues don't so workers take what they can get and 
dismiss what is denied them as unimportant "pragmatic 
accommodation". Their experience gives them a sense of 
class identity and location but not a sense of the 
totality of class relations or of any alternative 
society which would be a prerequisite of revolutionary 
class consciousness. Unions reflect this dual 
consciousness to the extent that they pursue economic 
and job control issues separately and the latter 
defensively and as long as they do this, no matter how 
aggressively, they are a profoundly conservative force 
which works to weaken class consciousness.
For Hyman28 however it is precisely unions' economic 
focus which produces situations of radical instability 
for capital because it hangs on capital's ability to 
satisfy workers' demands. The level of demands which 
can be accommodated varies according to the economic 
context and stagnation means that improved wages can't 
be financed out of economic growth. Trade union 
activity also raises issues of power and control or at 
least 'the demand not to be controlled disagreeably'29 
which can form the basis for far more explicit 
"political" demands and runs through all trade union 
activity.
While the above contributions represent the major 
positions within industrial relations debate on union 
and class activity, there have been some important
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challenges to some of their assumptions from other 
analysts of class relations. In particular De Ste.Croix 
has argued that to restrict the notion of class 
struggle to occasions where an overt struggle on the 
political plane, involving class consciousness on both 
sides, can be shown to exist, is inadeguate. He 
clarifies 'the very common conception of class struggle 
which refuses to regard it as such unless it includes 
class consciousness and active political conflict (as 
some Marxists do) is to water it down to the point 
where it virtually disappears in many situations. It is 
then possible to deny altogether the very existence of 
class struggle ... merely because in each case the 
exploited class concerned does not or did not have any 
"class consciousness" or take any political action in 
common except on very rare occasions and to a very 
limited degree. But ... bring back exploitation as the 
hallmark of class, and at once class struggle is at the 
forefront, as it should be.'30 It will then become 
clear that 'The essence of the relationship of classes 
in a class society founded on the existence of private 
property in the means of production, is the economic 
exploitation which is the very raison d'etre of the 
whole class system ... If the division into economic 
classes is in its very nature the expression of the way 
in which above all exploitation is effected . . . then 
there is to that extent an unceasing struggle between 
exploited and exploiting classes.'31
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For De Ste. Croix even if workers were precluded from 
playing any sort of political role and had no chance of 
taking industrial action in their own defence (which 
was not the case from the mid 19th century) the very 
existence of an exploited class has important 
consequences not only in the economic sphere but also 
socially and politically. The very existence of classes 
involves tension and conflict between the classes.'For 
even if only the masters could carry it on effectively: 
they would always be united, and be prepared to act ... 
the masters conduct a permanent struggle ... in the 
very act of holding down their slaves ... but in a 
sense even slaves who are kept in irons and driven with 
a whip can conduct some kind of passive resistance, if 
only by quiet sabotage and breaking a tool or two.'32 
Given this De Ste.Croix argues, the only definition of 
class struggle that makes sense is one that proceeds 
from the fact of exploitation and takes account of its 
nature and intensity. Class struggle is a permanent 
feature of human society above primitive levels. It 
does not necessarily involve collective action by a 
class as such and it may or may not include activity on 
a political plane although such activity becomes 
increasingly probable when the tension of class 
struggle becomes acute.33 In setting up a permanent 
state agency for the analysis and management of 
industrial conflict in this period, the state reveals
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its awareness of class struggle as an unceasing 
struggle between exploited and exploiting classes and 
of worker organisation as the manifestation of this 
struggle.
A second important distinction confirmed by this study 
concerns the conflation of worker organisation and 
trade unionism. This distinction emerges in Price's 34 
analysis of 19th century worker organisation. Price 
shows that worker organisation generally was the 
problem for employers and not trade unionism per se. 
Price distinguishes between trade movements and trade 
unions. The former were separate and distinct from any 
union organisation. They emanated from organisational 
efforts in a few shops which brimmed over to a district 
or town and the sources of authority flowed upwards 
from the mass to the leadership. He also argues that 
employers' complaints about the restrictions which 
unions imposed on their activities (e.g. control over 
labour supply, rules restricting output, rules against 
overtime, opposition to machinery, enforcement of 
standard rates and the regulation of apprenticeship) 
have been misunderstood. These restrictions were 
commonly associated with trade union organisation.
There was however a disjuncture between the number of 
trade unionists and their supposed power and influence. 
The restrictions employers encountered were typically 
those of the workgroup and bore little relationship to
union existence and function.35 He emphasises that 
"union" was likely to have meant any attempt by workers 
to act in union such that "unions" were a 'rhetorical 
target.' Lastly he draws attention to the fact that 
militancy was not the sole preserve of unionists. Union 
men complained that non-unionists were hot headed and 
reckless.36
For the state, worker organisation was the problem. 
Worker organisation was typical 'of the association of 
working men in masses'37 and strikes and violence were 
'ordinary incidents of the association of working men 
in masses' to which responsible trade unionism 'brings 
an increased sense of order, subordination and 
reflection.,38
The key feature of worker organisation for the state 
was not that it displayed class consciousness among 
workers but that it highlighted their lack of 
consistent or informed commitment to any one set of 
beliefs. This was 'dry material' which could be set 
ablaze 'by a chance spark.'39 On a large scale it 
possessed the 'potential for action of a more concerted 
kind, both industrial and political, the ultimate 
threat of which is to create a major degree of economic 
dislocation and civil disturbance ... This potential 
requires and reflects, on the one hand, the readiness, 
under certain conditions, of a working class ... to
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"hold up the country to ransom" ... the relative 
weakness of its moral and social integration into the 
existing order; and, on the other hand, its reserves of 
grass roots solidarity on which concerted 
organisational strategies can draw.'40
The dry material was set ablaze in 1910. The chance 
spark was a peculiarly British hybrid of syndicalism 
and industrial unionism which fuelled the massive 
strikes in the period under study. The state was forced 
to intervene to minimise economic dislocation and civil 
disturbance. Paradoxically however this intervention 
revealed that 'it is the degree and forms of state 
intervention in "mass strikes" as well as the scale of 
strike action, that have a crucial impact on workers' 
consciousness.' It was recognised that repressive 
intervention by the state was likely to engender class 
consciousness - 'the feeling that all workers share a 
common plight and a common enemy ... The more 
forcefully the state intervenes the more likely it is 
to polarise society around two major social classes and 
create the preconditions for an escalation of working 
class political consciousness.'41 This realisation 
underpinned the state's concern with projecting an 
image of impartiality in dispute resolution in this 
period.
The next chapter will outline the development of trade 
union organisation from the late 19th century in 
Britain and assess the impact of syndicalism and 
industrial unionism on this development. The aim is 
firstly to provide a background for understanding the 
tactics and strategies adopted by workers, their 
leaders and the state which are analysed in the later 
empirical chapters. Secondly to show that the 
conflation of two separate movements with diverse 
origins, aims and objectives by analysts of industrial 
conflict in this period has given rise to a 
misunderstanding of the dynamics of industrial 
conflict. This confusion has often meant that the role 
of workers in industrial conflict has taken second 
place to that of trade union leaders and state 
officials in the existing literature on this important 
period.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Syndicalism and Industrial Unionism on
Trade Unions
For much of the 19th century trade union organisation 
in Britain was dominated by craft workers in exclusive 
craft associations. Unions in the craft industries were 
built on apprenticeship and on customs which had 
persisted from before the industrial revolution.1 Craft 
societies built on custom to delimit a preserve of 
craftsmen's work defined sometimes by the material, 
sometimes by the tools and machinery and sometimes by 
the product. This preserve was defended against the 
unqualified, against changes in the organisation of 
production or techniques and against encroachment by 
other crafts.2 Craft rules occasionally led to conflict 
but widespread conflict and bargaining with employers 
were untypical of craft unionism. It was craft unions' 
contention that craftsmen should regulate 'what we 
alone have a right to regulate, the value of our 
labour.'3
Every craft union provided friendly benefits. Firstly 
because there were advantages in disguising a trade 
society as a friendly society when the latter was 
accepted by employers and protected by the law.
Secondly they were a vital element in their control of
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working conditions. Benefits made union mem bers a 
cohesive force 'any member who had been paying in for 
some years was likely to feel he had an investment not 
likely to be sacrficed.'4
The strike was used to prevent infringements of the 
rules in particular shops and to extend a society's 
control of shops not previously organised. The 
technique of withdrawing small groups of men or 
individuals known as the 'strike in detail' was used to 
enforce craft rules without large scale conflict with 
employers. Strikers were supported by unemployment 
benefit not strike pay.5
Throughout the 19th century craft unions were 
increasingly threatened by technical change. In 
industries created by the industrial revolution, such 
as the railways, there were no hallowed customs and no 
traditional basis for apprenticeship. Other industries, 
particularly coal, iron and cotton, were so profoundly 
altered that protective customs, where they existed, 
were swept away. New skills were acquired by experience 
and by promotion from less skilled to more skilled 
without formal apprenticeship.6
Workers in these industries earned more than labourers 
but these industries were subject to trade 
fluctuations. Craft unions' resistance to the assault 
on their exclusiveness and workers' relative weakness
in these industries gave rise to the formation of 
separate and comparatively open trade unions 
(industrial-type unions) which were more dependent on 
the strike and collective bargaining.7 They were 
vertically open in that they organised workers with 
varying degrees of skill, but horizontally closed in 
that they did not attempt to organise outside of the 
boundaries of their own industries and they excluded 
labourers.
Early organisations of labourers tended to be transient 
both because of their insecure position in the labour 
market and because of craft opposition. The year 1889 
however, marked an enormous burst of trade union growth 
and industrial conflict especially in industries and 
occupations which had previously been poorly organised 
or unorganised. These were the 'new unions' commonly 
understood as socialist-led unions of unskilled 
labourers who revolted against the exclusive and 
selfish trade unionism of the crafts.8
New unionism was not based on a single principle of 
organisation but aimed to fill in the gaps left by 
existing forms of trade unionism by organising unions 
for the general run of workers in one or more 
industries. This was not a new departure and had been 
pioneered long before by the Weavers, the Boot and Shoe 
Operatives, the Railway Servants and to some extent, 
the Miners.
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The new unions however, applied this principle on a 
wider scale among seamen, dockers, gasworkers, chemical 
workers, transport workers and recruited less skilled 
workers in industries where only the skilled were 
organised. The new unions adopted this form 
unintentionally. As they set out to organise particular 
groups of workers they found other workers keen to join 
and their industrial coverage expanded. These unions 
therefore became general not as a result of any 
coherent policy or tactics but because union officials 
welcomed the subscriptions of those 'clamouring to 
join.'9
There is much evidence of ruthless behaviour by union 
bureaucrats to maximise membership numbers. Dockers' 
and seamen's unions set about crushing and eliminating 
rival unions and poaching their members.10 Most new 
unions were intended by their members to be sectional 
unions but pressure of circumstances and the influence 
of their officials made them general. Clegg, Fox and 
Thomson point out, in addition, that not all of the new 
unions were composed of the unskilled and low paid or 
were against friendly benefits and had low 
subscriptions. They also emphasise that not all new 
unions were socialist and/or militant. Nevertheless 
most analysts including Clegg, Fox and Thomson believe 
that most of the new unions used militant and coercive 
tactics 11 and the new unions have been typically
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viewed as being committed to a 'fighting policy based 
upon class solidarity and directed by implication at 
any rate against capitalism itself.'12
The source of this fighting policy has been traced by 
inflential commentators to new union leaders such as 
Tom Mann who introduced syndicalism - 'a socialism far 
removed from the jolly fellowship of Robert Blatchford, 
the hygienic bureacracy of the Fabians or the idylls of 
Heir Hardie.'13 It has been shown however that 'the new 
unions, their rules and their officers were on the side 
of moderation from their inception.'14 Matthews sites 
examples of new union leaders' advocacy of conciliation 
and arbitration and their support of employers' need to 
discipline their members. It was the rank and file 
which forced strikes on a usually reluctant leadership 
'Thorne and Tillett might take the lead in a strike and 
talk aggressively but this only served to obscure the 
origins of the militancy.'15 More often than not union 
officials were looking for ways to call off strikes to 
preserve funds and safeguard their own livelihoods 'the 
leadership had plenty of past evidence that if the 
union collapsed they could easily end up back in the 
retorthouses or at the dock gates.'16
New union leaders' contribution to rank and file 
militancy was not syndicalism. To consolidate the 
organisation and their leadership of the new unions 
leaders such as Mann and Tillett opportunistically
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employed the rhetoric and applied some of the 
strategies and tactics, notably the critique of 'pure 
and simple trade unionism' and the concept of the 
general strike from industrial unionism and syndicalism 
respectively. This caught the imagination of key 
sections of the working class and when superimposed on 
the existing structure of British trade unionism, 
against a background of mounting working class 
discontent and disillusionment with established trade 
unionism, this was to prove a heady mixture which was 
to threaten the trade union leaders themselves, 
established trade unionism and the state in Britain.
Contemporary analysts have generally regarded 
industrial unionism as a variant of syndicalism and 
much of the existing literature fails to make any 
distinction between them. 17 A notable exception to 
this rule among modern writers on the labour movement 
in Britain is the work of Hinton18 who acknowledges 
that syndicalism and industrial unionism were separate 
movements and paves the way for a clearer understanding 
of industrial conflict in the period after 1910. This 
confusion is longstanding and has its roots in Tom 
Mann's approach to working class action in Britain in 
the early 20th century which not only failed to 
distinguish the two movements but actually propagated a 
confusion of terms inasmuch as he would refer to his 
position interchangeably as syndicalist, industrial 
unionist and industrial syndicalist.
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The rest of this chapter will set out the origins, 
theory, aims and methods of syndicalism and industrial 
unionism respectively and chart their progress in 
Britain up to the 'Great Unrest' in 1910. Its aim is to 
provide a background for understanding the tactics and 
strategies adopted by workers and the state's 
deliberations on industrial unrest in the period.
Syndicalism
The word 'syndicalism' has traditionally provoked 
strong sentiments among labour movement watchers but at 
the movement's height in the decade before World War 1, 
it engendered widespread fear and criticism across 
continents and was seen as a "new red spectre" with a 
menacing and subversive programme, 'Rarely has a 
movement aroused such universal agitation, awakened 
such world wide discussions and called forth such 
expressions of alarm as this one, that seemed suddenly 
to spring from the depths of the underworld fully armed 
and ready to do battle.'19
In France before 1895 syndicalism meant trade unionism 
and the French 'syndicats' (or unions) were merely 
associations of skilled workers who combined in pursuit 
of higher wages and shorter working hours.
Revolutionary syndicalism - the movement which is 
widely seen as the engine of unrest throughout parts of
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Europe before World War 1 - emerged in France in the 
1880s with the passing of the Waldeck Rousseau law in 
1884 which granted legal freedom to the formation of 
unions. This law was part of a government policy aimed 
at encouraging moderate trade unions and industrial 
conciliation and discouraging militant action.
The body of ideas known as Revolutionary Syndicalism 
was made explicit at the Amiens Congress of the 
Confederation Generale du Travail in 1906 in the famous 
Charter of Amiens. This Charter laid down that the CGT 
brought together, independent of all political schools 
of thought, 'all workers who are conscious of the need 
to struggle for the abolition of the wage system. ' This 
declaration involved 'a recognition of the class 
struggle, which on an economic foundation, puts the 
workers in revolt against every form of exploitation 
and oppression, material and moral, that is operated by 
the capitalist class against the working class'.20 
Moss21 notes that the Charter also recognised that the 
class struggle had both a reformist and a revolutionary 
character viz. 'In its day to day demands, syndicalism 
seeks the coordination of workers' efforts, the 
enhancement of workers' well being through the 
achievement of such immediate reforms as the shortening 
of hours and the raising of wages. This effort, however 
is only one aspect of the work of syndicalism. It 
prepares for complete emancipation, which can only be 
achieved by expropriating the capitalist class. It
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advocates the general strike as the means of action to 
that end and holds that the union which is today the 
instrument of resistance, will in future be the unit of 
production and distribution, the basis of social 
reorganisation.,22
Syndicalism did not seek to refashion the state and so 
rejected political action. In this view the state was 
the tool used by capitalists to exploit workers and had 
to be destroyed. Struggle on a political level was 
useless since all political parties were a fraud and 
'Parliament was a sink of jobbery, corruption and 
compromise. The Socialists were no better than the 
rest, perhaps worse. Claiming to represent labour they 
diverted workers from the real issues and dropped their 
cause after they had arrived through their votes ... 
only the workers own action could emancipate them.'23 
In any case as there was to be no state in the new 
society there was no need to try and control it in the 
present one, the point was to undermine it.
As a doctrine Revolutionary Syndicalism was based on 
the idea of class struggle - the idea that society is 
divided into two classes - employers and workers. The 
former own the means of production and the latter own 
nothing but sell their labour power to survive. The 
struggle between the two classes is a creative force 
which will ultimately emancipate the workers because 
class struggle itself promotes workers' awareness of
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themselves as an exploited class. Syndicalism aims to 
assist this process by organising workers into trade 
unions since organisation on this basis is the most 
fundamental and permanent of all human groupings based 
as it is on the one interest common to all - the 
satisfaction of economic needs - which transcends all 
others. Organisation on this basis promotes solidarity 
and encourages class consciousness.
The union is also the instrument of direct struggle 
with employers - it enables workers to mount "Direct 
Action" against employers. Direct action is action 
taken by workers without external intervention and is 
'the manifestation of the consciousness and of the will 
of the working men themselves.'24 Various activities 
constituted direct action in syndicalist terms. 
Syndicalist leaders saw every act, every union campaign 
to achieve any economic gain as a successful battle in 
the class war - sabotage, strikes, boycotts and using 
the label; agitation for the regulation of apprentices, 
support for minimum wages, shorter hours, the 
enforcement of health and safety legislation, egual 
pay, suppression of piecework or work in convents, 
prisons and military garrisons and propaganda. These 
were activities syndicalists believed, which weakened 
capitalism, benefitted workers materially and 
psychologically and produced solidarity. But the 
ultimate form of direct action - the raison d'etre of 
syndicalism - was the general strike through which the
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new society would be achieved. Syndicalists believed 
that labour alone was absolutely necessary to 
production such that when the workers decided to 
withdraw their labour all of society including 
employers and the state would be forced to capitulate. 
There was, however, no clear idea of the form the 
general strike might take - some saw a general strike 
as short, decisive and probably violent, others saw it 
as a peaceful 'strike of folded arms'25 and yet others 
understood it as a general strike in a single trade or 
industry or a local general strike of all trades.26
Syndicalism"appeared in Britain in 1910 under the 
sponsorship of Tom Mann, erstwhile member of the early 
Social Democratic Federation, veteran of the 1889 Dock 
strike, leader of the Transport Workers' Federation and 
formerly of the Independent Labour Party. Mann had 
spent the previous eight years in Australia and New 
Zealand where he had been active in the labour 
movement. Mann's involvement in industrial conflict in 
Australia had led him to conclude 'that the present 
system of sectional trades unionism is incapable of 
effectively combatting the capitalist system under 
which the civilised world is now suffering, and such 
modifications and alterations should be made in the 
existing unions as will admit of a genuine federation 
of all organisations with power to act unitedly for 
industrial purposes.'27
On his return to Britain in May 1910, Mann declared his 
intention to advocate "Industrial Unionism" owing to 
the weakness and sectional character of the existing 
trade union movement and stressed the importance of 
industrial organisation over political action. However 
he emphasised that he did not aim to destroy or disrupt 
the trade union movement but to improve it. Soon after 
this Mann and Guy Bowman (journalist, translator and 
leading light of the Social Democratic Federation) left 
for Paris to investigate the workings of the CGT. Mann 
was so impressed with the "French Policy" that on his 
return to England he produced the first issue of the 
"Industrial Syndicalist" (in partnership with Bowman) 
in which he compared the aims and methods of the 
American Industrial Workers of the World and the French 
Confederation Generale de Travail and found the former 
wanting.28
Industrial unionist George Harvey, at the time the 
editor of the organ of the Socialist Labour Party ,"The 
Socialist", was concerned to correct the confusions 
instigated by Mann and propagated by the capitalist 
press " few people are clear on the distinction between 
Syndicalism and Industrial Unionism. Furthermore, the 
Syndicalists themselves were rather mixed up and aided 
the capitalist press to confuse the issue for one month 
they called themselves "Syndicalists" and another month 
"Industrial Unionists."29 Harvey further highlighted 
the confusion of labour leaders by citing Philip
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Snowden's attack on Industrial Unionism in the "Weekly 
Record" of 1910 where he wrongly stated that industrial 
unionists obtained their ideas from America but the 
movement originated in France and was an anarchist 
movement of which Tom Mann was an exponent. Similarly 
Ramsay Macdonald, both in the press and in "Socialism 
and Society"30 maintained that industrial unionism was 
American syndicalism and British syndicalism was the 
result of industrial unionist propaganda.
Industrial Unionism
Industrial Unionism was the child of Daniel De Leon a 
convert to Marxism, who went to the USA from Curacao in 
1872 to study at Columbia law school where he later 
taught. Four years after the headquarters of the First 
International were moved to New York in 1872, it was 
dissolved at the Congress of Philadelphia in 1876 and 
was reconstituted as the Socialist Labour Party by the 
largely German immigrant members of the defunct 
International. This was the first Socialist party to be 
established in America and until 1890 when Daniel 
DeLeon joined the SLP it had remained a negligible 
force in the American labour movement. Under DeLeon's 
influence the SLP blossomed. In 1891 he stood as SLP 
candidate for governor of New York state, was elected 
editor of the SLP organ "The Weekly People" and began a 
campaign to inject "socialist discipline" into the 
party by expelling middle class reformers and turning
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their newspaper from a source of entertainment and 
rallying point for German emigres into a propaganda 
weapon. At this time the SLP was influential in seventy 
two trade unions united in the New York Central Labour 
Federation and had members in both the Knights of 
Labour and the American Federation of Labour but 
despite widespread membership support the SLP was 
unable to influence the policy of these unions or to 
persuade trade union leaders to adopt a socialist 
programme which would have committed them to struggle 
for the collective ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange.31
The two most prominent unions in America in this period 
were the powerful American Federation of Labour under 
the leadership of Samuel Gompers and the less 
successful Knights of Labour (in terms of membership). 
The AFL in particular saw its role as defender of the 
skilled against the threat from the less skilled, from 
women, from black workers and from immigrant labour and 
sought and received employers support in this 
endeavour. Under Gompers' leadership the AFL opposed 
old age pensions, health insurance, unemployment 
benefit and 'uncritically supported the domestic and 
foreign policy of successive governments' on the ground 
that its business was 'trade unionism pure and simple 
and not politics.'32
Repeated failures to initiate fundamental changes 
within existing trade unions led DeLeon to conclude 
that struggle within them was pointless because they 
were controlled by the "labour lieutenants of capital" 
they were "the limbs of capitalism" and 'a belated 
reproduction of the old guild system' which 'deserves 
no quarter at the socialist's hands.'33
DeLeon called his theory Industrial Unionism or 
Industrialism. 34 The aim of the movement was to 
organise a class union not a trade union, not a loose 
affiliation of class unions but one union under one 
constitution composed of industrial departments to 
include the many and closely related grades of labour. 
The object of this industrial organisation was to 
enable the working class as a class to take control of 
and hold as their own collective property, all the 
means of production and to constitute the organisation 
of the "Socialist Republic" of which the central 
directing authority was to be a Parliament of Industry 
composed of the representatives of various departments 
of production elected from below.35
Seretan 36 has highlighted some analysts failure to 
distinguish DeLeon's doctrine of industrial unionism 
from the generic term 'industrial unionism' pointing 
out that this has traditionally been a source of 
confusion about the movement.
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For DeLeon, industrial unionism was the path for true 
socialists to follow. Unions should be set up which 
would unite the entire working class organised by 
industry and 'not merely for those for whom there are 
jobs...not only those who can pay dues.'37 Industrial 
unions would ensure that the worker would be ready to 
assume and conduct production 'the moment the guns of 
the public powers
fall into his hands.' This would be achieved through 
the votes of informed workers who would elect SLP 
members to the state so that at the moment of 
revolution, the armed forces of the state could not be 
turned against them". The workers'representatives in 
the state would then 'adjourn sine die'38 because 'the 
industrial organisation forecasts the future 
constituencies of the parliaments of the Socialist 
Republic.'39 DeLeon was not, however, against 
representative government - on the contrary he argued 
that 'when groups are so large that they cannot meet in 
public assembly and decide things, representative 
government becomes a necessity, a useful thing and a 
good thing.'40 As to political action he urged 'make no 
mistake: the working class must both be economic and 
political. The capitalist is organised on both lines, 
you must attack him on both.'41 For DeLeon the 
political movement made 'the masses
accessible to the propaganda of Labour' and 'raised the 
labour movement above the category of a conspiracy.'42
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DeLeon argued that political organisation was 
imperative to facilitate the work of the industrial 
organisation because the present function of the state 
is to defend the interests of the ruling class and the 
workers can only disarm the capitalist class by taking 
the state out of its grasp. The function of the state 
was originally to raise the level of production to a 
degree which would allow abundance for all. This stage 
had been reached and passed but the political state had 
been retained beyond its political utility not in the 
interests of the people but to protect the interests of 
the capitalist class by holding down the working class 
- it is 'a means of suppression, of oppression, of 
tyranny.'43 Once the means of production were 
communally owned the state would reassume its 
bénéficient functions of aiding and assisting in 
production. A state or central directing authority is 
necessary because 'the nature of the machinery of 
production, the subdivision of labour which aids 
cooperation and which cooperation fosters, and which is 
necessary to the plentifulness of production that 
civilisation reguires, compel a harmonious working 
together of all departments of labor and thence compel 
the establishment of a central directing authority.'44
Deleon understood workers' desire for reform but argued 
that "steps in the right direction", so-called 
"immediate demands" are among the most precarious ... 
'Reguest a little when you have a right to the whole.
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and your request, whatever declamatory rhetoric or 
abstract scientific verbiage it be accompanied with, 
works a subscription to the principle that wrongs you 
... the palliative works the evil of inoculating the 
Revolutionary force with a fundamental misconception of 
the nature of the foe it has to deal with. It proceeds 
from the theory that the capitalist class will allow 
itself to be 'pared off' to death - a fatal illusion. 
The tiger of capitalism will protect its superfluities 
with the same ferocity that it will protect its very 
existence. Nothing is gained on the road of 
palliatives, all may be lost.'45
DeLeon did not invest the industrial union with any 
more power to increase real wages than the craft union. 
The main weapon of the industrial union as of the craft 
union was the strike and although he tolerated strikes 
in the IWW, he was scathing of the strike's 
revolutionary potential 'the strike against an employer 
... is not a method of revolution, it is a method of 
warfare within existing conditions. It is more, it is 
in the nature of a declaration of loyalty to the system 
in force. The workingman who goes out on strike does 
first of all leave in the hands of the capitalist the 
plant of production. By that mere fact he admits that 
the employer is the rightful owner, at least as much is 
implied. The revolutionary act of the working class 
will not be a strike.'46
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DeLeon proposed a 'general lockout of the capitalist 
class' and not a general strike. 'The general lockout 
proceeds from the correct premises that the land and 
the fulness thereof are labour's and so proceeding it 
starts with possession. It thus safeguards the 
revolution against being starved out.' DeLeon further 
distanced Industrial Unionism from syndicalism saying 
he had no sympathy with 'men who talk dynamite, bombs, 
blood and thunder.'47
The Socialist Labour Party emerged in Britain in 1903 
after George Yates, a member of the Scottish SDF, 
became disillusioned with the increasing reformism of 
the Second International and the SDF and set out to 
build a new party composed of like-minded people and to 
publish a paper expressing their views in opposition to 
"Justice", the organ of the SDF. Yates received the 
support of James Connolly, the leader of the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party, who joined him from Ireland 
in 1901. The British SLP faithfully reflected DeLeon's 
beliefs, some members corresponded with Daniel DeLeon 
and the SLP distributed his writings in Scotland.48 .
In the event the only aspect of DeLeon's message which 
gained a firm foothold among British workers was its 
critique of moderate trade unionism. By 1910 there was 
a ready made constituency for the view that the 
structure and leadership of the established trade 
unions were inconsistent with their members' interests.
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Summary
It can be seen from the above that syndicalism and 
industrial unionism were two separate movements which 
differed on every key issue except for the need to 
overthrow capitalism. These movements had distinct 
theoretical origins, they differed on the relative 
value and usefulness of political and industrial 
action, on the use of violence, on the general strike, 
trade unionism, the question of reform under capitalism 
and on the need for a state or central directing 
authority in the new society.
Worker organisation in Britain in the period 1910-21 
was influenced by both of these movements as this study 
will show. However trade union leaders such as Tom Mann 
and Jack Murphy superimposed some of the strategies and 
tactics of these movements on the traditions and models 
of organisation of the craft societies. They did not 
envisage revolution. Their 'innovations lay in the 
field of industrial tactics, not of political strategy 
as such.’49
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Chapter 3
The State, Trade Unions and Industrial Conflict
Introduction
This chapter sketches the historical development of the 
relationship between the state and trade unions in 
Britain and analyses the process by which the state 
came to promote and participate in conciliation with a 
view to reducing industrial conflict. It is not my 
intention to engage in abstract debate about the 
character of "the state".1 However as Miliband notes 2 
a 'theory of the state' underpins all political 
analysis. At the beginning of the thesis I emphasise 
that the fundamental relationship in capitalism is that 
between labour and capital. In this thesis the state is 
taken to be that set of institutions which politically 
regulates the terms of that relationship. Underpinning 
this approach is the view that the labour-capital 
relation is not just economic but also legal and 
political. Although it seems that exploitation in 
capitalism takes place purely through the buying and 
selling of labour power this economic relation is 
underpinned by property relations. Property relations 
are legal relations and the law is backed up by 
political power or force supplied by the state. This 
should not be taken to imply that the state is a
unified actor. On the contrary, as this thesis shows, 
the state is a set of heirarchical institutions with 
overlapping and contradictory objectives. My aim in 
this chapter is to uncover the understandings of 
industrial conflict, of trade unionism and of trade 
union officials on which state industrial relations 
policy rested in the period 1910-21. To this end I have 
concentrated on the first of a series of state agencies 
- the Labour Department of the Board of Trade - which 
were directly empowered to regulate the terms of the 
relationship between labour and capital. I will begin 
by outlining the development of the relationship 
between the state and trade unions in the last half of 
the 19th century and the part which the Labour 
Department of the Board of Trade and its policy of 
conciliation and arbitration came to play in this 
relationship. I will then focus on the most influential 
analyses of the determinants of state labour policy and 
the role of trade unions in the period up to and 
including the First World War.
Trade Unions and the State
Trade unions and industrial conflict have been a long 
run feature of British society and throughout the state 
has regulated them by means of legislation.3 Trade 
unions have occupied a central position in industrial 
relations policy since the last half of the nineteenth
century. In the first half of the 19th Century trade 
unions were illegal organisations although they 
persisted, especially among craft workers, either 
secretly or with the tacit acguiescence of employers. 
Although the Combination Acts were repealed in 1824 
which allowed workers the right of free association and 
encouraged the spread of worker associations, 
prosecutions of trade unionists continued through the 
use of other laws so that associations and strikes 
concerned with issues other than wages and hours 
remained criminal conspiracies at common law. It was 
not until the Trade Union Act was passed in 1871 that 
trade unions were made legal and freed from prosecution 
for conspiracy in restraint of trade. The determinants 
of this change are outlined below.
The Royal Commission on Trade Unions 1867.
In 1867 the Royal Commission on Trade Unions was set up 
in response to the Sheffield outrages and 'The growing 
power and solidarity of the small trade union movement 
[which had] roused alarm among the governing classes.'4 
The Commission's brief was to inguire into allegations 
of intimidation and outrage which these unions were 
accused of encouraging, 'The practical problem before 
us is this: seeing that the bulk of the artizan 
population consider it in their interest to form 
themselves into these associations, in what way can 
they be rendered most conducive to public policy?' 5
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The Commission was expected by many employers to favour 
repression, but instead it discussed the merits of 
conciliation and arbitration and the Minority Report 
recommended giving unions legal recognition. The 
Commission noted the striking and steady increase of 
well organised and powerful trade unionism among 
skilled workers but recognised that this had gone hand 
in hand with improvements in their general character, 
compared with earlier inguiries, (1824,1825,1838.) and 
that violent incidents were a rarity. This type of 
trade unionism was not the problem, in the Commission's 
view, but trade unions which were badly organised and 
unrecognised and clung to the ways of the old secret 
trade unions. The latter did not provide benefits for 
their members and preserved the criminal features of 
the surreptitious unions under the old law.
(Combination Acts 1799,1800.)
Evidence brought before the Commission showed that the 
readiness to strike on the part of workers was not in 
itself due to trade unionism and that strike activity 
did not increase as the strength of a trade union 
increased. The reverse was true. Once trade unions 
established themselves strikes decreased and, instead 
of a bid to constantly increase wages, a regularity of 
wages and hours ensued. The strongest, richest and 
largest unions were in those trades which exhibited 
established wage rates and few disputes. For example,
unions in the engineering trade had a large membership 
and a large reserve fund but wages had remained static 
for twenty five years except when varied by employers. 
Similarly the shipwrights and printers unions exhibited 
the same characteristics.
In addition the evidence showed that trade unions were 
'a benefit of immense public utility and must spare the 
community a heavy burden in the poor rates and 
infirmaries alone' since 'every fresh expansion of 
industry is accompanied by a vast train of 
destitution.' Unions offered sick benefits, accident 
benefits, funeral funds, superannuation and 
unemployment benefits. They kept a great body of 
workers out of pauperism by keeping records on the 
state of trade and by sending labour from places where 
work is scarce to where it was plentiful or assisting 
their emigration. Well organised trade unions like 
these were 'plainly useful both to capitalists and to 
the community '6.
It was noted that the best types of union owed their 
superior organisation to men like the Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers who 'must impress all 
who have the opportunity of knowing him as a man of 
ability and character.' 7 Of trade union officials 
generally it was noted 'We cannot suppose that the 
officials ... look on the acts of illegality and 
violence with any less feeling of abhorrence than we do
ourselves ..• employers know of no case of violence .. 
which they could connect with the principal union 
officials,'8
Strikes were shown to be most frequent and the least 
orderly in the absence of any established union. 
Examples were cited of strikes, lockouts, outrage and 
riots in the coal mining districts of South Wales and 
Derbyshire where no regular union was in force. 
'Experience has shown how readily a body of men who are 
dissatisfied with their wages subscribe a small fund 
for the purpose of striking, and form a rude union 
which scarcely exists, or is intended to exist beyond 
the immediate occasion.,9 Thus it was concluded that 
strikes and violence 'are ordinary incidents of the 
association of working men in masses' to which trade 
unionism of the kind referred to above 'brings an 
increased sense of order, subordination and 
reflection.,10
The evidence presented to the Commission also showed an 
increasing antagonism between employers and workers and 
increased organisation on both sides which had 
manifested itself in ever more violent episodes of 
industrial conflict. The employers complained that the 
advent of unionism had fostered this spirit of 
antagonism. They had lost control over their employees. 
It was agreed that the time when employers 'were 
regarded by both law and usage as the governing class
is now greatly relaxed, and cannot be revived, a 
substitute has now to be found for it.'11 Employers' 
claim that violence and industrial conflict was caused 
by workers' determination to remain outside unions was 
rejected. No workers had come forward to substantiate 
this claim. 'This may be interpreted, either as 
implying that the labouring classes in general are not 
discontented with the restrictions that trades unions 
appear to impose on industry or as implying that the 
influence of those unions is so very extensive, their 
ramifications so minute, and the general dislike to 
oppose an established class feeling so strong, that the 
real sentiments of the workmen opposed to unions have 
been, to a great extent, withheld from us.'12 The 
Commission did not accept the latter implication and 
concluded that this was a small element in industrial 
unrest, that only a very small minority of workers 
wanted to remain outside trade unions and that this was 
probably due to the influence of outside agencies such 
as the Free Labour Registration Society (a body 
organised by employers for the express purpose of 
counteracting trade unions). Many strikers were wage 
labourers struggling for subsistence who saw unionism 
as a way forward. The biggest obstacles to this and a 
major cause of unrest were, in the Commission's view, 
the oppressive practices of employers and the legal 
containment of trade unions.
It was concluded that all the disadvantages of trade 
unionism, as far as employers and the community were 
concerned, disappeared when they reached a high degree 
of organisation and a 'well recognised code of general 
rules exists, with a competent authority to maintain 
and explain them. The element of due notice before a 
change on either side, alone effects the greatest 
results in removing sources of dispute. The difference 
between one state of things and the other appears to us 
to be that between a morbid and a healthy state of 
industrial relations' ... 'When the great advantages of 
the system of a code of rules and prices is further 
supported by a board of arbitration, it appears to us 
the nearest solution of the labour and employment 
guestion which has yet shown itself.'13
It was the Royal Commission's conclusion that 
conciliation and arbitration boards offered 'a remedy 
[for industrial conflict] at once speedy, safe and 
simple'14. It was recognised that the success of this 
remedy depended on the promotion of trade unionism of 
the type described at length in its report. This type 
of worker organisation - 'responsible' trade unionism - 
was the solution to the older and more typical form of 
worker organisation which was often accompanied by 
strikes and violence. Responsible trade unionism was 
seen as a discipline on these natural tendencies of 
workers and a substitute for employers loss of direct 
control over them.
The legislative outcome of the Commission's 
deliberations was the Trade Union Act 1871 which 
accorded permanent recognition to trade unions by 
declaring that a trade union was no longer to be 
considered unlawful because its objects were in 
restraint of trade. Flanders 15 notes that the 
definition of trade unions in this Act was 'any 
combination, (including employers' associations) 
whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects 
of which are under its constitution, the regulation of 
the relations between workmen and masters or between 
workmen and workmen or between masters and masters, or 
the imposing of restrictive conditions on the conduct 
of any trade or business and also the provision of 
benefits to members.' It should be emphasised, however, 
that although these Acts established trade unions on 
firm social and legal foundations 'the foundations ... 
were still extremely narrow, and equally narrow was the 
prevailing conception of their tasks.'16
The Trade Union Act 1871 aimed to provide a status and 
role for the trade unions. The legislation had two 
important effects. On the one hand, it entitled a 
recognised union to bargain collectively with the 
employer concerned. On the other hand it denied the 
right to bargain collectively to unions which were not 
recognised by employers. It thereby imposed legal 
restraints on rank and file activity. Also as Hyman17
emphasises, this allowed employers to determine the 
scope of collective bargaining. An employer would 
naturally favour a union which had no inclination to 
challenge seriously the right of management to control 
production. Even without such selectivity, the terms on 
which an employer recognised a union could include 
restrictions on its right to pursue certain issues in 
negotiation. And even where no explicit restrictions 
existed, union representatives would not normally 
present demands which jeopardised the bargaining 
relationship. This legislation therefore aimed to 
create an environment which favoured the expansion of 
'responsible' trade unions led by officials with 
authority over their members with whom employers could 
negotiate so that industrial conflict could be 
contained.
Conciliation and Arbitration
Conciliation is a practice which involves the services 
of a neutral third party in a dispute as a means of 
helping the disputing parties to arrive at an amicable 
settlement or agreed solution. The responsibility for 
settling disputes rests with the parties themselves. 
Arbitration is a procedure whereby a third party, not 
acting as a court of law, is empowered to take a 
decision which disposes of the dispute.18 Conciliation
and arbitration as ways of resolving disputes between 
employers and workers were pioneered in the hosiery 
industry in the 1860s. The increase in popularity of 
conciliation and arbitration between employers and 
workers in the last quarter of the 19th century was 
interpreted at the time as a sea change in industrial 
relations such that 'confidence and good will have 
replaced suspicion and open hostility.'19 Later it was 
characterised as 'an evolutionary triumph of liberal 
principles and civilised restraints, with workers 
coming gradually to "learn" what was required of them 
in this best of all liberal worlds. Organised labour 
after a turbulent and irrational period, grasped the 
wisdom of rational peaceful negotiation and fashioned 
systems which took their place in the emerging panoply 
of civilised institutions, with alternative strategies 
deservedly sinking down into the dustbin of history as 
pathetic and doomed digressions.'20 While noting that 
the use of conciliation and arbitration marked an 
important development in industrial relations, 
contemporary writers have been less effusive or 
unanimous in their assessments of them.
Although workers achieved some concessions and worker 
organisation was strengthened by the existence of joint 
procedures for settling disputes (acceptance of joint 
boards was a condition for survival of trade 
unionism21) it is clear that in terms of wages 
employers had most to gain from them.22 Phelps Brown
argues that two factors explain employers participation 
in conciliation and arbitration at this time, the 
growing strength of worker organisation and employers' 
interest in standardising wages as this removed one 
element in competition. Phelps Brown 23 clarifies, 'The 
unionists were at least strong enough to bring a number 
of mills out together, and would go back only when a 
common settlement had been made for them all. If the 
employers had begun by feeling that the wider the 
combination was, the greater the threat to them, they 
soon found it was really the other way round: except 
where they were pinned down by foreign competition they 
might have little to fear from a wage settlement if 
only it was enforced on all of them alike, and a strong 
union was their guarantee that it would be. Not a few 
reached the conclusion that it was a positive advantage 
to them to have a floor put under price competition in 
this way. Those who had little love for the union were 
still willing to meet it to negotiate a rate, because 
of all union activities this interfered with them 
least. They would resent hotly any encroachment on 
their prerogatives as managers of their own businesses, 
but collective bargaining only meant that they were 
paying the same price as their competitors for one 
factor of production, just as they did when they bought 
a raw material in the same market.'
Porter shows how conciliation and arbitration 
procedures were weighted in favour of employers.
Arbitration was used more than conciliation in the 
1870s because it circumvented the issue of recognition 
and placed the onus of deciding claims on arbitrators. 
The majority of arbitrators were lawyers, politicians 
and employers who shared the conventional view of 
political economy. This, combined with union leaders 
willingness to negotiate 'placed a definite restriction 
on the possibility of any considerable change in the 
workers' position.'24
For example, the criteria most often used by 
arbitrators for determining awards favoured employers 
and included the general state of trade, the 
competitive needs of a district and changes in the 
selling price of the product. The first of these offers 
no precise criterion - 'what the trade is and what it 
can bear are relative matters, to be determined only 
after taking into account a large number of factors ... 
A great deal depends on obtaining figures from 
employers on which to base a judgement. As a general 
rule employers have been extremely reluctant to supply 
this evidence, and when it has been furnished it has 
been too fragmentary to be of much use.'25 The second 
standard could mean that no district ever got a wage 
advance.26 It was nevertheless often used by 
arbitrators. The most popular criterion was changes in 
the selling price of the product. Influential 
arbitrator Rupert Kettle asserted in 1869 that 'price 
forms the only legitimate fund out of which wages can
be paid, and the enquiry should be strictly confined to 
this.'27 Few arbitrators considered profits as a 
standard for wage awards, sharing the employers' view 
that profits were no concern of the workers. Few 
recognised the question of a subsistence level and 
where arbitrators did recognise this standard, 'it was 
usually sacrificed to their need to make an award 
reflecting the change in the state of trade.'28
Arbitration as a method of settling wage disputes was 
at its height in the 1870s during the Great Depression. 
After 1879 the number of wage disputes taken to 
arbitration began to decline sharply due to trade union 
members' disenchantment. In the period 1873 -1896 few 
arbitration awards gave wage increases - most were 
either reductions or rejections of claims for 
increases. In the industries analysed by Porter 29 in 
this period - the hosiery and lace trades, boot and 
shoe, cotton spinning, iron and coal mining - 
arbitration awards showed a correspondence to the trend 
of average industrial prices and to short run changes 
in the level of economic activity. He finds only two 
instances of wage increases and twenty eight 
reductions. Product prices were the main information 
provided by employers. Arbitrators were forced to 
accept these and, since the main feature of the Great 
Depression was the fall in prices, award wage 
reductions. In addition, where other criteria were used 
such as changes in output, these were based on a
comparison of the present level of activity with that 
of a previous year and since the majority of awards in 
the Great Depression took place against a background of 
temporarily declining economic activity, the pressure 
to reduce wages was reinforced.
Since it seemed invariably to correspond with wage 
reductions, trade union members became disillusioned 
with arbitration and there was a shift away from 
arbitration towards conciliation in the coal, iron, 
cotton, hosiery and lace trades. Trade union leaders 
became enthusiastic supporters of conciliation boards 
and pointed to the gains made through them not least 
the reduction of strikes.30 However there was a growing 
belief among union members that their leaders had 
become too willing to compromise their interests to 
preserve conciliation machinery and this discontent 
began to be expressed in unofficial action resulting in 
several conciliation boards being broken during and 
after the Great Depression.31 This action grew as the 
restraints imposed upon trade unions' bargaining power 
in prosperous periods became more obvious especially 
during years when the cost of living increased.
Both Porter32 and Burgess33 find that trade union 
leaders imposed conciliation and arbitration on their 
members because it consolidated their relatively 
privileged position and that this contributed to a 
growing split between officials and their members
making the unofficial dispute a characteristic aspect 
of British industrial relations. Unofficial action grew 
as the restraints imposed upon trade unions' bargaining 
power in prosperous periods became more obvious 
especially during years when the cost of living 
increased.
A major restriction characteristic of agreements 
reached through joint procedures was the length of 
agreements negotiated by union leaders which prevented 
workers taking advantage of prosperous trade to press 
for wage increases. By negotiating long term agreements 
as trade was increasing, employers could keep wages 
down as profits were rising and production was less 
likely to be disrupted by disputes. Long agreements 
also prevented local union branches from making wage 
claims so that for militant local unionists, union 
discipline was as important as employer opposition.
In addition conciliation machinery reguired a period of 
notice after the expiry of agreements before a claim 
could be made. The Nottingham Hosiery Board required 
one month's notice while most sliding scale agreements 
provided for two or three months notice. This prevented 
employers from being caught in the middle of an order. 
There were also restrictions on the size of wage rate 
fluctuations at any one time or within a certain time 
e.g. 5% at any one time or within five years.
In some industries employers placed restrictions on 
what could be discussed on conciliation boards. For 
example the terms which followed the Boot and Shoe 
lockout in 1895 (negotiated with the assistance of the 
BOT) restricted the work of the boards to the 
interpretation of existing agreements to prevent the 
discussion of 'abstract principles of socialism.' The 
employers' chairman described the terms as 'a charter 
of rights for the manufacturers, under which three 
fourths of the disputes which affected the industry 
would be rendered impossible.'34
Procedural delays involved in making a claim through 
conciliation machinery also constituted a barrier to 
effective action. For workers, who were obliged not to 
strike while their claims were being processed, this 
could mean a wait of months or even years as in the 
case of the "abnormal places" dispute in South Wales.36
The restrictive effects of conciliation agreements on 
workers' wages in a boom were not matched by eguivalent 
restrictions on employers when their relative power was 
greatest in a depression. For instance in the coal 
mining districts of the Federated Area and South Wales 
where a conciliation agreement (which was virtually a 
sliding scale with a maximum and minimum rate) operated 
after 1894 and 1903 respectively. The divergence 
between the level of wage rates when these rates 
reached the maximum permitted by the agreement was
greater than the divergence between the level of prices 
and wage rates in a depression when the minimum rate 
was in operation.36
It can be seen from this that in practice conciliation 
and arbitration operated to improve the position of 
employers and trade unions rather than workers' 
position in industrial bargaining. As we have seen it 
was this effect of conciliation and arbitration 
together with its beneficial effect on strike activity 
which was applauded by the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions when it concluded that responsible trade 
unionism and conciliation and arbitration were 'the 
nearest solution of the labour and employment question 
which has yet shown itself'37. The establishment of 
numerous boards of conciliation and arbitration in the 
1870s were similarly credited by the BOT with 'the 
relative moderation in the demand of the workmen for a 
share in the profits of the extraordinary trade 
expansion then in progress.'38 However the Royal 
Commission's hopes for responsible trade unionism and 
conciliation and arbitration soon began to founder. A 
range of legislation had been passed to encourage 
conciliation and arbitration. The Councils of 
Conciliation Act was passed in 1867 to promote the 
setting up of councils of conciliation where employers 
and workers' representatives could meet to thrash out 
voluntary agreements which would then be legally 
enforceable. This legislation had failed to be
effective for a variety of reasons but chiefly because, 
like the Arbitration Act 1824, it was inconsistent with 
trade unions desire, borne of their experience at the 
hands of the law, 39 to free themselves from legal 
constraints, it ruled out determination of wage rates 
when the majority of disputes concerned wages questions 
and because the success of conciliation depended on a 
much higher level of organisation and recognition of 
trade unions than was in existence at the time except 
in a few well established and organised trades.
In 1872 AJ Mundella (hosiery manufacturer, MP and later 
President of the BOT) succeeded in passing the 
Arbitration (Masters and Workmen) Act to try and 
encourage the trend towards arbitration. This Act 
provided for agreements drawn up between employers and 
workers as a result of conciliation or arbitration to 
be made binding on both. It facilitated compulsory 
arbitration but was weaker than previous legislation in 
that it was necessary for both parties to agree. A 
decision could not be imposed on either party. The Act 
failed for much the same reasons as its predecessors 
but for Sharp40, it is interesting' as a last attempt 
to devise a universally applicable means of settling 
disputes with a legal sanction ... the state ceased for 
the time being to attempt to legislate for the 
settlement of industrial strikes and left industry to 
find its own panacea.' It will become clear below 
however that 'the state ... has never stood passively
by to let the contending parties get on with it as they 
will' and escalating industrial conflict led to another 
Royal Commission.41
The Royal Commission on Labour
The Royal Commission on Labour was set up in 1891 in 
response to an unprecedented increase in trade union 
activity and a period of widespread friction and 
dispute. In 1889 and 1890 alone there were 1,145 and 
1,028 strikes respectively.42 The Commission noted that 
the initiatives taken by the Royal Commission of 1867- 
69 had been based on the idea that well organised and 
responsible trade unions and employers organisations 
were the key to improved industrial relations. The 
latter had worsened significantly in the intervening 
period after a promising start and the Commission 
concluded that this deterioration was the outcome of 
various factors.
Firstly it was noted that the expansion of responsible 
trade union organisation as described by the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions had been smaller than 
envisaged. This owed much to the fact that many 
employers still endeavoured to employ workers who were 
not organised. Secondly that the power and constitution 
of trade unions had an important influence on the
character of industrial relations. For the most part 
power was still with the rank and file in trade unions 
and not with the executives. It was emphasised that in 
some cases, such as that of the Durham coalminers, so 
many references had to be made in the case of general 
questions to the local lodges or branches, to be 
decided by ballot, that the central body were little 
more than delegates acting under immediate instructions 
and had to refer points to their constituents even in 
the midst of negotiations with employers.
In other cases, especially where a trade was scattered 
in various branches all over the country and through 
districts differing widely in local circumstances from 
each other, much power and discretion was frequently 
left with the district or executive committees or local 
branches. The only power the central executive of most 
unions of this kind seemed to have was the power of 
withholding funds if strike action was taken by a local 
branch or district and this power was seldom 
exercised.43
The ideal trade union from the Commission's point of 
view was characterised by 'such a proportion of men in 
a trade as will give it controlling power in the trade 
and enable it to treat with employers as representative 
of the whole and to make agreements and decisions 
binding on the whole trade. It will have a strong 
executive council, thoroughly representative of the
members and implicitly trusted by them. This machinery 
will enable the society to negotiate with employers 
with the least possible friction, either from time to 
time, or by way of a permanent joint board for the 
purpose of settling hour and wage rate questions and 
other points of dispute and to give undertakings and 
enter into agreements on which employers can rely.'44 
Some trade unions came near to this ideal but these 
were mostly in skilled trades which were more adapted 
to organisation (it was easier to convert the natural 
craft already in existence into a formal and permanent 
trade union) or in other less skilled trades where the 
monopoly possessed by an industry and its consequent 
facilities for organisation were more developed due to 
extraneous causes e.g. legislation. Coal mining was 
cited as a good example of this. The natural monopoly 
which, in some trades, was due to workers special skill 
had been obtained by coalminers not only because the 
industry was concentrated in certain districts and they 
had practical possession of the villages adjacent to 
which they worked, but through the provisions of the 
Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887 which rendered it 
impossible for employers to bring in new men, in case 
of a strike, to take the place of the strikers.
Thirdly there were serious deficiencies in organisation 
among employers. Employers' organisations tended to be 
formed in response to the growing strength of workers 
organisations. They were forced to combine to resist
them. There were some longstanding employers 
associations originally formed to watch legisation 
affecting trade or for tempering competition by 
agreement among themselves which had become instruments 
of mutual protection against worker organisation. 
Generally, however, employers combined unwillingly and 
competition between them usually ensured that their 
combinations were shortlived. Many employers did not 
join employers associations.
The findings of the Royal Commission are in accord with 
the view that this traditional structure of authority 
relationships began to be challenged once industrial 
relations were formalised and that conciliation boards 
played a key role in this process by separating the 
rank and file from their traditional control over 
negotiations so that the traditional flow of union 
authority from below could be reversed and disputes 
could be subject to executive control. 'It was the 
unions who were participating in any power sharing that 
was involved but it was a power that was to be 
exercised over the men. Of course the system depended 
on a union authority that was viable and effective, but 
the system also worked to enhance and legitimise that 
authority.'46 Price is concerned to emphasise that this 
should not be taken to mean that union officials 
consciously sold out their members, on the contrary, 
from their point of view conciliation offered many 
advantages to their members.
94
Price's view is however qualified by the fact that the 
Commission 46 was equally concerned with the 
substantial rise in the numerical representation and 
importance of organisation among unskilled labour since 
the reports of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions.
The organisation of the previously powerless, who saw 
in trade unionism and conciliation and arbitration the 
way to address their powerlessness, had caused new 
difficulties. Unskilled organisations were usually 
weak. They rapidly arose, enrolled many members and 
rapidly declined. Their members had no natural monopoly 
over their work as in the skilled trades and employers 
could easily replace them. They relied solely on strike 
action to achieve their aims. The unskilled unions' 
prosperity and numerical strength depended on success 
in conflicts. When strike action was unsuccessful they 
lost many members because they could not offer the 
benefits which provided solidity and permanence to the 
established trade unions. Their low paid members could 
afford only small subscriptions.
In spite of these weaknesses however, the unskilled 
unions had become a source of concern for the state for 
several reasons. Firstly, unskilled union members 
tended to use violence to prevent non union labour 
taking the place of locked out unionists. Secondly, 
they sought the support of unskilled labour in other 
trades, other trade unions and the state in industrial
conflicts. Thirdly, large schemes of amalgamation and 
federation had appeared with the intention of achieving 
sympathy strikes. This had extended the range and 
damage caused by industrial conflict. Finally the 
growth of organisations with membership extending 
outside of a single establishment across an entire 
industry had loosened the control of employers over 
their workforce in individual firms. It was noted that 
attempts had been made to counteract this by profit 
sharing schemes, mutual benefit and accident funds to 
'reproduce the old fashioned sentiment of unity only on 
a basis of more egual relations suited to the altered 
spirit of the time' and to make firms 'independent 
industrial polities constituted on the footing of 
partnership' but the established trade unions had seen 
these initiatives as an attack on them and resisted 
them.47 It was noted that many recent conflicts in the 
ranks of unskilled labour had been aimed at compelling 
employers to recognise their organisations. Employers, 
however, saw no need to recognise them and totally 
resisted their attempts - they were easily replaced by 
non union labour and labour imported from country 
districts. This was causing great bitterness and 
violence.
A New Departure in Industrial Relations
As a result of the Commission's deliberations the 
Conciliation Act 1896 was passed which repealed the 
Arbitration Act 1824, the Councils of Conciliation Act 
1867 and the Arbitration Act 1872 and gave statutory 
authority to Labour Department of the BOT to act as 
state conciliator. It was empowered to intervene in 
industrial disputes by the provision that it should 
'take such steps as to the Board may seem expedient for 
the purpose of enabling the parties to the difference 
to meet together.'48
Before 1896 intervention in trade disputes was not 
formally included in the BOT's functions although it 
had intervened and undertook conciliation procedures 
informally with a view to the settlement of strikes or 
lockouts which were either imminent or in progress - 
they were a method of settling disputes not of 
preventing them. It also collected, digested and 
published statistical information bearing on guestions 
relating to the conditions of labour.49
After the Conciliation Act, conciliation came to mean 
much more than a practice involving the services of a 
neutral third party in a dispute to help the parties 
reach an amicable settlement. The aim of conciliation 
came to include intervention by the BOT to actively 
foster the growth of collective bargaining - to 
intervene permanently to prevent disputes from arising. 
Since disputes provided the occasion for strikes and
lockouts, it was concluded that they could be prevented 
from arising by making collective bargaining a more 
effective and widespread process. The Labour Department 
began to set up a dialogue with existing conciliation 
boards, to cooperate with them and to promote the 
setting up of new boards. Where the BOT was called upon 
to assist in the settlement of disputes, it embodied 
the settlement in the form of a collective agreement 
signed and issued by the state conciliator which 
included procedural arrangements to facilitate further 
agreements as well as a clause providing for the 
appointment of a state conciliator should the parties 
fail to reach a settlement by negotiation. The BOT gave 
itself the right to intervene.50
The practice of conciliation was now aimed at 
expediting the recognition of trade unionism through 
the imposition on employers of a duty to bargain with 
trade unions recognised as 'representative.' In this 
way the state consolidated and built on the network of 
formal structures, rules and procedures which had begun 
to characterise British industrial relations over the 
previous thirty years. In so doing it was able to 
extend the recognition of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining and address the source of labour unrest as 
well as its symptoms.51 The BOT systematically and 
successfully promoted trade unionism and collective 
bargaining over the whole period 1896-1913. By 1910 the 
BOT could report to Parliament that 'the method of
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collective bargaining may be said to prevail throughout 
the whole of our manufacturing industries and to a very 
considerable extent in regard to the employment of dock 
and waterside labour, and of labour employed in 
transportation and sea fishing.'52 In 1896 105 
conciliation boards were known to be in existence53 by 
1913 there were 325.54
Contemporary writers differ on the significance of the 
state's intervention at this point. Middlemas sees the 
pre war Labour Department of the BOT as an 'enlightened 
bureaucracy, sympathetic to the interests of labour, 
which took up the cause of trade unionism 'to 
ameliorate some of the disadvantages suffered by trade 
unions in industrial bargaining.'55 Middlemas 
attributes the character and policy of the Labour 
Dept., to its key personnel particularly Askwith, the 
Chief Industrial Conciliator of the Labour Department. 
'These years vindicated no one but Askwith and his 
personal, apparently apolitical, establishment of 
collective bargaining machinery ... [he] strenuously 
opposed intervention by individual ministers or 
governments.56 Strong employers, strong unions and a 
habitual form of bargaining comprised, in his eyes, the 
best recognition of the rights of the public.'57
Davidson 58 however, shows that official decisions were 
constrained by a broader imperative. He cites evidence 
which suggests that the extent to which the state
sought to redress the balance in favour of organised 
labour through conciliation was very limited and 
circumscribed by the need to safeguard the 
competitiveness of British industry which, it was 
thought, would be jeopardised if the state sought to 
moderate the role of market forces in the determination 
of wages. This is manifest in the fact that in the 
overwhelming majority of disputes handled by the BOT in 
the period 1896-1914, labour achieved its objectives in 
only 21% of disputes compared to 27% of all industrial 
stoppages. In addition the majority of disputes handled 
by the BOT in this period stemmed from trade union 
demands for wage increases and better working 
conditions at a time of declining real wages such that 
the high percentage of compromise settlements under the 
Conciliation Act represented a serious failure on the 
part of labour to realise its aims. While he also 
attributes the character of industrial relations policy 
in the years before WW1 to officials of the Labour 
Dept., Davidson argues that these officials saw the 
state campaigns for union recognition as as much a 
means of social control as of social eguity. The prime 
concern of officials of the Labour Dept, was that the 
assault on the legal status of trade unions would 
exacerbate class conflict and foster the growth of 
revolutionary socialism. Having said this, however, 
Davidson goes on to acknowledge an 'underlying identity 
between the bureaucratic objectives of the Board and 
the self interest of employers: a concern for the
preservation of the free market, for the security of 
capital and for the continuity and cost competitiveness 
of industrial production'59 such that the main 
difference between officials of the BOT and employers 
was over the means by which these objectives might be 
achieved. Many employers favoured repressive measures 
involving penal or military sanctions while the BOT saw 
intervention in wage determination together with 
welfare legislation as 'the most effective antidote to 
socialism and the preservative of industrial 
capitalism'.60
Like Middlemas, Fox61 sees the policies of the BOT as 
the consequence of the personal qualities and 
preferences of its leading officials. Fox emphasises 
however that the object of the Labour Department's 
policies was to tame the trade unions. In encouraging 
and promoting union recognition and collective 
bargaining BOT officials hoped to reform trade unions 
and move them away from their defensive restrictionist 
stance towards a responsible role of constructive 
cooperation with management rather than the 'adversary, 
win-lose, arms length relations' which characterised 
collective bargaining at the time.
Price 62 argues however, that 'conciliation and 
arbitration were symptomatic of a deeper, more profound 
change within the structures of industrial relations 
than the creation of a new institutional form. Implicit
in the creation of the boards was the replacement of 
autonomous regulation with mutual negotiation as the 
governing mode of employer - employee relationships ... 
Unlike autonomous regulation mutual negotiation 
legitimised and formalised a role for the unions within 
the structure of industrial relations. If mutual 
negotiation was to be effective, organised 
representation of masters and men was essential; 
unionisation and the institutionalisation of masters' 
associations followed naturally from the demise of 
autonomous regulation ... Mutual negotiation 
transformed the status of the unions; for the first 
time they began to be treated as representative agents 
of the workmen.'
Price sees the setting up of the Labour Department as 
the end of a process which occurred between 1870 and 
1890 whereby power was moved away from the workplace 
into the hands of the unions whose role was now 
integral to the successful workings of the whole 
system.63 Mutual negotiation legitimised and formalised 
a role for the unions within the structure of 
industrial relations. Up to this point 'As an 
institutional force, trade unionism had never been 
anything other than an incipient agent of collective 
bargaining ... It was the men who had to be disarmed, 
tamed and disciplined and it was this problem that 
conciliation and arbitration boards were designed to 
meet.'64 If conciliation was to be effective organised
representation of employers and workers was essential 
hence the Trade Union Act 1871 which freed the trade 
unions by providing that no trade union, however wide 
its objects, was henceforth to be illegal because it 
was'in restraint of trade' and protection for its 
funds.65 At the same time however, the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act was passed. This Act effectively re­
enacted and codified all the judicial restrictions 
placed upon strike activity since the Combination Acts. 
It 'revealed the dual purposes of the labour 
legislation; on the one hand to buttress the 
institutions of stability and, on the other, to 
legitimise employers' discipline.'66 It did not 
challenge trade unionism but focused on the methods of 
autonomous regulation which work groups both unionists 
and non unionists needed to realise their power.67
This view of the role of trade unions in industrial 
relations policy is supported by the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Labour 1894. Although Royal 
Commissions are not noted for ushering in sweeping 
change, their deliberations are important in defining 
'the key problems confronting British capital in its 
relations with organised labour and in suggesting 
guidelines for strategy.'68
The Royal Commission concluded that trade unions could 
reduce industrial conflict or exacerbate it but they 
did not cause it. On the contrary, the encouragement of
responsible elements in trade unionism could greatly 
assist the state's management of industrial conflict. 
The Labour Department's policy of conciliation and 
arbitration aimed to consolidate a responsible 
leadership in trade unionism, to establish trade unions 
as an institutional force and to shift decision making 
power from the rank and file and local activists to the 
leadership in established unions. Agreements reached 
through conciliation agreements to which the state was 
a party imposed a duty to bargain with trade unions 
recognised as "representative" on employers. By setting 
up machinery and agreements relevant to particular 
employers and their employees, the state aimed to 
assist the development of responsible trade unionism 
and reduce the scale, scope, violence and bitterness of 
the industrial conflict which had characterised the 
emergence of the unskilled unions.
Summary and Conclusion
In the preceding pages an outline of the complexities 
of conciliation and arbitration has been sketched. 
Particular attention has been given to the 
understandings of trade unionism, of trade union 
leaders and of the origins and nature of industrial 
conflict which underpinned the state's adoption of 
conciliation in the management of industrial conflict.
Evidence to the Royal Commissions led them to conclude 
that strikes and violence were ordinary incidents of 
the association of working men in masses. When large 
numbers of workers were brought together they quickly 
became aware of their collective power and exerted itü 
readily and violently without regard to the 
consequences. This was power without reponsibility.
The essence of most disputes between employers and 
employed was 'the shares in which the receipts of their 
common undertaking shall be divided. By far the largest 
proportion of disputes, strikes and lockouts have 
direct reference to the increase or diminution of the 
standard of wages.'69
It was believed that trade unions brought an increased 
sense of subordination, order and reflection to this 
state of affairs. Moreover evidence brought before the 
Commissions had shown that trade unionism combined with 
conciliation further reduced industrial conflict.
The practice of conciliation and arbitration over the 
previous thirty years illustrated that the effective 
management of industrial conflict turned on the 
promotion of a 'responsible layer' in trade unionism. 
Conciliation involved investing a group of workers with 
authority over their peers so that a finger could be 
publicly pointed at them when solutions to industrial 
conflict were called for. At the same time this
localisation of responsibility accorded status to 
leaders ambitious on their own account. This status was 
however dependent on compliance with standards deemed 
essential to the national/public interest. It was power 
tempered with responsibility in that it encouraged the 
emergence of trade union officials with their own 
specific interests and a tendency towards conservatism 
manifest in a preference for constitutional methods of 
conflict resolution rather than confrontation. They 
tended to prioritise their own role in negotiations 
with management at the expense of mass participation in 
union activities. For the BOT the leadership of trade 
unions comprised 'all those officials whose duty it is 
to organise strikes and all persons whom these persons 
post as pickets.'70
However, many employers had hampered the spread of 
conciliation and responsible trade unionism and 
contributed to industrial conflict by refusing to 
recognise trade unions. The efficacy of the Trade Union 
Act 1871 which aimed to encourage recognition of trade 
unions and responsibility among the leadership of the 
trade unions had been reduced by employers' attitude 
and by reluctance on the part of the rank and file of 
established trade unions to cede decision making power 
to their leaders. The wave of industrial conflict which 
characterised the late 1880s was attributed to 
employers. 'Many recent conflicts in the ranks of less 
skilled labour ... seem to have been in reality wholly
due to the determination of members of new trade 
societies to compel employers to recognise and deal 
with them.'71
It was concluded that the solution to the problem lay 
in the imposition on industrial relations of a well 
recognised code of general rules and a competent 
authority to maintain and explain them. The 
Conciliation Act was passed in 1896 which designated 
the Labour Department of the Board of Trade the 
competent authority and empowered it to devise, 
maintain and explain a code of general rules for the 
regulation of industrial relations. Industrial conflict 
was henceforth to be managed through conciliation and 
not confrontation. 'The history of legislation proves 
emphatically that the retention of the common law 
doctrine of the unlawfulness of trade combinations does 
nothing whatever to repress the combinations or any of 
their practices.'72 Given then that worker organisation 
was irrepressible and that 'the existence of 
associations of some kind is indispensible to the 
formation of either codes of rules or boards of 
arbitration' it was concluded that 'whatever tends to 
give a permanent legal and public character to unionism 
tends, in our judgement, to improve the existing unions 
and to fit them to cooperate in sound mutual agreements 
with employers.'73
The state's adoption of conciliation was underpinned by 
an understanding of industrial conflict and of trade 
union leadership which corresponds with rank and filist 
premises. It was believed firstly that workers have a 
vast reservoir of latent disruptive power which was 
contained by well organised and responsibly led trade 
unions. Secondly that a clear line of demarcation could 
be drawn between the leadership of trade unions, 
activists and the rank and file. It was believed that 
involvement in conciliation inclined trade union 
officials towards moderation and that this could be 
exploited to domesticate the rank and file. The rank 
and file, led by local officials and activists, was 
closer to the bulk of the working class which was 
unpredictable and more ready to resort to more militant 
and disruptive forms of industrial action.
Subsequent chapters will explore the usefulness of this 
perspective in the state's management of industrial 
conflict throughout the period under study beginning in 
the next chapter with the "Great Unrest".
1 For a review of theories of the state see Rosemary 
Aris, 1990. For an extensive discussion of the 
character of the state see Carnoy, 1984. Holloway & 
Picciotto (eds) 1978. Jessop, 1990. Clarke (ed), 1991.
2 Miliband, 1969 pp.3-4.
3 Pelling, 1971.
4 Flanders, 1968 p.14.
5 Eleventh and Final Report of the Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions 1869. p.12.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid p.35.
8 Ibid p.36.
9 Ibid
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid p.18
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid p.235.
15 Flanders, 1968 p.14.
16 Ibid.
17 Hyman, 1975 p.lll.
18 International Labour Organisation, 1980.
19 H.Crompton, 1876 quoted in Allen, 1971.
20 Fox, 1985 p .167.
21 Tarling & Wilkinson, 1975 p.9.
22 Allen, 1971 pp.72-73.
23 Quoted in Hyman, 1975 p.lll.
24 Porter, 1970 p.462.
25 Burns, 1926 pp.385-387.
26 Porter, 1970 p.464.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid p.465.
29 Ibid passim.
30 Porter, 1970 p.470.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Burgess 1975 p.10.
34 National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives Monthly 
Report Nov-Dec.1900 quoted in Porter, 1970 p.473.
35 Evans, 1911.
36 Porter 1970 p.473.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Kidner, 1979.
40 Sharp, 1950.
41 Kay, 1979.p.114.
42 Sharp, 1950 p.290.
43 Price, 1980.
44 Royal Commission on Labour 1894 Fifth and Final 
Report p.29.
45 Ibid p.192.
46 Ibid, Part 1 June 1894.
47 Ibid p.38.
48 Sharp 1950 p.294.
49 Memorandum on The Progress of the Labour Department 
of the Board of Trade April 1893.
50 Askwith, 1920. Sharp 1950 p.297.
51 International Labour Organisation 1980.
52 Sturmthal, 1972 p.56.
53 Report on the Strikes and Lockouts of 1896 Cmd 8643 
1897.
54 Report on Strikes and Lockouts in 1913 Cmd 7658.1914 
- 16.
55 Middlemas, 1979 p.59.
56 Ibid p.61.
57 Ibid p.63.
58 Davidson, 1978 p.590.
59 Ibid p.590.
60 Ibid p.591.
61 Fox, 1985 P.246.
62 Price, 1980 pp.120-123.
63 Ibid p.220.
64 Ibid p.119.
65 Fox, 1985 p.153.
66 Price, 1980 p.126.
67 The Act prohibited picketing defined as the activity 
of individuals or small groups.
68 Hyman, 1978. PRO CAB 37/110/63. Report of the Labour 
Department of the Board of Trade to the Cabinet 14th of 
April 1912.
69 Royal Commission on Labour 1894 p.38.
70 PRO Lab2 /1481/L283/1901 Memorandum by the Labour 
Department of the Board of Trade on the Effects of the 
Taff Vale Judgement_ 14th August 1901.

Chapter 4
The Great Unrest
Introduction
It is generally argued that industrial conflict during 
the years 1910-14, subsequently known as the'Great 
Unrest', was the result of British workers espousal en 
masse of 'direct action' for revolutionary purposes as 
advocated by the syndicalist movement.1 Some 
contemporary writers have been concerned to distance 
themselves from these views, to see them as overstating 
the case and the 'General Strike of 1914' as 'a mirage 
of historians treading the infertile deserts of labour 
history in search of a revolution manquee'2. They have 
emphasised the diversity of the conflicts at this time, 
questioned the extent to which they can be described as 
revolutionary and whether responsibility for the Great 
Unrest can be laid at the door of the syndicalist 
movement.3 One of the more influential commentators, 
Eric Hobsbawm, concludes that there was no 
revolutionary threat at this time and that at best 
syndicalism was 'a slogan of the struggle and not a 
programme for social transformation.'4 For Hobsbawm the 
error lies in historians' failure to take account of 
the fact that 'class and the problem of class 
consciousness are inseparable.'5
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This chapter challenges these views on the grounds that 
they misunderstand the nature of the revolutionary 
potential of the working class. This misunderstanding 
has its roots in the search for class consciousness. 
This chapter will outline the 'Great Unrest' and set 
out the BOT's analysis of the conflict and of trade 
unionism as well as its proposals for maintaining 
control. From this it will become clear that for the 
state class consciousness was not characteristic of 
industrial conflict at this time, nevertheless the 
industrial unrest was seen as potentially 
revolutionary. The characteristics of the unrest which 
made it so in the state's view were the scale and 
coherence of worker organisation and its rejection of 
the methods of the established trade unions. The former 
owed something to the methods of syndicalism. The 
latter had its roots in industrial unionism.6 This 
resulted in the decline of the established trade unions 
as a power over their members and forced the state to 
intervene directly to restore industrial peace. However 
it was recognised that direct state intervention was 
problematic and that the ill timed use of force could 
escalate the situation. As previously argued, the 
reasons for building a framework to permanently contain 
unrest in the first place were based on the recognition 
of the disruptive power of the organised working class 
and the regulatory effects of responsible trade 
unionism on it. In keeping with these views the state's
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management of the 'Great Unrest' was aimed at restoring 
the influence of responsible trade unionism and 
breaking up support for the organisations which aimed 
to supersede it through conciliation procedures. It was 
thought that conciliation could weaken worker 
organisation by dissipating its grass roots support 
whereas confrontation at this time was more likely to 
strengthen it. This policy withstood the impact of the 
'Great Unrest'.
Industrial Unrest 1910-12.
The years 1910-12 subseguently became known as the 
'Great Unrest' because they were characterised by 
industrial conflict on a scale previously unheard of in 
Britain. The first main phase of the "Great Unrest" 
began with the rapid escalation of discontent in the 
South Wales coalfields.
On September 1st 1910 the Cambrian Combine closed the 
Ely pit, part of the Naval Collieries, after the 
failure of the South Wales Conciliation Board to settle 
on a price for the working of a seam which was subject 
to difficult geological conditions. Nine hundred men 
were thrown out of work. By 19th of September all the 
pits of the Cambrian Combine were on strike in sympathy 
with these workers and in defiance of a decision taken 
by the S.W.M.F.that work should be resumed pending a 
ballot of the whole coalfield.
The strike continued to spread until 10,000 men were 
out on strike. By November 1910 the Rhondda and 
Aberdare valleys and the Tonypandy area were the scene 
of bitter conflict. Confrontation and sabotage were 
widespread. Various tactics were used by the miners to 
end the dispute including mass picketing, attacking 
collieries which were still operating and mine 
managers' homes and hounding blacklegs brought in to 
keep the collieries working. Employers resisted with 
the help of local and imported police and later troops. 
Violent battles developed, notably at Tonypandy, where 
strikers responded to police tactics by looting shops. 
There were many casualties.7
The Labour Department intervened and attempted to 
mediate between the coalowners and miners but was 
unable to break the deadlock. The strike continued with 
the S.W.M.F. being financially supported by the 
M.F.G.B. The M.F.G.B. attempted to reach a settlement 
through a meeting with the coalowners in which it was 
agreed that the employers' terms should be given a 
year's trial. This was unanimously rejected by the 
S.W.M.F. whereupon the M.F.G.B. withdrew its support on 
August 31st 1911 and the miners returned to work on the 
terms offered by the employers in the previous October.
Meanwhile on the 14th of June 1911 the National Sailors 
and Firemens' Union had declared a general strike at
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Southampton in support of demands for a conciliation 
board, a minimum rate of wages, reduced working hours 
and various changes in working conditions. The 
Shipowners brought in blackleg labour and the by the 
20th of June the strike had spread to Goole and Hull 
where the dock labourers struck in support of the 
seamen and put forward claims of their own. The strike 
spread to Manchester and Liverpool where the Seamen's 
union stopped the White Star Line's 'Olympic' on her 
maiden voyage in order to force the Shipping Federation 
to recognise the union for collective bargaining 
purposes and thereby negotiate improvements in pay and 
conditions. The strike came to include dockers and 
workers in factories and processing plants who 
initially struck in sympathy but later framed demands 
of their own. The circumstances of the strike suggested 
the presence of syndicalism to many commentators on the 
Transport strikes of 1911 and the prior Cambrian 
Combine strike. For example, the Board of Trade 
investigator J.P.Moylan discerned the influence of 
syndicalism promoted by a small group of hitherto 
unknown young syndicalists which threatened the 
position of established union leaders.8
The Transport strike was characterised by hostility 
towards mediation attempts by union leaders and the 
Board of Trade and widespread violence including 
assaults on blacklegs, attacks on the offices of 
shipowners and a Labour Exchange operated by the
Shipping Federation. George Askwith of the Board of 
Trade reported that 'the union leaders have little 
control and are now frightened'•9 About four hundred 
extra police were drafted in from other areas but on 
the 1st of July workers rejected a further settlement 
and the meeting broke into a riot. A further five 
hundred police were sent to the area to maintain 
control.
On the 18th of July shipowners in Cardiff attempted to 
use Chinese labour to unload the S.S. Annan and police 
were unable to control the subsequent riot in which the 
quayside was set alight. Extra police were imported and 
the next day Cardiff was virtually in the grip of a 
general strike when workers in many trades came out in 
sympathy with the waterfront workers. The Chief 
Constable expressed the view that this sympathetic 
strike owed much to the 'considerable influence 
...exercised by bodies of men and women going from 
place to place with a view to inducing those inclined 
to remain at work to join their ranks'10
By mid July negotiations were in progress to end the 
strike but before these had been completed more 
conflict broke out in early August in London.
Waterfront union leaders had accepted the terms of the 
Devonport Agreement which gave substantial increases to 
most groups of waterfront workers but this agreement 
was rejected by the dockers who wanted more and this
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led to unofficial strike action throughout the London 
dock system. Official union calls for a return to work 
went unheeded. The state intervened as the strike 
paralysed the docks and food supplies dwindled. 
Agreements were reached by the end of August which gave 
wage rises to workers not covered by the Devonport 
agreement and concessions were made on the issue of the 
employment of casual labour under pressure from the 
state. Before the month was out, however, conflict 
surfaced amongst railway workers in Liverpool in 
response to the pressure of falling real wages and 
hostility towards the Conciliation Boards set up in 
1907.
Unofficial strike action was taken by Merseyside 
railwaymen and centred initially on goods services 
where many workers were employed in railway depots on 
the docks and had close contact with waterfront 
workers. By mid August fifteen thousand railwaymen were 
out on strike and were quickly followed by coal 
porters, lightermen and carters until a total of about 
eighty thousand workers were on strike. Port employers 
responded with a general lockout and the Strike 
Committee declared a general strike.11
This was the biggest rail strike in history. There was 
mass picketing and violence. There were attacks on 
blackleg labour and on goods in transit and fires were 
started in dockyard areas. The Liverpool City
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authorities formed a committee of public safety and 
called in large numbers of police and troops until by 
the middle of August there were three thousand troops, 
several hundred imported police and two gunboats moored 
on the Mersey with their guns trained on the city. At 
the same time the War Office dispatched troops to many 
industrial areas both with and without the request of 
the civil authorities and the Home Secretary (Winston 
Churchill) announced that Britain was under the control 
of the military authorities.12
The strike came to a head in the third week in August 
when a peaceful mass demonstration of eighty thousand 
workers, including women and children, sponsored by the 
National Transport Workers' Federation was broken up 
with a 'merciless use of violence that horrified those 
who saw it'13. Troops with fixed bayonets and loaded 
rifles fired on the crowds - one man was killed and 
many others wounded.14 Agreements were reached in the 
wake of this conflict after the state had interceded 
and a general return to work began. The settlement 
provided for the setting up of a Royal Commission to 
look into the Conciliation scheme of 1907 and all 
strikers were to be reinstated without penalties.
On October 18th the Commission produced its Report 
which was rejected by the unions who called for a 
meeting with the railway companies to discuss it - they 
refused. The unions prepared to ballot their members on
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whether to renew the strike. In the House of Commons 
the Labour Party condemned the railway companies' 
intransigence and put forward an amended resolution 
calling for a meeting to discuss 'the best means of 
giving effect to the Report.'15 The vote was carried 
and the railway companies agreed to attend a meeting 
under state auspices. A settlement was reached on the 
basis of a modified Report and the strike threat was 
lifted.
The new improved Conciliation Scheme 1911 however, 
still refused trade union recognition. It only 
instituted a system of Boards peopled by worker 
representatives who had to petition management. 
Nevertheless railway companies were forced to negotiate 
indirectly with the unions because workers could choose 
their representatives from any source and in practice 
these tended to be trade union officials.
The State's Analysis of the Industrial Conflict.
Amid calls for the Government to take more stringent 
action to stem the tide of industrial conflict, the BOT 
was asked to submit a report on the situation to the 
Cabinet in July 1911. This report provided the basis 
for the reconsideration of existing state policy 
towards industrial conflict. The report began by noting 
that the largest and most virulent strikes which marked 
the current outburst of unrest involved 'the three
classes of labour in which the community as such is 
most deeply entrusted16.' Its findings confirm Cole's 
view17 that the underlying cause of unrest is always 
the same. 'The one permanent basis of discontent ... 
[which] ... at bottom justifies all revolution and 
makes all strikes, however wrong in their particular 
circumstances, ultimately right and defensible' is the 
general feeling that 'all labour is robbed' - 
exploitation. 18 For Cole and the BOT the labour unrest 
of 1910 - 12 was no exception being mainly the 
consequence of the fact that between 1900 and 1910 
wages were static but prices rose considerably. The BOT 
was unprepared however for the ferocity of the 
explosion of industrial conflict at this time. Its 
first assessment of it is set out below. It embarks on 
a comparative and historical study of industrial 
conflict in order to identify any new factors which 
could account for the severity of the outbreak.19
The industrial unrest displayed certain characteristics 
which, according to the BOT, distinguished it from 
earlier periods of industrial conflict. Most notably, 
attention was drawn to the speed and success of strike 
movements and the readiness with which the better 
organised trades, like miners and railwaymen, gave 
support to each other and the transport workers. For 
example, the Seamens'strike which was called on the 
16th of June 1911 had been threatened for some time but 
was not generally expected to be serious. The Shipping
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Federation was aware that if a strike did break out it 
would present problems because of the shortage of 
seamen, but no-one foresaw the extent of the support 
the strike attracted from transport workers or the 
cohesiveness of the different workers involved. The 
Seamens' Union was a weak institution and the Transport 
Workers' Federation embryonic and yet this strike 
achieved far reaching concessions and engendered such a 
belief in collective action among the workers that they 
felt they had the power to stop the trade of any port. 
This victory owed much to the fact that shipowners were 
reluctant to leave ships idle while trade was good. 
Nevertheless, it did not account for the spontaneous 
character and improved organisation of the disturbances 
in the labour world which forced employers to concede 
the seamen's demands.
In summing up it was concluded that the main cause of 
unrest was the same in 1910-11 as it had been in the 
past - the conflict between workers and employers over 
wages. Specifically in this period the cost of living 
had increased while wages had not. However a 
combination of factors over the previous thirty years 
or so had led to a change in the character of 
industrial conflict. Firstly there had been an increase 
in casual employment combined with an increased risk of 
unemployment. In the conditions of modern competitive 
industry employers tended to see the labour force as 
something to be switched off and on like electric
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current as required and that any decrease in the 
certainty and continuity of employment causes unrest.
Secondly, because the workers of 1910 were better 
educated, "propaganda" had a bigger impact and workers 
were more concerned with social questions than 
hitherto. Books such as "Merrie England" written by 
Blatchford had sold by the million and had had a 
profound effect. The cheap press and advances in 
communication had made workers more homogenous, more 
aware of their common interests and more inclined to 
act collectively - aware that there is strength and 
safety in numbers. However, although it was recognised 
that 'older unionists' complaints about the younger 
union men being 'rotten with socialism', undisciplined 
and spoiling for a fight were not unfounded it was 
concluded that most of the workers concerned 'do not 
realise what a fight to the finish means' - they had 
only a superficial understanding of socialism. They had 
developed new methods but not new aims in their 
struggle.20
Thirdly, their new methods had been assisted by the 
growth of specialisation in industry which had 
increased interdependence among the various branches 
such that 'the dockers can stop the whole trade of a 
port and a few hundred collierymen can threaten to stop 
all the coal mines in Scotland.'21
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Fourthly it was noted that workers' struggle had been 
advanced by 'a change in middle and upper class 
attitudes, among whom Victorian theories as to capital 
and labour have become obsolete' although 'no settled 
body of doctrine has emerged to take their place'22. 
Instead there was now a disposition to try to see 
things from the worker's point of view and to wonder, 
not why he is discontented, but that he has been 
patient for so long. Finally and most importantly there 
was a marked decline in the influence of the 
established trade unions.
The central focus of this report is the fear of the 
'sympathetic strike' and the grave consequences that 
would ensue 'should there be any widespread acceptance 
of the sympathetic strike policy'.23 In the joint 
opinion of Askwith and Mitchell of the Board of Trade, 
'a new force has arisen in trade unionism and on every 
hand there is evidence to show that the power of the 
old leaders has been superseded.' That this new force 
had been so influential among workers was shown firstly 
by the fact that there were practically no successors 
to the moderating influences exerted by trade union 
leaders such as Burt, Fenwick, Knight, Burnett, 
Bowerman, Bell, Maudsley, Mabon and Chandler. When any 
of the more moderate union leaders retired they were 
replaced by very different types of men and the 
moderates still in office had practically no influence. 
This change was manifest in the Northumberland miners'
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decision to abolish the three shift system in defiance 
of an agreement only just reached, the triumph of the 
rank and file of the Boilermakers over their executive, 
the recent printers' dispute, the complete annihilation 
of the policy pursued by Mr Bell in connection with the 
railways, the ascendancy of Mr Crinion as the 
dominating influence in Lancashire, the capture of the 
South Wales Miners Federation by the Tonypandy men and 
the almost complete obliteration of Mr Chandler as a 
force in trade unionism.
Secondly it was illustrated by the emergence of 
"industrial unionism", having Tom Mann as its most 
active advocate, the central practical idea of which is 
the sympathetic strike.
Thirdly, it was advocated widely by the workers 
themselves. Mitchell believed that the success of the 
movement for better conditions among transport workers 
was attributed by the men to those who struck in 
sympathy and that the old leaders' opposition to the 
sympathetic strike was due to their desire to conserve 
their union funds to fight their own battles. This 
conservative policy was thought to be rapidly weakening 
and there was a strong feeling amongst trade unionists 
that trade union policy generally would become more 
aggressive and united which means the more extensive 
adoption of the "general strike" policy. Signs of this 
were discerned in the miners' constant demand that the
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MFGB should put its twentieth rule into operation. This 
rule stated that 'whenever any county, federation or 
other district is attacked on the wage question, all 
members connected with the Society shall tender a 
notice to terminate their contracts if approved of by a 
conference called to consider the advisability of such 
joint action being taken.'
Lastly Mitchell pointed to the significant development 
amongst transport workers whereby all sections (seamen, 
dockers, carters, labourers) were united in one 
organisation - the Transport Workers Federation - which 
gave its leaders (J.H. Wilson, Tom Mann and Ben 
Tillett) enormous power. All indicators showed the 
probability of railwaymen joining these new forces as 
during the Hull and Manchester disputes. Mitchell 
believed that workers were attracted to the new policy 
and would seek its more extensive application. In the 
hands of the leaders named, he argued, who are 
supported almost without exception by the younger local 
leaders who have largely displaced the older and more 
moderate men, anything might happen in the near future, 
indeed possible consequences of a very grave nature 
have been put forward - for instance, a refusal to 
handle goods by railwaymen is only a step removed from 
refusal to handle special trains (troop trains).24
By 1911 the overall conclusion of Askwith and Mitchell 
was clear. The most threatening aspect of the
industrial conflict was the coherence and scale of 
worker organisation. 'It may be said that difficulties 
such as are being experienced are cyclical and pass 
away after a period of unrest. But there is a 
fundamental difference between past periods of unrest 
and the present one which renders this view complacent. 
The earlier movements were spasmodic and had little 
national cohesion. The present one is essentially 
national and frankly aims at complete stoppage with all 
the advantages of organised bodies in their separate 
trades acting together. During the last thirty years 
the regiments have been formed and disciplined and are 
now, practically for the first time, acting together as 
an army. Thirty years ago the "general strike " was a 
very shadowy proposal. Now it is a definite objective 
deliberately advocated by the same men who have 
achieved at least some success in the present struggle. 
We are in fact thirty years older and labour men, like 
others, learn from experience ... these being our 
general views of the situation we are driven to the 
conclusion that some effort should be made to maintain 
control.'25
The Industrial Council
On 9th August 1911 the President of the BOT, Sydney 
Buxton, endorsed this appraisal of the situation and 
put forward the BOT's recommendations for maintaining
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control26. Buxton noted that the unrest and its 
consequences had directed public attention to the 
question of the improvement of the official machinery 
for preventing or shortening industrial warfare and 
suggested that the public would welcome and support any 
well considered measure for dealing more effectively 
with the question especially if it could be utilised to 
anticipate and thus to prevent disputes from 
culminating in a strike or lockout. Buxton stated that 
it was now generally recognised that industrial 
disputes were not merely the concern of the parties 
directly involved and that the question was not whether 
the state should interfere in trade disputes but what 
form this interference should take. There was a growing 
demand for machinery which would operate quickly and 
automatically. However Buxton was dismissive of the 
many crude suggestions which had been offered as 
solutions of the industrial conflict and of the 
unrealistic expectations of the existing machinery set 
up to deal with the problem. He called for the greatest 
circumspection in taking any steps to address the 
problem since 'a step taken in the wrong direction 
might do great damage and undo much of the patient work 
which has been gradually accomplished in recent years 
by administrative action on the part of the Board of 
Trade.,27
In view of the foregoing Buxton suggested that any 
action taken could follow two distinct lines. Firstly,
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official or judicial powers of compulsion could be 
strengthened either as regards the initial step of 
requiring the submission of a dispute to conciliation 
or arbitration before a stoppage of work takes place or 
with regard to the enforcement on both sides of an 
award when made by a court or both these powers. 
Secondly the official machinery available for 
conciliation, enquiry and (in suitable cases) decision 
could be improved.
Buxton rejected compulsory arbitration since 'it is 
quite certain that neither public opinion nor the 
opinion of employers nor of workmen would assent to the 
compulsory enforcement of an arbitration award.'28 The 
British tradition has 'favoured elasticity of machinery 
proceeding by way of conciliation, enquiry and 
agreement with no reference to arbitration except by 
consent and with arbitration awards (so-called) resting 
solely on moral sanctions.'29
Buxton was more in favour of the suggestion (which he 
identified as substantially the Canadian, Lemieux - 
Mackenzie - King Act) that judicial powers of 
compulsion could be strengthened either as regards the 
initial step of requiring the submission of a dispute 
to conciliation or arbitration before a stoppage of 
work took place. This suggestion had much to recommend 
it, in Buxton's view, in that it gave time for 
consideration, investigation and report before a strike
or lockout could take place, and he advocated that 'it 
might be found practicable with general assent,to 
legislate more or less on those lines.'30 The President 
of the BOT emphasised however that this reform would 
reguire legislation which could not be attempted that 
year but the necessary delay would give an opportunity 
for consideration and consultation on the subject and 
administrative action would have to be resorted to in 
the meantime. The latter consisted of powers under the 
Conciliation Act 1896 given to the BOT to promote 
amicable settlements between parties to disputes. It 
was explained that the idea behind this was to overcome 
the suspicion which is sometimes entertained of single 
arbitrators while avoiding the dangers of setting up a 
Court consisting permanently of the same people. 
Nevertheless, Buxton pointed out that while the BOT's 
interventions had largely been welcomed this was not 
always the case.
It was concluded that the weakness of the present 
system lay in the fact that every act done in the 
direction of conciliation was the direct administrative 
act of a department which was, and was known to be, 
under a political head. Given this it was inevitable 
that at any given time, one party or the other to a 
dispute would suspect BOT intervention. There was 
therefore reason to believe that the work of the BOT 
was materially impaired by the belief (with however 
little foundation) that it was subject to political
influences which favoured one or other parties to a 
controversy.
The strengths of the existing system lay in the fact 
that the BOT was flexible and unhampered by formal 
rules and able to respond in any particular case with 
solutions which seemed most appropriate. There was no 
court consisting of named individuals who might become 
the focus of discontent at an unpopular decision. The 
problem was how the political disadvantage was to be 
eliminated without changing the existing system.
With this in mind Buxton considered Sir Charles 
Macara's plan to transfer the jurisdiction of the BOT 
with regard to labour disputes to an independent court 
under an "Industrial Judge". This plan was rejected on 
the grounds that it would mean the repeal of the 
Conciliation Act to divest the BOT of its duty and on 
the grounds that the 'transfer of these powers to an 
independent and therefore an irresponsible Tribunal' 31 
would have little chance of being accepted by 
Parliament. Even if it was accepted, Buxton went on, 
there would still be the difficulty that the new 
Tribunal, in order to safeguard its independence, would 
have to be permanent in constitution and withdrawn from 
the control of Parliament, like the Courts of Law. It 
was felt that the parties concerned would not agree to 
such a proposal. In addition it was thought probable 
that in the case of a permanent body such as this, its
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method of handling a particular dispute or its refusal 
to intervene, or the nature of its decision would in 
some cases give cause for dissatisfaction to one or 
both sides. It would not be safeguarded as at present, 
by the anonymity of the Board of Trade, the periodical 
changes of Ministers or the power which a great 
administrative Department can exercise of shifting 
about or supplementing the officers in charge of 
particular branches of work. The Industrial Court could 
find itself out of favour for any of these reasons and 
it would simply cease to be invoked with the result 
that recourse to the mediation of the BOT would simply 
begin again in the way that it did before the 
Conciliation Act and there would be two rival official 
agencies which would be highly inadvisable.
It was decided that the solution to the problem of bias 
was reorganisation within the BOT. The BOT, Buxton 
concluded, was of the opinion that any Office or Court 
charged with conciliation and arbitration should not be 
divorced from the BOT; that enough connection should be 
kept between them as to obviate the possibility of the 
future growth of two rival systems of mediation in 
labour disputes and also to secure the ultimate control 
of Parliament.
It was proposed that this could be secured and the 
difficulties circumvented by the expedient of 
delegating the Board's responsibility for action to an
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officer, to be called an Industrial Commissioner or 
Chairman of the Court of Conciliation or Arbitration or 
by some other appropriate name. This officer would hold 
a position in relation to the BOT analogous to that of 
the Comptroller General of Patents. The Patent Office, 
it was clarified, is administratively a branch of the 
BOT but the Comptroller is a judicial person who is 
solely responsible for certain classes of acts and 
decisions and is not under the direction of the 
President of the BOT. An Industrial Office could be 
constituted, presided over by a Commissioner with a 
suitable staff and an Advisory Council all appointed by 
the BOT such that it would be unnecessary to refer to 
the BOT with regard to action to be taken in any 
particular dispute.
The BOT should therefore appoint twenty four Industrial 
Commissioners to include twelve 
employers'representatives and twelve 
workers'representatives under the chairmanship of a 
Chief Industrial Commissioner assisted by a suitable 
departmental staff with power to inquire into and 
report upon any industrial dispute referred to them 
affecting any of the principal trades of the country, 
and likely to cause disputes involving ancillary trades 
or which the parties ,before or after the breaking out 
of a dispute, are unable to settle.
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In addition to the powers conferred upon the Chief 
Commissioner as chairman of the Commissioners, it would 
be his duty to carry out on behalf of the BOT the 
duties conferred upon the Board under the Conciliation 
Act and any other work now carried out by the Labour 
Dept.of the BOT so far as conciliation in labour 
disputes is concerned. The avowed object of the 
Government in appointing Industrial Commissioners with 
an impartial Chairman would be 'to avoid the appearance 
of undue Governmental interference with the problems 
which the trades of the country should specially 
interest themselves in settling.'32 In taking this 
course it was to be made clear that the government did 
not desire to hinder any voluntary methods or 
agreements then in force or likely to be adopted for 
the prevention of stoppage of work or the settlement of 
disputes, but to afford an opportunity in any trade of 
referring such difficulties as may arise to 
investigation, conciliation or arbitration more 
extensively than had previously been the case. The 
object and effect of the new departure was to decrease 
the present great waste of national resources by 
industrial war. Further, this organisation was to 
provide machinery which might facilitate the adoption 
of legislation along the lines of the Canadian model if 
thought advisable. The President of the BOT ended by 
emphasising that it would be undesirable to put the 
above or any other plan before the employers and 
workmen who were to meet the Prime Minister since it
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might be fatal to success if it appeared that the BOT 
had already worked out a plan before the conference. It 
was most important not to give this impression 'but 
rather to elicit the suggestions of the various 
representatives than to present them with a scheme as 
from the Board of Trade.'33
An initial round of talks between employers and workers 
representatives and the state took place on the 15th 
August 1911 and the Industrial Council was established 
on the 10th October 1911. The employers representatives 
included Charles Macara himself.
The Council was chaired by George Askwith, now knighted 
and given the title of Comptroller General of the 
Labour Dept, of the BOT and Chief Industrial 
Commissioner. At the first meeting of the Council on 
the 26th October 1911 Buxton, President of the BOT 
stressed that the 'last thing' he desired was 'to lay 
before you a cut and dried scheme.'34 In the Memorandum 
establishing the Council on the 10th October 1911, 
however, it had been emphasised that the main role of 
the Industrial Council was to supplement and strengthen 
the operation of the BOT in the discharge of its duties 
under the Conciliation Act of 1896.
From the beginning the Industrial Council lacked power 
and influence and failed to gain the confidence of both
136
employers and trade unions particularly those not 
directly represented by the the members of the Council. 
However, the further subdivision of the BOT to produce 
the special Dept.dealing with labour problems under 
Askwith had the effect desired by the President of the 
BOT. As a forum seemingly independent of the BOT,
(which had suffered from accusations of bias towards 
employers and labour in turn) it gave the impression of 
impartiality and action while reinforcing and extending 
the status quo. It supplemented strengthened and 
expanded the operation of the BOT in the discharge of 
its duties under the Conciliation Act and gave the 
impression that something new was being done. Lastly it 
bought time for the measures set in motion by the 
Labour Department to work.
Proposals for State Strategy.
In the intervening period the situation had been 
closely monitored at the request of the Prime Minister 
(Asquith) and two further reports were submitted to the 
Cabinet by the President of the BOT and the Chief 
Industrial Commissioner in April 1912.35 These reports 
assessed the impact of the great strikes on the workers 
themselves, on the trade unions, on the country and on 
the state's management of industrial conflict.
It was noted firstly that the railwaymen's strike of 
the previous August had been a failure from the
workers' point of view and they were very disappointed. 
'They struck in order to obtain "recognition" which 
would at once lead to a large increase in wages. They 
did not obtain recognition in the sense in which they 
interpreted it, namely direct negotiations as in other 
trades between the company and the officers of the 
trade union. They did not obtain any advance in wages 
in any grade from the strike itself though, after the 
strike was over, and no doubt partly in consequence of 
the strike, the companies produced a considerable 
amount of conscience money for the lower grades. 'The 
railwaymen live in hopes, however, that by means of the 
newly constituted conciliation boards, which meet in 
May, further considerable concessions will be obtained. 
Unfortunately their demands are being put very high and 
are almost bound to lead to disappointment. The leaders 
at least propose to continue to act under the 
constitution which came into being under the Royal 
Commission 36 but the leaders are not strong men and 
their influence is by no means supreme.'37 Meanwhile it 
was noted that the coal strike had in some ways eased 
the position. On the one hand the generous 
consideration shown on the whole by the railway 
companies to the men during the great reduction of 
employment which was consequent on the [coal] strike 
had tended to materially improve the relations between 
the men and the managers. On the other hand the funds 
of the Amalgamated Society [of Railway Servants] were 
depleted to the extent of some £100,000 by the coal
strike and to this extent the union has been crippled 
as a fighting force.
With regard to the miners it was thought to be too 
early to estimate the effect of the strike on their 
future action. It was noted that 'The men are sulky, 
suspicious and disappointed' because 'The promises 
freely made by their extreme leaders of a week or two's 
holiday and the early concession of their full demands 
by the owners, under pressure from the community, have 
not been fulfilled.' Neither the community nor the 
government had been terrorised or brought to their 
knees but quite the contrary. The moderate leaders had 
allowed themselves to be overawed by the extremists.
The Executive and the Conference [MFGB] had continually 
shrunk from taking responsibility or failed to give a 
lead. The result was that the trade union leadership 
'both forwards and moderates have come out of the 
conflict discredited and have greatly diminished 
influence. ' The Federation itself had been shaken to 
its foundations and it was thought possible that it 
would not survive the shock and that a process of local 
disintegration might set in. Further,it was noted 'the 
miners have now experienced, very much against their 
will in the case of a large minority and against the 
anticipations of all, the discomforts and sufferings of 
a strike and their funds are for the most part 
exhausted. It is at least doubtful therefore whether, 
whatever may be the decisions of the Joint District
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[conciliation] Boards or of the chairmen (and in some 
cases at least they are bound to be disappointing), the 
Federation, the leaders or the miners will be in a 
position, or care to put up another at the present.'38
The Transport workers were a very different matter for 
the President of the Labour Department. The success of 
the seamen in the previous summer 'in a strike which 
precluded anticipation by the Shipping Federation, was 
astonishingly rapid and thorough. The dockers and 
others followed suit and also obtained large 
concessions. The result was a very great increase in 
the membership and in the funds of the respective 
transport trade unions, great elation on the part of 
the men and a confident belief in their power of 
forcing a successful strike, either for themselves or 
for others in cooperation with them. I do not myself 
believe that syndicalism as such has acquired any hold 
in the country though the South Wales miners' strike 
caused alarm and the recent prosecutions have given it 
an unlooked for advertisement.'39 What was more 
worrying for the President was the 'sympathetic strike 
idea' which 'has made great strides and the more 
extreme of the transport workers (both leaders and men) 
are under the impression that they could, by a 
sympathetic strike of all the import transport workers 
including the railwaymen, "hold up" the country and 
enact practically any terms they chose.' However, 'the 
comparative ill success of the railway strike and the
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failure of the miners to exact their terms have shown 
that the country is not so easily held up as was 
supposed. The object lesson of the miners' strike, that 
the brunt of the suffering of a general strike falls on 
the working classes themselves has probably somewhat 
cooled their ardour. Further, the more moderate leaders 
at all events are anxious not to endanger what they 
gained last year by a precipitate and unsuccessful 
fight.' Finally the Transport Workers Association 'is a 
very heterogenous body and its organisation is not yet 
a year old'.40
Although these factors indicated that industrial 
conflict would probably not escalate, it was noted that 
'there is at least a possibility that the seamen might 
come out as a protest against the prosecution of Tom 
Mann ... Though such action would greatly embarrass 
other unions, as the strike would be political and not 
industrial, it would undoubtedly just now receive great 
sympathy and possibly receive sympathetic backing from 
other unions on the ground that it was a protest 
against "free speech" and against "strike breaking".'41
It was concluded that there were certain disquieting 
features of the situation which found their clearest 
expression in the transport workers' organisation and 
had profound implications for the management of 
industrial conflict. Firstly, any strike which before 
would have been purely local in character or confined
to a trade, 'may now easily develop into a strike on a 
large scale. Secondly, a strike affecting the utility 
services will not only be sympathetic but will, in all 
probability, be begun without notice and in total 
disregard of any agreement, legal or otherwise.' 
Thirdly, a change for the worse had come over the trade 
union movement in respect of the attitude of the men 
towards their leaders and towards agreements 'a change 
of attitude not confined to the less skilled and more 
"rabble" trade unions. The leaders no longer possess 
the confidence and are not allowed the executive 
authority that used to be reposed in them. A 
recommendation by the leaders used, for the most part, 
to be loyally adopted and carried out ... The leaders 
have lost influence and consequently self confidence 
and naturally are unwilling to take the same 
responsibility as they would gladly have taken and did 
take under former conditions. The newer leaders have 
little respect for agreements and their own signatures. 
All this makes collective bargaining far less certain, 
effective and peacemaking.'42 Fourthly, the Labour 
Party has almost completely collapsed as an effective 
influence in labour disputes. They are not consulted 
and are not involved in the current disputes. They 
tried 'to act as a go-between for the men and the 
government but they had very little actual influence 
over the action of the men or on the result. During the 
miners' strike the miners' representatives professed to 
belong to the Labour Party in the House but the Labour
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Party exercised no influence over them at all. The 
miners used them as a "cat's
paw." This was 'a distinct loss to industrial peace' 
since the influence of the Labour Party 'if it still 
existed, would be moderate and constitutional on 
leadership and action ... they may be forced to seek to 
regain their influence by taking up a more aggressive 
attitude on labour questions.'43
For the Chief Industrial Commissioner three factors 
made the continuation of industrial conflict likely. 
Firstly, 'organised unions and disorganised masses of 
workers have become more or less organised, they have 
felt their strength and discovered that their strength 
is greatly increased by united action.' Secondly, 'the 
causes of the industrial conflict in 1910-11, 
particularly the cost of living, are unlikely to be 
minimised in the near future. Owing to the coal strike, 
the importation of foreign food, meat and corn will be 
greatly hampered by the delays and so on in sailing and 
freights of ships due to the lack of coal and the 
certainty that it will be some time before coal 
supplies are back to normal. The scarcity of food means
I
that the advantages of any gains made by workers in 
1911 will be diminished.' Thirdly, employers may 
attempt to get back concessions made as a result of 
strikes and this may provoke 'very stern resistance by 
the workers.' 44 Lastly it was emphasised that the 
country would suffer very badly from any further large
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scale strikes in coal, railways and transport and these 
were the industries in which workers' leverage was 
greatest.
For Askwith industrial disputes might well continue but 
the organisation which had underpinned the industrial 
conflict need not. 'The form of the agitation will 
depend upon the claims remaining after the Joint 
District Boards have done their work.'45 Measures had 
already been taken to weaken the organisation which had 
made the industrial conflict so threatening. 
Conciliation machinery had been set up in the coal 
industry and on the railways. In the coal industry, it 
was noted, workers' future action would depend on the 
outcome of the Joint District Board meetings. Askwith 
pointed out that 'the decisions of the Boards or 
Chairmen will in all likelihood fall short of the hopes 
with which the strike was entered upon' ... 
[nevertheless] ... 'if the main grievances such as 
"abnormal places" and "low paid men" are removed a 
period of comparative guiet will follow.' It was 
acknowledged that 'Scotland may present difficulties 
when its agreement expires in July' but this was not 
thought significant because 'a stoppage in Scotland or 
any other isolated district will not raise serious 
alarm.' It was concluded that 'notwithstanding some 
agitation in districts where the awards are 
disappointing and uncertainty and fear conseguent upon 
the new condition of affairs under the Act46 the mining
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difficulty may be taken as out of the way as far as the 
national danger is concerned.'47
On the railways no immediate difficulties were expected 
from workers because 'their new Boards have been 
formed, they have been heavily hit by the miners' 
strike and have had to pay out large sums in 
unemployment benefit. With railwaymen as contrary to 
miners, careful administration may possibly tend 
gradually to disintegrate the wonderful combination of 
last year. The grade system on the railways and the 
power in the hands of the companies of lightermen must 
ultimately have its effect. The danger from railways 
does not in fact rest so much within the ranks of 
railwaymen themselves as it does in the possibility of 
their organisation being stampeded by other allied 
sections. This danger lies particularly in the close 
connection with transport workers ... It would not be 
wise to ignore this possibility of action and even 
greater danger of united action.'48 The Labour 
Department went on to review the options available for 
counteracting this threat.
The first option, of doing nothing and allowing the 
situation to run its course, was rejected on the 
grounds that this would mean a constant war between the 
parties growing bigger until it would reach something 
approaching a civil war. Secondly, things could be left 
as they were and matters allowed to take their course.
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This would involve the state intervening and attempting 
to mediate difficulties as they arose in the usual way. 
It was emphasised that this policy had been vindicated 
by its results on the railways and in the mines but 
that further action of this type in these industries 
would be difficult and premature - 'this policy takes 
time to show its full effects.' Calls for immediate 
government action 'to relieve the harassment of 
industry are not silenced by this policy.' Given this, 
some other course of action, if necessary, could be 
undertaken by the government. However none of the many 
suggestions put forward by uninformed people such as 
compulsory arbitration, extension of trade boards, the 
doctrine of the Canadian act, enforcement of collective 
bargaining and so on, nor any feasible course of 
legislative enactment would address the situation as 
outlined above or convince the country that panic 
legislation had not been undertaken. It was realised 
that because of the power of the 'new force' in trade 
unionism 'stringent action' would not have the desired 
effect. 'It is certain that in the present temper of 
labour and capital any crude proposals of this nature 
would be bitterly resisted by organised labour. The 
difficulty in this matter is the difficulty of 
enforcing them especially on the men. Men cannot be 
made to work if they will not work and they cannot be 
imprisoned (a million miners for instance) for 
striking. Apart from " conspiracy to defeat the law " 
under which the leaders in Australia might be
prosecuted, a pecuniary penalty is the only 
alternative. A penalty not easy to impose or to 
enforce.'49 What was wanted was a 'careful inquiry' 
which might take a number of forms.50
Firstly, a Parliamentary inquiry. It was acknowledqed 
that this had its uses but was rejected as impractible 
at this time because Labour members of Parliament were 
not the real leaders of the labour movements beinq 
considered and even if they had been, the method of 
selection of such committees would preclude a 
sufficient number being members of the committee.
Secondly, a Royal Commission. The Commissioner 
acknowledged the criticisms levelled against such 
bodies notably, that they tended to create and shelve 
problems rather than solve them, that their 
deliberations were long and tedious and bore no 
relation to what was actually happening. Members often 
needed educating as to what the problem actually was 
and they were subject to exploitation by 'faddists.' On 
the positive side he felt that they did collect a mass 
of valuable evidence and allowed the consideration of 
many hitherto unknown grievances together with 
practical solutions for their redress.
Lastly, Commissioners could be appointed with first 
hand knowledge of the problem. This could be called a 
Royal Commission but be composed of a small number of
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people capable of dealing with the actual problem with 
no preconceived ideas or fads and with a working 
knowledge of the movement to supplant the generally 
conceived methods of trade unions (moderate trade union 
policy). Such people, according to the Commissioner, 
might make sensible suggestions and even if they could 
not agree on many issues, might be able to put forward 
ways in which, for example, the unionist/non-unionist 
dificulty might be solved, or ways in which bargains 
entered into might have a reasonable chance of being 
kept. The exact composition of such a body, it was 
decided, would depend on its frame of reference. 'The 
reference might be put on a very wide basis provided 
that the special attention of the commissioners was 
drawn to the present situation and the necessity for an 
early report for example to enquire and report as to 
the extent, character and causes of the unrest and 
discontent among certain sections of the industrial 
population which have manifested themselves in recent 
labour disputes, and especially to enquire and report 
at an early date as to the best means of securing that 
the industries in which continuity of work is essential 
to the community shall be carried on and to recommend 
what steps, if any, are advisable to deal with the 
situation whether by legislative, administrative or 
voluntary action'.51
However, if the Commission's brief was to concentrate 
only on those trades from which special danger was
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apprehended then a very small commission of capable 
practical men representing both employers and employed 
and consisting of men in the thick of the fight 
including men like Gosling, Smillie, and Vernon 
Hartshorn on the labour side together with three or 
four persons representing the community might be 
selected. With regard to this corporatist solution 
Askwith commented that 'Inclusion of the extreme 
leaders might tend to bring home to them more fully a 
sense of public responsibility and the interests of the 
nation as well as their perfectly legitimate 
aspirations for themselves and their particular 
trades.'52
It was concluded however that there were limits to the 
usefulness of commissions and bodies set up to address 
the question of trade disputes and combinations - 'We 
do not think they offer the solution of existing 
problems.'53 The President of the BOT advised the 
Cabinet that 'The whole question of industrial unrest 
is obviously one abounding in difficulties of all 
sorts. It appears clear that the government cannot 
wholly or effectively move in the direction of 
legislation or even administrative action without much 
fuller information than they have at their disposal and 
after much greater consideration of the question than 
they have yet been able to give.'54 The next section 
will show that, as predicted, industrial conflict 
continued but the measures taken by the Labour
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Department in the direction of conciliation served to 
weaken the 'new force' in worker organisation.
The Miners'and the Transport Workers' Strikes of 1912
Both old grievances and the sympathetic strike were to 
rise again very guickly and in 1912 the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain demanded a National Minimum 
Wage from the coalowners represented by the Mining 
Association. The latter agreed only that local 
negotiations might take place. The miners accepted this 
but threatened national strike action if a settlement 
was not reached in all areas. Negotiations in Scotland, 
South Wales, Northumberland and Durham ended in 
stalemate whereupon the Miners Federation took a strike 
ballot which resulted in overwhelming support for a 
national strike. This strike involved one million 
workers and was the largest Britain had yet seen.
The state intervened and proposals were drawn up for 
the settlement of the dispute endorsing the miners' 
claim to a minimum wage but with the proviso that this 
must be settled on a local basis by agreement or 
government arbitration. The coalowners were divided on 
this. The miners accepted on condition that the minimum 
wage should not be less than 5/- a shift for an adult 
miner anywhere in the country. However the Coal Mines 
Minimum Wage Act 1912 recognised only the principle of 
a minimum wage and did not fix specific wages in
different coalfields or specify the minimum.55 This was 
rejected by a majority of miners but the Miners' 
Federation considered this majority insufficient and 
ordered a return to work. Unrest mounted at this 
decision in large mining areas, notably Northumberland 
and Durham, which had voted overwhelmingly against a 
return to work and this was the source of much 
organised resistance to the return and a widespread 
anti - leadership crusade.56 In spite of this the 
strike faded after five weeks and Minimum Wage Boards 
were established, in all the coalfields. The Boards had 
no power to fix wages but only to protect the position 
of miners working in "abnormal places" or prevented in 
some other way from earning the current district 
wage.57
After the settlement of the 1912 Miners' strike the 
London Transport Workers struck in June and July 1912. 
This strike began as official union action and was 
called as a result of trade unionists' attempt to 
extend the gains of 1911 [for example on the guestion 
of union control over the employment of casual labour, 
employers' resistance to any further union demands and 
refusal to recognise the N.T.W.F]. State intervention 
failed and a general strike was called which attracted 
support from London workers and their families and 
included huge demonstrations involving up to one 
thousand people.
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The strike was characterised by widespread violent 
conflict between strikers, blacklegs and police. There 
were several gun battles, notably on the steamship 
'City of Columbo' in Victoria docks at the end of July 
and similar conflicts erupted at the Royal Albert, West 
India, Surrey Commercial and Tilbury docks. However 
employers proved intractable, the strike did not 
attract significant sympathetic action from outside 
London since most transport workers had achieved higher 
wages and union bargaining rights as a result of the 
1911 strikes and no common set of grievances existed to 
unite transport workers nationally. Also the strike 
leadership did not make practical preparations for 
national action - they assumed that 1911 would be 
repeated.58 London strikers were thus isolated, food 
and money dwindled and they were starved into 
submission. Leaders called for a return to work and the 
strike was called off on July 27th 1912 although many 
workers initially refused to return to work.
Summary and Conclusion.
This chapter has highlighted the concerns of the state 
in managing the industrial conflict. The reports of the 
BOT emphasised that in the years immediately preceding 
1910 'the capitalist had been able to secure a larger 
reward'59 whilst the living standards of the working
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class had fallen. Buxton of the BOT chided particularly 
intransigent employers and concluded in 1912 that 
'looking back over the last twelve months probably no 
one, least of all any reasonable employer would deny 
that, taking into account the prosperity of the 
country, the expansion of trade and the increased cost 
of living, the increased remuneration thus wrung from 
employers was fully justified.'60 Although the 
exploitation of the working class was highlighted, the 
aim of the Labour Department's activities in the field 
of conciliation was not to redress the balance in 
favour of the working class in industrial bargaining. 
The activities of the Labour Department were primarily 
aimed at preventing the development of worker 
organisation which could dislocate the country.
Investigations by the BOT into the industrial conflict 
of 1910-12 revealed that the aims of the workers were 
not revolutionary in the sense that there was no 
coherent radical agenda. Workers had adopted the 
methods of syndicalism "Direct Action" rather than its 
aims. Worker organisation was characterised by a new 
coherence and scale and the leaders of the established 
trade unions had lost power over their members. The 
scale and character of worker organisation in key 
industries constituted a potential "national danger" 
which could be realised through ill considered action 
on the part of the state. The more forcefully the state 
intervened the more likely it was to produce the
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situation it aimed to prevent and yet to do nothing 
could have the same result. The conservatism which made 
trade union leaders valuable in defusing industrial 
conflict had become its focus. They had lagged behind 
new developments in working class organisation with the 
result that their members began to perceive them as a 
brake on their aspirations. Because of trade union 
leaders' refusal to embark on sympathetic strikes in an 
effort to protect their union funds and existence, they 
came to be seen as collaborators with the state and 
employers rather than representatives of what their 
members saw as their interests.
The state's response was to set up the Industrial 
Council which bought time during which existing 
machinery for curtailing disputes could be strengthened 
and directed with increased vigour towards 
disorganising the 'wonderful combination' which 
underpinned the threat.
The next two years until the outbreak of war were 
peaceful by comparison with the preceding two years. 
This is not to say that tranquillity had been restored 
just that there were no strikes on the same scale. 
However the formation of the Triple Alliance of miners, 
railwaymen and transport workers' unions and continued 
unrest prompted Askwith to predict that 'Within a very 
short time there may be movements coming to a head of 
which recent events have been a small foreshadowing.'61
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Nevertheless, because of the temper of organised 
labour, the state's management of industrial unrest 
remained gualitatively unaltered in this period and the 
majority of industrial disputes involving a strike or 
lockout were settled through existing conciliation 
machinery or through mediation by the BOT which set up 
conciliation machinery.62 Askwith reported that this 
was having a beneficial effect and 'Trade after trade 
was gradually being organised on a basis of good 
relationships so far as the leaders of both sides were 
concerned. A network of associated employers and 
federated trade unions was spreading all over the 
country.'63
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Chapter 5
Trade Unions and the Munitions Of War Act
Introduction
When war was declared on the 4th of August 1914 there 
were one hundred strikes known by the BOT to be in 
progress.1 On the 25th of August a joint meeting took 
place of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC, the 
management committee of the General Federation of Trade 
Unions and the Executive Committee of the Labour Party. 
At this meeting the cooperation of the labour movement 
was pledged to the war effort and it was resolved 'that 
an immediate effort be made to terminate all existing 
trade disputes whether strikes or lockouts and whenever 
difficulties arise during the war period, a serious 
attempt should be made by all concerned to reach an 
amicable settlement before resorting to a strike or 
lockout.'2 By the end of August the number of strikes 
had been reduced to twenty.3 It seemed that workers' 
patriotism had triumphed over their conflict with 
employers. It soon became obvious to the BOT however 
that this was misconceived. 'New ideas and new 
organisations among the workers had not disappeared in 
the confusion of the early days of the war; and when 
the first shock was over the public were apparently
astonished to find that men were very much what they 
had been before August 1914.'4
By June 1915 the BOT was forced to conclude that 
patriotism was losing to self interest and both workers 
and employers were taking advantage of the war 
situation. The shortage of labour, it was noted, was 
an increasingly serious problem which directly delayed 
production but it had effects 'perhaps even more 
serious. Practically any workman of any pretensions to 
skill at all in the engineering and shipbuilding trades 
has so little difficulty in finding work the moment he 
wants it that he has little economic motive left for 
remaining with his employer, if he is in any way 
dissatisfied, whether with good reason or without. On 
the other hand, the employers, constantly urged by the 
Government to increase their output, do not feel 
themselves really in a position to bargain with the 
men, and have indeed, in many cases owing to the terms 
of their contracts, little incentive to do so. The 
ordinary economic control of the individual workman has 
practically broken down.' This situation was made worse 
by 'the increase in prices, the rumour of large profits 
made by those who were regarded as enemies of the 
working class and the distrust of established 
authorities which survived the excitement of war - all 
this had developed into a movement opposing the 
generally accepted policy of the Government and the 
officials of the trade unions ... The result is that to
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a very considerable extent the men are out of the 
control of both employers and their own leaders.5
To understand how the situation confronting the BOT 
arose and the strategies which were developed in the 
wake of these difficulties this section will outline 
the sequence of events which preceded it. In keeping 
with the overall emphasis of the thesis this chapter 
will focus on the relationship between the state and 
the trade unions and between the trade union leadership 
and the rank and file in the management of industrial 
conflict
Industrial Unrest at the Outbreak of War
Once war was declared the growing need for recruits to 
the armed services quickly produced a shortage of 
labour, especially skilled labour in the engineering 
trades, and a shortage of munitions6. By October 1914 
the engineering trades had lost 12.2% of their pre - 
war male workers; by February 1915 16.4%; by July 1915 
19.5%.7 The worsening labour situation led to the Shell 
Conference on 21st December 1914 at which the BOT 
proposed that disputes should be settled by some agreed 
form without stoppage of work by strike or lockout and 
that trade union rules and practices which restricted 
output should be temporarily suspended for the duration 
of the war to allow for dilution.
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The BOT outlined these proposals in a letter to both 
the engineering employers and the ASE in January 1915 
and asked that they now resolve the labour shortage on 
this basis. On 4th February 1915, with still no 
agreement reached, the Prime Minister, Asguith, 
appointed a committee (composed of Askwith of the BOT, 
Sir Francis Hopwood of the Admiralty and Sir George 
Gibb of the War Office with HJ Wilson, former registrar 
of the Industrial Council, as secretary). This 
committee was called the Committee on Production in 
Engineering and Shipbuilding and its brief was to 
obtain the agreement of the engineering and 
shipbuilding workers to the above proposals.8 The 
Committee's intervention resulted in the Shells and 
Fuses Agreement in March 1915 which provided for the 
introduction of unskilled labour, including women, on 
jobs reserved for skilled men in the engineering 
industry 9 but with the conditions that women who took 
over men's jobs were to get the rate for the job, (to 
protect the male rate at the end of the war not to 
establish the rate for the job, regardless of sex as a 
basic principle) the agreement was to last for the war 
only and women would be the first to be discharged when 
the labour shortage was over.10
In early 1915 however labour unrest began to escalate 
once more. 11 The Committee on Production recommended 
that the government take action to prevent all strikes
and lockouts on war work and to have disputes where 
parties could not reach a settlement referred to an 
independent tribunal for arbitration. This 
recommendation was accepted and the next day 21st 
February 1915 the Committee on Production became the 
arbitration tribunal.12
Whilst trade union leaders and the state had agreed on 
the need to implement labour controls however, trade 
union members proved less amenable. In January 1915 
only ten disputes had been known to the Labour Dept., 
of the BOT, but by March there were seventy four fresh 
disputes. In March 1915 trade union leaders in 
munitions asked the state to help them secure their 
members acceptance of the proposed labour controls and 
a conference was called to discuss the issue.13 An 
agreement was reached between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Lloyd George), the Parliamentary Committee 
of the TUC and the leaders of the thirty six unions 
involved in war production that trade union restrictive 
practices would be abandoned, dilution would be 
introduced and strikes would be avoided by means of 
arbitration. This agreement, called the Treasury 
Agreement, was reached in exchange for the pledge that 
trade union practices would be restored after the war, 
that employers' profits would be restricted during the 
war and was based on the Shells and Fuses Agreement.
The Miners'leaders were not party to this agreement and 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers held out for
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better terms.14 Without the ASE this agreement had 
little value and a week later a Supplementary Treasury 
Agreement was drawn up which was more acceptable to the 
ASE. It contained additional clauses stating that trade 
practices were only to be relaxed for the war period 
and protection for skilled workers 'in the case of the 
introduction of new inventions which were not in 
existence in the pre war period the class of workmen to 
be employed on this work shall be determined according 
to the practice prevailing before the war in the case 
of the class of work most nearly analogous.'15
The agreement still did not eliminate unofficial 
strikes which began to proliferate after it was signed. 
In the three months following the agreement strikes 
increased affecting more than 84,000 workers and 
involving the loss of over 525,000 working days.16 
These strikes were concentrated on the Clyde where 
industrial unrest had begun to mount even before the 
Treasury agreement was signed or discussed with the 
trade unions. On the 16th of February 1915 events had 
crystallised in a general strike among Clyde engineers 
over a wage issue. The strike ended on the 4th of March 
after a Government ultimatum to the strikers and the 
Committee on Production stepped in as arbitrator in 
advance of its official role as arbitration committee - 
the strikers were given half of their original wage
demand.
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The attempt to prevent strikes and implement dilution 
by voluntary agreement had failed. These had been 
agreed to in theory but strikes had broken out and 
dilution was still the subject of protracted 
negotiations between all parties. LLewellyn-Smith of 
the Labour Department of the BOT put the matter 
succinctly 'The difficulty ... is that the workmen, 
though engaged in armaments work, still feel themselves 
to be working essentially for private employers with 
whom they have only a "cash nexus" and that in the 
present circumstances a cash nexus is guite inadequate 
to secure control.'17
In a report circulated to the War Office at the 
beginning of June, LLewellyn-Smith reviewed labour 
policy to date and opted for compulsion. 'My considered 
judgment is in favour of immediate legislation, as I am 
convinced that any further attempt on merely voluntary 
lines unsupported by legislative enactment will only 
break down and lose valuable time. I am glad to find 
that these views are shared by Sir George Askwith and 
Mr Mitchell of the Chief Industrial Commissioner's 
Department.'18
LLewellyn- Smith proposed to take the Treasury 
Agreement of March 17th 1915 as the starting point for 
legislation saying that although this had to a large 
extent covered the ground it had been rendered largely 
inoperative because trade union leaders had found
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themselves unable to carry their rank and file with 
them by voluntary persuasion and the Government had 
found themselves unable to complete by purely voluntary 
agreement their undertaking to control the profits of 
the principal contractors. In the event, as the next 
section will show, the provisions of the legislation 
focused on the growing strength of the working class.
The Munitions of War Act.
The BOT noted that during 1915 the cost of living had 
begun to rise and wage increases began to be granted of 
varying amounts, on different bases in different trades 
and in different parts of the country. A sort of wage 
anarchy had set in as employers with and without 
government contracts began to bid against each other in 
offering higher wages to attract and keep skilled 
workers. It was emphasised that the success of the war 
effort depended on keeping skilled workers on 
Government munitions work. In response to this crisis 
LLewellyn-Smith proposed as a form of control, the 
strengthening of the Defence of the Realm Regulation 
prohibiting employers from holding out inducements to 
workmen to change their employment.19' In view of the 
very wide prevalence of this evil, I am inclined to
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think that we should tighten up the Regulation and it 
may be necessary to take the opportunity of the [MOW] 
Bill to make sure it is not "ultra vires". Without 
going into details, I suggest the line followed might 
be that, in the case of workmen engaged on Government 
work, no new employer should take them on within a 
certain period of their leaving such employment without 
either a certificate from the previous employer that he 
consents or a certificate from some tribunal such as a 
Court of Referees that this refusal was unreasonably 
withheld'.20
At the same time it was realised that the success of 
this policy depended on the cooperation of munitions 
workers - 'a great and concerted voluntary effort will 
also be needed'.21 This in turn depended on the 
substitution among them 'of a motive not of a purely 
economic character.' If workers in munitions were to 
accept these new demands it was necessary to appeal to 
their patriotism. Patriotism might be encouraged and 
the shortage of skilled labour eased, in Llewellyn 
Smith's view, by 'the raising by voluntary enrolment of 
an "Industrial Army" of munition workers with some such 
title as the King's Munitions Corps.'22
Although they expressed themselves largely in favour of 
these initiatives 'as a penultimate measure in the hope 
of avoiding industrial conscription,' officials of the 
War Office thought they would not address the problem
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of recruitment or increased arms production. In this 
view trade union leaders were the main obstacle in the 
way of further recruitment and increased industrial 
production - they should be bought off for the duration 
of the war and replaced by factory managements.23 For 
the Labour Department of the BOT however the goodwill 
of trade union leaders was indispensible. Llewellyn 
Smith had earlier warned the government that 'nothing 
but disaster would attend any attempt to rush the 
position by a frontal attack on union policy, or by any 
Government action which would give the unions the 
impression that the Government in this matter were 
acting as the mouthpiece of the employers'24 Of the 
industrialists at the War Office he noted 'On labour 
matters ... Girouard and Booth are amateurs ... I doubt 
if either has any idea of the pitfalls in any "new 
labour policy".'25 In any case as employers their 
primary objective was not the national interest but 
competition with each other in search of individual 
profit.26
Amid escalating industrial unrest and alleged shortages 
of munitions 27 the Ministry of Munitions was set up 
headed by Lloyd George on the 9th of June 1915. The 
Ministry of Munitions was organised in separate 
sections including a Labour Department, whose personnel 
and policy were transplanted from the BOT.28 
Immediately after the formation of the Ministry of 
Munitions Lloyd George held talks with the unions which
had signed the Treasury Agreement about giving 
statutory effect to the latter. The unions agreed and 
the Munitions of War Act was passed on the 2nd of July 
1915. However the Munitions of War Act went much 
farther than the Treasury Agreement. The Act gave the 
state extensive powers over workers in controlled 
industries. The state now controlled their mobility, 
pay and conditions of work. The Act provided that for a 
period of six weeks no employment was to be given to a 
worker who left work in munitions without a leaving 
certificate from his employer. This made it difficult 
for workers to increase their wages by moving to 
employers offering higher rates. Strikes and lockouts 
in all industries engaged in war work became illegal 
and all disputes were to be referred to the BOT for 
arbitration. Since there was now a boom in the 
munitions industry and employers had no use for the 
lockout, workers bore the brunt of this regulation and 
now had no way of improving their wages except through 
the long process of a tribunal. The Act did not forbid 
incitement to strike but under the Defence of the Realm 
Acts (regulation 42) amended in November 1915, it was 
an offence 'to impede, delay, or restrict the 
production, repair or transport of war material or any 
other work necessary for the successful prosecution of 
the war'.
Under the Act 6,000 Controlled Establishments were 
ultimately created and Munitions Tribunals were
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established as the agency of enforcement of the Act.
In addition, it provided for the control of employers' 
profits so that the restriction of trade union 
liberties should benefit the state and not employers.30
The MOW Act and Industrial Unrest.
The Munitions Act met worker resistance almost 
immediately. Thirteen days after it was passed 200,000 
miners stopped work in South Wales. An agreement 
between miners and coalowners had expired and 
negotiations for a new one had broken down. The BOT had 
been conducting negotiations but the miners had 
rejected the peace formula suggested. On the 13th July 
a Royal Proclamation was issued under the MOW Act 
making it an offence to take part in a strike in the 
South Wales coalfields and setting up a General 
Munitions Tribunal in that area. This exacerbated the 
strike and on the 20th July the Minister of Munitions 
and the President of the BOT (Lloyd George and 
W.Runciman) went to Cardiff and ended the strike by 
granting practically all the strikers' claims.31
The storm centre of industrial unrest in 1914-16 
however, was the Clyde Valley where munitions 
production was concentrated and where, from the 
outbreak of war, workers found themselves under 
increasing pressure to accept dilution. On the 25th of
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July 1915 coppersmiths at Fairfield's shipyard struck. 
In early July the management of Fairfield's had applied 
for and was granted permission from the Glasgow and 
West of Scotland Armaments Committee to substitute 
plumbers on work usually done by coppersmiths. The 
Coppersmith's union had been reluctant to approve of 
this move but was told by management that since the 
firm was a controlled establishment it would do it 
anyway. After the annual works holiday the coppersmiths 
struck over the initiative but were subsequently fined 
only a very small amount by a Munitions Tribunal and 
the Coppersmiths' union showed its support by paying 
the fines.32
On the 26th of August Fairfields'workers struck again 
over the dismissal of two shipwrights for slacking. The 
latter had been sent on their way with leaving 
certificates which bore the inscription 'not attending 
to work.' (The leaving certificate rule was 
increasingly used by Clyde employers to discipline 
workers. By threatening to dismiss workers without 
leaving certificates, which would effectively mean they 
would be unemployed for at least six weeks, employers 
could force workers to take on dirty low paid and 
unpopular work and keep skilled labour regardless of 
the availability of work elsewhere. 33) After a meeting 
the shipyard director had reluctantly agreed to remove 
the offending phrase but not to reinstate the workers 
and 426 shipwrights struck. The Ministry of Munitions
was informed and a week later twenty six of the 
strikers were prosecuted (mostly shop stewards).
Shortly after the coppersmiths' hearing Lloyd George 
had told the shipbuilding employers that the Ministry 
would consider prosecuting 'in suitable cases ... where 
we could make sure we could make a real example.'34 At 
the shipwrights'hearing fifteen men pleaded guilty to 
contravening the MOW Act and two of those who pleaded 
not guilty were convicted and fined ten pounds each 
with twenty one days to pay. Three of the men refused 
to pay and were imprisoned and this provoked a swell of 
unrest among Clyde workers and threats of a general 
strike.
It should be noted that unrest on the Clyde predated 
the MOW Act and there had been considerable trouble 
over swingeing rent increases imposed by landlords 
taking advantage of the housing shortage made worse by 
the influx of munitions workers into the region. In the 
summer of 1915 the Clyde Workers Committee had been 
formed out of the strike committee which had 
coordinated the February 1915 strike over wages and the 
attempt to introduce Taylorism in engineering on the 
Clyde. This strike marked the beginning of the Shop 
Stewards' and Workers'Committee movement which was 
later to spread across the country. This movement grew 
out of the engineering workshop which was organised 
around shop stewards and their committees. For some 
years the Amalgamated Society of Engineers had
organised its membership in disparate factories through 
a system of shop stewards appointed by, and responsible 
to, District Committees (also known as Vigilance 
Committees) of the union. In the years leading up to 
the First World War however, a rift developed between 
the District Committees and the shop stewards such that 
they became semi-independent of the former and were 
appointed by the rank and file.35 However it was only 
during the war that an independent shop stewards' 
movement developed outside of existing trade union 
organisation and evolved its own policy based on the 
theory of class struggle, the abolition of capitalism, 
the reorganisation of trade unionism and 
workers'control of industry.36
The Clyde Workers'Committee leadership was dominated by 
members of the influential Socialist Labour Party. The 
SLP had the most consistently revolutionary outlook of 
any political party active on Clydeside at that time. 
Members of the SLP were adherents of Daniel DeLeon's 
Industrial Unionism.37 The influence of the SLP was 
expressed among the leadership of the CWC in its 
awareness of the need for one union in each industry 
and for political action.
This was the backdrop to industrial unrest on the Clyde 
and the leaders of some of the strikes, with the 
exception of the rent strikes and the strike at Lang's 
of Johnstone, (see below) were members of the CWC. The
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CWC was not against dilution per se, believing that it 
was an inevitable step in the evolution of capitalism 
such that it was an illusion to think (as the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers believed) that the 
pre-war situation of labour could be restored. In 
adhering to Industrial Unionism the CWC was, 
theoretically, against barriers of craft, sex and race 
and sought workers'control of industry as the only way 
workers'interests could be protected. Of all the 
agreements negotiated concerning dilution on war work 
the Clyde Workers'Agreement, negotiated by the CWC, won 
the best terms (egual pay or the rate for the job) for 
dilutees who were largely women. However there is no 
evidence that this was done for women workers but to 
ensure that women could not be used to undercut men.38
The Cabinet became concerned on receiving reports on 
the situation39 from the Labour Dept.,of the Ministry 
of Munitions. Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lynden 
Macassey were appointed 'to enguire into the causes and 
circumstances of the apprehended differences affecting 
munitions workers in the Clyde district'40. However, 
Balfour and Macassey had no authority to release the 
imprisoned workers and union leaders of the Clyde 
engineering and shipbuilding industry sent a telegram 
to the Ministry of Munitions demanding the release of 
the workers and a reply within three days. The union 
leaders met Lloyd George and it was decided that the
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men would be released and the unions could pay the 
fines.
The state of mind of Clyde workers was characterised by 
Macassey as 'universal irritation, unveiled hostility 
to the Act and corroding suspicion of every clause 
under the Act. From this mental disposition, all the 
present unrest is begotten' and is not 'the spontaneous 
product of the workmen's own cogitation' but the work 
of 'two or three local trade union officials who 
deliberately and for their own purposes, circulated 
only too effectively, untrue statements as to the 
origin of the Act and garbled, misleading versions of 
its effect.' These officials did this for their own 
advancement (the prize was the General Secretaryship of 
the ASE41) and did not expect such a powerful response 
from their members. The officials lost control and were 
swept along by the tide of resentment and 'soon the 
crowd overtook their local leaders. Now these 
particular officials, to justify their existence, are 
forced to inflate and paint as crowning tyrannies of 
the Act, every pettifogging complaint that in peacetime 
would not have secured report by a shop steward to his 
union local branch.'42
The MOW Act and dilution.
Towards the end of 1915 information received from 
controlled establishments led the Labour Department to
conclude that, although the suspension of restrictions 
and the dilution of labour was taking place, it was 
taking place too slowly for the necessities of the 
situation. Some firms were making changes but many more 
were not. In explanation some employers asserted that 
they did not need to abolish trade union restrictions 
(they had managed to increase output in other ways) and 
had not therefore attempted to do so. A number were 
willing to make changes but the threat of worker 
resistance prevented them. Some unions (notably the 
Boilermakers) would not work with non unionists. In 
short there was a great deal of conservatism among both 
employers and workers.43
In addition the War Munitions Volunteer scheme 
(formerly the King's Munitions Corps) had failed to 
live up to expectations and the total number of skilled 
men transferred from private work to munitions was only 
12000 44 It was decided that this laid to rest the 
theory, favoured by the trade unions, that the absolute 
shortage of skilled men could be met by shifting 
skilled men from one shop to another. Further, the 
policy of releasing skilled men from the army had 
proved disappointing 45 as had the importation of 
skilled men from the Dominions and other countries.46 
As early as December 1914 the Board of Trade had been 
considering importing labour from outside Britain.
Although some trade unions had suggested this, in 
practice it had proved problematic not least because
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trade unionists would not work with imported labour 
while their own workmates were recruited to fight in 
the trenches47. Of the bid to introduce coloured labour 
it was noted 'the trade unions constantly and 
successfully set their faces against the attempt.'48 
The Ministry of Munitions had not pressed the unions on 
this issue and opted for segregation by setting up 
separate establishments staffed exclusively by foreign 
labour as at Birtley in Durham which consisted 
exclusively of Belgian workers.49
In July 1915 a National Registration Act had been 
passed and on the 15th of August 1915 a census was 
taken to provide information as to the size and skills 
of the maximum possible workforce in Britain. From this 
exercise it was concluded that no more skilled labour 
could be recruited, that Britain could not expect to 
produce munitions with male labour while maintaining an 
army of continental size, and without dilution it would 
be impossible to raise the 1,500,000 men thought 
necessary for the 1916 campaign.60
LLoyd George addressed a conference of the executives 
of the engineering unions in September 1915 and told 
them that since all other expedients had failed, only 
dilution could prevent labour conscription or the 
destruction of the nation.61 He assured the engineering 
unions that their interests would be safeguarded if 
dilution was accepted and suggested the appointment of
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a committee of trade union representatives, engineering 
employers and representatives of the Ministry of 
Munitions to help implement dilution. This Committee 
was to draw up a comprehensive scheme for dilution 
which would increase the scope and numbers of women 
employed in a way acceptable to men and women workers. 
The Central Labour Supply Committee was duly formed and 
at its first meeting on the 22nd of September 1915 it 
dutifully agreed that dilution was the only solution to 
the labour shortage and a directive known as CE 1 was 
issued to all controlled establishments instructing 
them to implement dilution on the 13th of October 
1915.52 This directive laid down that no worker in 
munitions production was to be employed on any work 
requiring less skill than he possessed. Where there was 
a shortage of manpower invalid soldiers, army rejects 
and women and children were to be introduced and the 
substitution of unskilled for skilled workers was to be 
achieved by the introduction of automatic machines and 
the subdivision of skilled tasks into their simplest 
processes.53 Following this directive the 'L'
Circulars were issued - a series of five circulars 
dealing with wages and general policies with regard to 
the implementation of dilution in controlled 
establishments. These circulars included 
recommendations on which jobs were 'within the limits 
of women's capabilities,' on health and welfare and 
minimum wages for women. They recommended that 
dilution be implemented only after consultation with
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the workers and clear explanation by management of 
proposed changes. The adoption of these recommendations 
was however optional and although they were implemented 
in munitions factories directly controlled by 
government they were ignored by employers who 
subcontracted work from the government as well as by 
some government departments, notably the Admiralty. 
Circulars L2 and L3 respectively recommended a £1 
minimum wage for women workers and a minimum for 
substituted male labour. It was not until February 1916 
that these circulars were made mandatory under pressure 
from the ASE.54
In advance of a proposed visit to the Tyne and the 
Clyde by the Minister of Munitions to expedite 
dilution, Lynden Macassey (arbitrator for the Labour 
Department) visited the Tyne in early December 1915.
His aim was to meet the District Committee of the ASE 
'to force the issue as to whether or not the men of the 
district would accept the scheme of dilution agreed 
upon by the government.' On arrival, however, he found 
the atmosphere such that 'it was inadvisable to force 
any issue, especially as I felt that by delaying 
matters for a few days and by careful handling the 
question could be satisfactorily settled.' In spite of 
'careful handling' Macassey found that workers on the 
Tyne remained unconvinced of the need to increase the 
output of munitions. For Macassey this was 'merely an 
excuse not to give up their restrictions ... there was
no question that the munitions were necessary and 
'every workshop must be diluted to the full.' For 
Macassey this was necessary not only to increase the 
flow of munitions but also to discipline skilled 
workers in the engineering works who had such power 
that the government, their employers and their own 
leaders were careful not to upset them. Macassey 
pointed to 'the lamentable and disgraceful timekeeping 
which takes place in these works. I believe I am right 
in saying that between 30% and 60% of the men in many 
cases do not turn up on Monday at all ... The men are 
better off than they have ever been, and whether they 
are fully employed or underemployed, the wages they are 
receiving now are higher than they have ever received 
before .' In Macassey's view 'dilution shoud be put 
into operation with all possible speed and force since 
[the workers] do not have a leg to stand on ... the way 
the government have met their point of view is far more 
generous than might have been expected when compared 
with the great national crisis.' Macassey's experience 
led him to conclude that while Lloyd George's proposed 
visit could be beneficial it would be insufficient to 
implement dilution. Macassey had been informed by the 
workers' leaders that although they were convinced that 
dilution was necessary the workers would not believe 
them such that 'definite and strong measures will have 
to be taken in any case where the men object to their 
restrictions for the moment being done away with.'56
Similarly on the Clyde, Paterson (Chief Labour Officer) 
reported that in spite of the MOW Act, 'trade union 
restrictions were being as firmly insisted upon as ever 
they were and it was hopeless to expect employers to 
take any action in the direction suggested (in CEI) 
until the Ministry of Munitions had brought the 
necessary pressure to bear on trade unions to secure 
the waiving in practice - and not merely on paper - of 
their restrictions.'56 Employers on the Clyde were 
convinced that the Ministry of Munitions knew the 
hollowness and insincerity of trade union action but 
was unwilling to pressure the unions preferring to let 
individual employers take the brunt of union 
opposition. Employers were determined not to be used in 
this way by the Ministry. It was emphasised that as far 
as Clyde employers were concerned the Ministry's 
position had been amply demonstrated at Lang's of 
Johnstone where 'The Ministry allowed the ASE to 
dictate the terms of settlement and this had resulted 
in the evaporation of all interest in the question of 
the dilution of labour.'57 Paterson emphasised that he 
had not discussed the employers' views or the great 
scope for dilution in works across the Clyde with the 
local officials of the trade unions because 'I am sure 
that no purpose could be served by consultation with 
the local officials of trade unions. The matter would 
merely be referred to the central executives of various 
unions and much valuable time would be lost.' Like the 
report on the situation with regard to dilution on the
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Tyne, this report was intended to acquaint the Minister 
of Munitions with the position before he went to 
Glasgow to meet the shop stewards with a view to 
expediting the implementation of dilution there. 
Paterson concluded his report with the opinion that no 
appreciable increase in dilution would be achieved in 
this way. 'The atmosphere which is essential to permit 
of such a movement yielding any result does not exist, 
and the chances of any movement might well be likened 
to an effort to advance and sustain an advance against 
a wall of poisoned gas.'58
The reference to Lang's of Johnstone in this report at 
the expense of the other disputes in progress at the 
time stems from the fact that this firm was a major 
machine-tool manufacturer and had been something of a 
test case for the Ministry. At this firm notice was 
given of the intention to introduce female labour at 
the end of August 1915. This was made impossible until 
November because of lengthy negotiations with the 
central and local officials of the ASE. The attempt to 
introduce women at Lang's in August 1915 led to a 
protracted dispute with the ASE which eventually 
resulted in a heavily qualified agreement and the 
introduction of only a few women.59
The dispute at Lang's was singled out by the Labour 
Department as characterising the key obstacles to the 
implementation of dilution viz. the provision requiring
notice to workmen of proposed changes, divisions within 
and between different levels of trade union 
organisation and hostility to the introduction of women 
workers. These factors were practically a guarantee of 
resistance and unrest with the result that some 
employers avoided attempting to implement change. Also 
some employers shared workers' attitudes towards 
changes especially with regard to the influx of women 
workers 'it is no use proposing dilution of labour when 
competent unskilled male labour cannot be obtained for 
work which would be unsuitable for women.'60
In summary the trade unions had agreed in theory to 
cooperate but it was recognised by the state that given 
union officials' need to retain credibility with their 
members which was manifest in their insistence on 
consultation and agreement at both local and national 
level they didn't intend to cooperate actively in 
dilution and so it had proved. In the original draft of 
the Munitions of War Act the provision reguiring notice 
to the workmen concerned and local consultation over 
the introduction of changes was omitted, it had been 
reinserted after talks with union leaders. This now 
stood in the way of further dilution because asking 
workers whether women workers could be introduced or 
whether other changes could be introduced 'practically 
means inviting them to raise difficulties, and this 
they do. It also means inviting them to ask for 
evidence that the change proposed is necessary. The
extent to which this may go is illustrated by the fact 
that at Elswick (Armstrong Whitworth & Co.) it was 
actually suggested by one of the men that before 
dilution was permitted they should be allowed to go to 
the Front and ascertain whether the guns alleged to be 
reguired were really needed.'61
At Smith's in Coventry and Manchester, after 
consultation failed, the Ministry instructed the firm 
to introduce women and it did so whereupon the men 
struck in defiance of their union. The union managed to 
get the men back to work and the women stayed at work 
but there was still opposition to women in other 
Manchester machine shops. It was concluded that in 
practice consultation usually meant stalemate since 
'Consultation unfortunately means, as a rule, 
consulting both the local workmen and trade union 
leaders and it sometimes happens that when one is 
favourable the other is unfavourable, and vice 
versa.'62
The State's Response.
The state assumed responsibility for the implementation 
of dilution at the beginning of 1916 and mounted a 
campaign to enforce dilution firstly on the Clyde. 
Responsibility for the implementation of dilution was 
centralised in 1916 with the formation of the Dilution
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Section of the Labour Dept., which was to replace the 
Central Munitions Labour Supply Committee now seen as 
slow and cumbersome.63 LLoyd George spearheaded the 
campaign on the Clyde but only succeeded in aggravating 
unrest and hardening resistance when "The Forward" was 
supressed under DORA Reg.51.on the 4th of January 1916 
for attempting to print a report of his Christmas Day 
speech thought likely to impede the progress of 
dilution.
On the 17th of January a letter was sent by the Chief 
Labour Officer of the Ministry of Munitions to Ministry 
headguarters in London which acknowledged that, while 
there was no evidence of their direct obstruction of 
dilution (they were willing to negotiate), the shop 
stewards focused public attention on them and this 
obscured the underlying problem which was the refusal 
of skilled workers generally to cooperate in dilution. 
They had been able to hide behind the more public 
activities of the shop stewards. If progress was to be 
made this buffer would have to be removed but only 
after care had been taken not to escalate the situation 
or present the government in a bad light. 'Below I give 
the names of the gentlemen whose removal would go a 
long way towards helping production, viz; Kirkwood, 
Gallacher, Messer, Muir, McManus, Clark, McLean, and 
Petroff. I am afraid that the removal of almost any one 
of these men (with the possible exception of McLean and 
Petroff) would at once cause a big strike. When a
strike takes place, it is desirable that the Government 
should have the best case possible to present to the 
public. Ultimately it will be forced to give some 
reasons for the removal of these men, and it would have 
to be disclosed that action had been taken on general 
statements, unsupported by real evidence of a 
convincing nature. A very much cleaner issue would be a 
strike against the enforcement of the dilution of 
labour, as the Government then would be in a position 
of asking the skilled men of the country to allow their 
skill to be used to the best advantage, and the public 
opinion would be overwhelmingly against the men. If 
therefore, definite orders for the dilution of labour 
are to be given, I think it would be better to delay 
consideration of the guestion of removing the men out 
of the district.'64
On the 22nd of January the Clyde Dilution Commission 
was appointed to introduce dilution on the Clyde. 
Shortly after its arrival in Glasgow on the 29th of 
January there was a strike of 2000 munitions workers in 
a number of CWC controlled factories over the 
suppression of "The Worker" - the CWC paper - for an 
article entitled 'Should the Workers Arm?' The article 
concluded that they should not. Nevertheless on the 7th 
February William Gallacher and John Muir (leaders of 
the CWC) and Walter Bell (the printer of their journal) 
were arrested on sedition charges. The strikes ended 
when the men were released on bail (it was not until
the 14th of April that the men were tried and 
imprisoned).
A memorandum from the Clyde to the Ministry of 
Munitions on the 9th of February however, reported 
fresh activity from the CWC and the increasing weakness 
of the trade unions. 'Its tentacles are now fairly 
widespread and are growing. However the committee has 
not effective control over the workers in more than 
five or six shops. The outstanding feature of the 
position is that the Official Trade Unions in the 
district are in many works now wholly unable to speak 
for their members. Agreements arrived at between the 
Commissioners and the local Trade Union officials or 
even the shop stewards in the works are promptly 
repudiated by the instigation of the emissaries of the 
Clyde Workers' Committee. The authority of the official 
trade unions in the Clyde district is being steadily 
undermined and will be inevitably ruined unless the 
Unions guickly rise to an intelligent appreciation of 
their position and exert themselves to recover their 
waning control over their members.'65
Matters came to a head on the Clyde in March 1916 when 
David Kirkwood, Convenor of shop stewards at Parkhead 
Forge resigned as convenor after the management refused 
him access to a new department in which women were at 
work under the dilution scheme. The Parkhead workers 
struck and were soon joined by workers in other
factories. Kirkwood and shop stewards, James Haggerty, 
Samuel Shields, Robert Wainwright and James Messer were 
deported on March the 24th 1916 and a further three 
stewards on the 28th of March under the Defence of the 
Realm Act. Under the threat of fines and further 
deportations and in the absence of its leadership, the 
strike was broken.
The CWC rightly challenged the state's justifications 
for its actions by pointing out that as convenor 
Kirkwood had the customary right to enter any shop in 
which a dispute was in progress, that there was no 
elaborate plot to stop work on any type of gun vitally 
needed for the army, that the CWC had not embarked on 
any definite 'policy to hold up the production of the 
most important munitions of war' and that the CWC had 
no deliberate policy of calling men out on strike and 
had not called them out in the above case.66
The evidence confirms Hinton's view that the first 
priority of the state was to break through the purely 
craft resistance to dilution typified by the workers at 
Lang's and the ASE executive and that the undermining 
and subsequent destruction of the CWC was by no means 
an incidental effect of the state's dilution campaign. 
The CWC was recognised as a danger to the war effort 
and to the maintenance of social stability in its own 
right. However it is inaccurate to claim as Hinton 
does, that it was only after dilution was well under
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way on the Clyde and conservative and craft resistance 
had been effectively broken, that the state mounted its 
premeditated offensive against the Committee itself67. 
The state felt that progress in dilution could only be 
made if the CWC was removed and the ASE publicly 
revealed as responsible. For some time the state had 
been aware that it was the official trade union 
movement which had persistently dragged its feet over 
dilution. The dilution campaign had begun with the 
Treasury Agreement in March 1915 but the introduction 
of women did not begin in earnest until January 1916.
It has been shown that there were many reasons for this 
delay including friction between the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Ministries whose functions it 
supplanted, and also the obstructiveness, incompetence 
or conservatism of many engineering employers, but the 
main reason was 'the remarkably successful rearguard 
action fought by the Executive of the ASE against the 
dilution to which it was nominally pledged.'68
On the 31st of December 1915, at a meeting between a 
deputation from the ASE, the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Munitions, the Minister of Munitions 
challenged the ASE on its resistance to some aspects of 
dilution especially the provisions surrounding the 
employment of women workers saying 'You see we have had 
an agreement since March and it really has not been 
carried out. You will all admit that. We simply cannot 
produce the stuff unless you do it ... It has not
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arisen through the Executive's fault. You have played 
the game right through, but you have men behind you who 
put forward fresh demands. They say "we are not going 
to do it unless you do so and so" and then we are 
confronted with another difficulty ... We never seem to 
get to a firm agreement. It makes such a difference 
when one is considering whether to make a concession or 
not. Is it really a firm agreement?'69
The Prime Minister felt that the solution was in the 
hands of the union leaders whose duty was to exert 'all 
their force to remove these suspicions and to encourage 
the men, and indeed, I will not say coerce, but bring 
every influence they can to bear upon them.' The 
Minister of Munitions professed himself sympathetic to 
the Executive's point of view 'I know your reasons and 
you know you are getting very big concessions for your 
people' but concluded with a barely concealed threat 
'what I am afraid of is that you will say, "Yes we will 
accept this" and then your men begin again. They do not 
like dilution and therefore they are always trying to 
find some sort of objection to it. They will find 
another and we shall be no nearer the end. If so I 
shall have to put another proposal before the Prime 
Minister to deal with the situation. That is a ghastly 
thing to contemplate.'70
This threat notwithstanding, there were limits to the 
state's actions in respect of dilution. Reid argues
that these limits were set by the law, public opinion 
and internal divisions in addition to the official 
trade unions. The only compulsory powers available to 
the state were under the DORA which allowed it to 
deport disruptive individuals from problem areas or to 
prosecute individuals for sedition and treason. It did 
not have the power to force through unpopular 
industrial policies against generalised resistance. The 
limits set on state action by public opinion were such 
that whenever the question of compulsion was raised 
there were outcries from the general public, members of 
parliament etc. This was reinforced by the state's own 
propaganda which painted the war as a war against 
dictatorship which made difficult the adoption of 
authoritarian measures. Internal policy differences 
between state departments especially between the 
Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions reduced the 
latters' room for manouevre, resulted in the reduction 
of the amount of skilled labour available for munitions 
production and began to undermine the dilution campaign 
as a whole by setting bad precedents.71
Reid's analysis rightly undermines the view that state 
policies conformed to the interests of employers citing 
the testimony of officials of the Labour Department who 
refused to delegate labour policy to employers on the 
grounds of conflicting interests and lack of expertise 
and by employers themselves who thought the Ministry 
was on the side of the trade unions against them. As we
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have seen the notion that the Labour Department of the 
Ministry of Munitions was biased against hard line 
employers and in favour of moderate trade unionism was 
a charge which had been levelled against the pre war 
Labour Department of the Board of Trade.
This charge gained credibility from the fact that 
virtually no attempt was made to legally enforce 
dilution even where the Munitions Acts gave power to do 
so and, even though it was recognised that consultation 
with workers representatives meant modification, unrest 
and delay, dilution proceeded mainly through 
conferences and agreements with the trade unions. There 
were practically no occasions when the Munitions of War 
Act was used during unrest on the Clyde to enforce 
dilution. The Ministry of Munitions claimed that 
dilution could only proceed peacefully if labour's 
consent and cooperation were secured. In all cases 
dilution agreements included clauses to safeguard the 
standard wage rate and to restore male workers'places 
and trade union rules after the war.72 By February 
1916 the Labour Department was forced to concede 
victory to the ASE, 'The Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers have pledged themselves at intervals from 
March onwards to cooperate with the Government in the 
dilution of labour and the prevention of strikes on 
munitions work. They have continually gone back on 
their agreements at a moment's notice, that is to say 
have themselves gone on strike.'73
192
It was not until February 1916 that the ASE, on 
condition that the state made circulars L2 and L3 legal 
and mandatory, agreed to accept the scheme of dilution 
'and cooperate actively therein.'74 By July 1916 the 
number of women employed in munitions establishments 
had risen from 2.6% in 1914 to 26%.75 In December 1916 
it was noted however that the extent to which processes 
performed by these women were identical or even similar 
to those done by men prior to the war was very limited 
and in the case of skilled work it was almost non 
existent. Also a considerable amount of semi-skilled 
work was being done by women but this was under the 
supervision of men and largely confined to repetition 
work.76 The new and highly automatic machinery which 
had been introduced into munitions factories (to enable 
the introduction of women on work previously the 
province of skilled men) had largely resulted in the 
operation of the machines too being the province of 
skilled men.
While it is difficult to disentangle the extent to 
which gender contributed to unrest on the Clyde it was 
acknowledged as one of the main factors in resistance 
to dilution by the Labour Department of the Ministry of 
Munitions 77. This particular aspect of resistance to 
dilution was seen as understandable and concessions 
were made to compensate. 'Every argument was used that 
could possibly be thought of to persuade the men to
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allow the introduction of female labour without causing 
trouble'78 The introduction of women was clearly 
presented as an unavoidable temporary expedient, work 
areas were rigidly defined as "mens' work" or "womens' 
work", women were to be paid men's wages when employed 
on men's work (although this became contentious when 
the Minister of Munitions moved the goal posts by 
regrading jobs79). Resistance to the introduction of 
women by skilled workers, whether tactical or 
principled, unlike wages or calls for a new social 
order, evoked support across class barriers and 
contributed to skilled workers success in modifing the 
impact of dilution. However, as the next section will 
show, the factor which contributed most to skilled 
workers' ability to resist dilution was the shop 
stewards' organisation. The significance of the shop 
stewards organisation was that it was a shift away from 
responsible unionism which had made substantial gains 
for and many converts among previously conservative 
unionists. It had done this by apparently repudiating 
the structure and methods of responsible trade 
unionism. The constituents of this "power for" will be 
set out below in order to illustrate why the shop 
stewards drew the state's fire and why concessions were 
made to the trade unions which modified the impact of 
the state's efforts to implement dilution.
The Shop Stewards Movement.
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The characteristics of the shop stewards' organisation 
which made it a power for skilled workers are amply 
described by Haydu80 who begins by noting that the shop 
stewards were well placed to play a central role in 
wartime unrest. Before the war they had assumed 
responsibility for regulating work rules and piece 
rates - tasks which had greatly expanded during the war 
with state sponsored changes in production techniques. 
Stewards defended workers' interests in dilution, 
bargaining with managers over specific manning 
arrangements, wage rates for upgraded workers and the 
implementation of general state regulations.
The shop steward's role in preserving direct control 
and freedom of action for rank and file engineers also 
assumed far greater importance amid compromises made by 
union leaders and centralised union/state collaboration 
in handling grievances. Through organisation at shop 
floor level engineers reclaimed the right to strike 
which had been given up by union leaders and proscribed 
by law. This enabled them to focus the state's 
attention on local grievances. The trade unions had 
abdicated their traditional responsibilities and at the 
same time freed unofficial action from national 
discipline. Jobs were easy to find, the state 
intervened to settle disputes, unions had agreed to 
suspend strike action - there were no effective 
sanctions against unconstitutional behaviour. 'The 
forces that before the war had kept rank and file
protest relatively routine and circumscribed were thus 
suspended.'81
The SSM also extended the pre war tendency for 
workplace organisation to ignore craft divisions. The 
MOW Act suspended customary demarcation rules in 
factories. Distinctions between craft workers remained 
intact but because craft workers faced common problems 
on the job and could not call on their respective 
unions, they had their own interest in common 
organisation at work. This organisation often involved 
members of different unions electing a common 
departmental steward to act on their behalf. In other 
cases stewards chosen by workers of given crafts formed 
joint works committees to deal collectively with 
management. 'Such stewards and committees thus had 
powers and constituencies that bypassed established 
trade societies.'82 Further, elected stewards 
negotiated on behalf of all workers in their department 
regardless of grade. This is not to say that divisions 
between workers of different skill, sex or race 
disappeared 'but for the first time all grades 
workplace action attained an institutional base.'83
The development of unofficial organisation provided 
opportunities for militants from Amalgamation 
Committees, the Socialist Labour Party and the 
Industrial Workers of the World to further their aims. 
They saw works committees as the basis of all grades
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organisation and therefore the key to ousting craft 
unionism and achieving the democratic control of 
industry. Their radical influence was plain among the 
leadership of the SSM and although most shop stewards 
and most rank and file engineers were committed trade 
unionists the SSM's programmes were effective and 
therefore attractive when sectional unions seemed no 
longer able to defend their interests.
'The key to containment in Britain was the authority of 
sectional unions and the constraints of industrial 
relations rules and procedures.'84 Because of this the 
position of official trade unionism (embodied by the 
ASE) was significantly strengthened by the challenge 
which the shop stewards' organisation offered to the 
state. Aware of the state's predicament (its dependence 
on official trade unionism to exert its authority over 
workers and its need to implement dilution) and its own 
fragile position with its members the ASE became less 
'responsible' and thought nothing of holding the 
country to ransom. 'The nation is being held up by a 
single union ... The negotiations with this union 
appear to be interminable, and no sooner is one 
agreement arrived at than it is broken, and new 
blackmailing conditions are imposed.'86
Sui ry and Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented an account of the 
origins and consequences of the MOW Act. In particular 
I have concentrated on the ways in which worker 
organisation and resistance limited the measures taken 
by the state to discipline workers and prosecute the 
war. Firstly recruitment to the armed services caused 
an increasingly serious labour shortage and a 
corresponding increase in workers' bargaining power and 
the state called on trade unions to cooperate in 
preventing strikes and implementing dilution. This 
measure failed because trade union leaders were unable 
to deliver their members' agreement and industrial 
conflict began to escalate. The MOW Act was passed to 
prohibit strikes and impose dilution. However the MOW 
Act generated and provided a focus for industrial 
conflict, reinforced the belief that union leaders had 
betrayed workers' interests, turned many workers 
against responsible trade unionism and provided further 
impetus for the changes already taking place in worker 
organisation. The MOW Act had further damaged the image 
of the state and responsible trade unionism in workers' 
eyes.86
The ASE was the largest and most powerful trade union 
for the state in this period. It represented a large 
number of skilled workers in the munitions industries 
with which the state was primarily concerned. Because 
of its centrality the state sought its cooperation in 
the implementation of labour policy from the beginning
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of the war. The price of its cooperation was however 
high in terms of both the reorganisation of production 
and management of industrial conflict. As this chapter 
has shown, the state's relationship with this trade 
union and its members was a troubled one which set the 
pattern of relations between the state and official 
trade unionism generally in this period. It produced 
not a change of tack from conciliation to coercion but 
the further development of conciliation as an element 
in the management of industrial conflict and gave a 
futher boost to rank and file movements.
At the same time as it aimed to secure the cooperation 
and shore up the authority of the official trade unions 
over their members in order to contain unrest and 
implement dilution the MOW Act increased their 
leverage. The claim that the unions were forced to 
abandon their powers and force their members to accept 
dilution overlooks the fact that state recognition and 
consultation with unions encouraged union organisation 
leading to a rapid and sizeable increase in trade union 
membership (more than a million more trade union 
members between 1914 and 1917).87 It overlooks the fact 
that the unions' role (as far as the state was 
concerned) was preserved and enhanced through the 
Committee on Production, that dilution was never fully 
or evenly implemented and of those changes which were 
implemented the majority were the result of protracted 
negotiations and qualified agreements and not
legislation. Finally it overlooks the extent to which 
the very existence of the powerful unofficial movement 
strengthened the trade unions' bargaining power. It 
would be overstating the case to say that skilled 
workers were not challenged by dilution 'and to some 
degree driven into opposition but [they were] by no 
means defeated or eliminated,' because although the 
state succeeded in introducing the machines, the 
machines became largely the province of skilled 
workers.88
Trade union leaders' apparent cooperation with the 
state however, had adversely affected their 
relationship with their members many of whom believed 
that they had come to represent employers and the state 
against them. This provided the impetus for the 
formation of rank and file movements in munitions, 
engineering and shipbuilding and provided a platform 
and a focus for the new ideas and new organisation 
which aimed to supersede them. It was the unofficial 
movement which had the confidence of the workers. 
'However much the fact may be regretted, owing to 
special war legislation, the influence of official 
Trades Unionism has been reduced, and any action 
through ordinary Trade Union channels suffers from an 
official disability on this account. It cannot be 
anticipated that the supercession of normal Trade Union 
procedure by an unconstituted organisation such as the 
shop stewards' committee will cease with the reversion
to normal conditions after the war. However unpalatable 
the truth may be, it is certain that the action of 
these committees has been forceful and efficient in its 
treatment of the claims and grievances of the workmen, 
and the latter are not likely willingly to relinguish 
an organisation which has proved its usefulness.'89
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Chapter 6
The Ministry of Labour and Industrial Conflict 1916-18
Introduction
The Ministry of Labour was constituted in early 1917 to 
administer the Conciliation Act 1896, the Labour 
Exchanges Act 1909, the Trade Boards Act 1909, the 
National Insurance (Unemployment) Acts 1911-1916 and 
part one of the Munitions of War Act (referring to 
arbitration) - all previously the province of the 
Labour Department of the Board of Trade. There has 
been extensive debate about whether the Ministry and 
its responsibility for the implementation of the 
Whitley Scheme was a great step forward for the status 
of organised labour1 or merely the consolidation of the 
status quo in the management of industrial conflict.2 
It is not my intention here to directly contribute to 
this debate. In this chapter I will focus on the 
Ministry of Labour as the successor to the Labour 
Department of the Ministry of Munitions in the sense 
that it inherited the mantle of state conciliator. It 
inherited the powers conferred by the Conciliation Act. 
In particular the function of collecting, preparing and 
interpreting information and other material to
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facilitate agreements between disputing parties as well 
as to facilitate decision making by the Cabinet: The 
MOL now 'passively' adjudicated the merits of 
conflicting claims presented to it.3
The MOL's intepretation provides a new perspective from 
which to view the major industrial conflicts in the 
period 1916-18 particularly with respect to the 
relationship between the state and the trade unions and 
between the trade unions and their members which had 
practical implications for industrial relations policy. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will outline the 
industrial context, set out the Ministry of Labour's 
interpretation of industrial conflict during 1916-18 
and analyse its implications for industrial relations 
policy.
Industrial Unrest 1916-18.
Prior to the inception of the new Ministry of Labour 
the tide of unrest had begun to rise again. On 27th 
January 1916 the Military Service Act was introduced 
and initially affected single men but was extended to 
include married men on 25th May 1916.
Until mid 1916 the munitions industries had not been 
greatly affected by the introduction of conscription 
because the problem of munitions supply was as great as 
the shortage of men for the army. The TUC and the
Labour movement generally were against conscription but 
assisted voluntary recruiting of men not classed as 
skilled. There were many disputes over whether this or 
that worker was skilled. Employers classed men who were 
paid unskilled rates as "skilled" in order to keep 
them. Trade unions would then demand skilled rates for 
these men.4 Sometimes the army would recruit a skilled 
man and negotiations would ensue - sometimes the army 
won and sometimes the unions. As dilution spread, 
however, the conditions of exemption tightened. The 
Ministry of Munitions was largely dependent on 
information from employers for nominees for exemption. 
This gave employers opportunities for victimisation. 
Also, recruiting officers were as anxious to enlist men 
as the Ministry of Munitions was to exempt them 'and 
the consequent clash of influences was not conducive to 
equality of sacrifice.'5
On the 22nd of July 1916 skilled workers' trade unions 
sent a deputation to the Government protesting against 
the recruitment of skilled men. On the 9th of November 
1916 a Sheffield engineer was wrongfully enlisted and 
an unofficial strike followed which spread across many 
munitions centres. The strike lasted until the 17th of 
November when the ASE called a National Conference 
after which the ASE and the Government came to an 
agreement known as the Trade Card Scheme whereby the 
ASE took over the administration of exemption 
certificates. Other skilled unions demanded the same
power, however, and this was granted whereupon the 
general unions demanded egual treatment on the grounds 
that no clear demarcation line existed between their 
members and the craft unions.6 The ASE dismissed this 
claim saying skilled men should not be in general 
unions and the Government refused to extend the scheme 
to general unions. Control over recruitment was given 
to the unions in the belief that it would engender a 
sense of responsibility and enable them to appreciate 
not only the short term interests of their members but 
the long term interests of the country as a whole. 
However, the very characteristics of responsible 
unionism (organisation on craft lines, sectionalism, 
confining their activities to bargaining over wages, 
self help, no participation in any general activity of 
the working class as a class) which made it 
indispensable in fragmenting class struggle, worked 
against the state's need to inspire unity and a sense 
of collective responsibility and effort in the 
"national interest."
The state failed in its bid to persuade the craft 
unions to put the "national interest" first and they 
had used the Trade Card Scheme for the benefit of their 
members, 'there can be little doubt that the Trade Card 
system had opened a door through which very many passed 
in the hope of escaping active service thereby.'7 On 
the 3rd of April 1917 the Trade Card Scheme was 
abolished on the grounds that insufficient numbers of
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men were volunteering for the army. It was replaced by 
the Schedule of Protected Occupations which made 
exemptions the prerogative of the National Service 
Department which narrowed the grounds for the exemption 
of skilled workers.
The extension of conscription exacerbated the shortage 
of skilled labour and on the 29th of April 1917 a Bill 
was introduced to spread dilution to private work. This 
broke an agreement made with the unions at the Treasury 
Conference. Skilled workers had agreed only to dilution 
on war work protected by legislative safeguards and 
ministerial promises 'now they fancied that they saw 
the cloven hoof.'8
On the 3rd of May there was a strike arising out of 
these new proposals at Tweedale & Smalley near Rochdale 
which anticipated the passage of the Bill. The firm 
instructed workers to teach and supervise women on work 
previously done by skilled men. The workers refused and 
were dismissed. The firm tried again with other workers 
who also refused and were dismissed. A strike ensued. 
The military authorities called up some of the strikers 
for the army. The strike threatened to escalate as the 
firm was fined under the Munitions Acts and one of the 
owners, Mr Tweedale, resigned. This strike triggered 
off a succession of strikes after the 10th May. These 
strikes were all unofficial, all led by shop stewards. 
They were not directed from any one centre, they
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involved both skilled and unskilled workers and 
different grievances such as the spread of dilution to 
private work in Lancashire, the operation of the 
Military Service Acts and the Munitions of War Act and 
the abolition of the Trade Card Scheme. The strikes 
spread to Coventry, Sheffield, Luton, Derby,
Birkenhead, Liverpool, Bristol, Southampton, London.
The state intervened and many of the leaders were 
arrested under the D.O.R.A. Within a fortnight there 
was a general return to work on an undertaking by the 
state that outstanding grievances would be dealt with 
by negotiation with official trade union leaders. On 
the 12th of June 1917 eight Commissions on Industrial 
Unrest covering the whole country were appointed to 
ascertain the causes of unrest.
The Minister of Munitions began to bargain with the 
unions. Initially, in exchange for the extension of 
dilution to private work, it was proposed that the 
Leaving Certificate provisions of the MOW Act be 
amended to permit labour mobility in cases where real 
hardship would be caused by denying a leaving 
certificate. The unions rejected this plan. Addison, 
the Minister of Munitions, then decided to abolish the 
Leaving Certificate against the advice of employers, 
his own Labour Department and the Ministry of Labour on 
the grounds that it was a major cause of unrest. At the 
same time the wages of skilled workers were fixed by
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Order and it was decided to bow to union pressure and 
provide a 12.5% bonus on skilled workers' wages.
One of the restrictions on output which the Treasury 
Agreement was designed to remove was the resistance to 
piecework. Its removal was implicitly directed by 
Section 4(3) and Section 4(5) of the MOW Act. Many 
employers had interpreted the Act to mean that workers 
had to accept payment by results or be penalised by the 
Act. The resulting opposition to piecework proved 'as 
fundamental as the objection to dilution'9 and its 
implementation made very slow headway. It was not that 
objection to piecework was universal in the munitions 
industries but in some sections it was strongly opposed 
because of craft pride and the belief that piecework 
led to unemployment but mostly because of the 
conviction that whenever remunerative piecework rates 
had been fixed they were cut by employers. On the 13th 
September 1915 the Ministry of Munitions had pledged 
that this would be prevented under the provisions of 
the MOW Act which laid down that no changes in wage 
rates could be made without reference to the Ministry 
(they could not be increased or decreased). This pledge 
was to result in further complications as more and more 
firms received government contracts for shell 
production. These firms based their price list for 
production on pre war production of shells and when 
these prices were applied to war production, wages on 
less skilled work more than trebled. Employers put the
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additional cost due to wage advances onto the charges 
they made to government contracting departments.10 The 
resulting high wages earned by less skilled workers 
with the help of automatic machines became a source of 
grievance for skilled workers who could find themselves 
with lower wages than semi and unskilled workers.
To prevent a repeat of the wage anarchy which 
characterised the earlier part of the war, this bonus 
was delayed by Churchill, who succeeded Addison as 
Minister of Munitions, until the possible consequences 
of these measures were clarified and means of 
counteracting them were put in place.
The Hills Committee was appointed on the 27th of August 
1917 to report on the effect of the removal of the 
Leaving Certificate on skilled workers' time rates. The 
Committee was made up of representatives of the trade 
unions, employers associations and the state. The 
employers wanted to exclude from the bonus any workers 
who had been given the opportunity of working on the 
payment by results system and had refused. Union 
representatives would not consider this and were backed 
by the Minister of Munitions. The union representatives 
asked for a general advance to time workers and piece 
workers not on repetition work. The employers 
representatives, the Ministry of Labour and the 
Committee on Production were opposed to the bonus on 
the grounds that it would disturb existing wage
213
relations and provoke further demands and unrest. No 
agreement was reached. Ultimately the War Cabinet 
ordered that a flat bonus of 12.5% should be paid to 
those classes of workers covered by the Hills 
Committee. This order was made on the 13th of October 
1917 and immediately drew claims of eligibility from 
other skilled and semi skilled workers. The bonus was 
extended to all adult male workers in munitions which 
left the differentials between skilled workers and 
others and the grievance substantially unchanged.11
The Ministry of Labour condemned this intervention on 
the grounds that it was a recipe for industrial 
conflict and pointed out that 'The Cabinet was not 
primarily or continuously a wage fixing authority; it 
did not understand, or if it did, could not be relied 
upon to bear in mind, the reactions which an isolated 
decision might have on wage demands that were not 
before it; it was influenced by considerations of 
political expediency rather than considerations of 
consistency in economic policy. Its decisions therefore 
were frequently illogical and inconsistent with one 
another and represented rather concessions to the 
strength of the group demanding them than a recognition 
of the reasonableness of their claims.'12
On the day after the bonus was conceded the Leaving 
Certificate was abolished. Its removal deprived the
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Ministry of Munitions of much of its power to refuse 
wage demands.
The Ministry of Munitions continued to press its case 
for dilution on private work by sending circulars to 
unions in munitions which read 'Dilution is the only 
means by which private industries can be maintained in 
such a state that they can recover after the war and 
compete against foreign trade. During the war foreign 
countries have been organising to capture industries 
from this country and unless dilution is introduced to 
carry private trades over the war period, there is a 
danger of serious loss of trade after the war.'13 A 
ballot of its members by the ASE decisively rejected 
dilution on private work. The repeal of the Leaving 
Certificate had already been agreed and could not now 
be withheld. Churchill concluded that the dilution 
clause of the Bill 'was only valid in so far as it was 
accompanied by agreement between the parties concerned' 
and that 'he found it impossible to force the question 
through and any attempt to do so would have led to 
friction by which more would be lost than would have 
been gained by dilution ... Happily however, in this 
matter, as in the matter of exemption from military 
service, the thoroughness of American assistance 
diminished embarrassments which would otherwise have 
been grave ... they had gained a complete victory by 
the use of unconstitutional methods. The presumption is
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strong that these methods will again be adopted when 
the occasion presents itself.'14
An agreement was reached between the Minister of 
Munitions, the ASE and the unofficial strike committee 
confirming the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme, the 
suspension of the MOW Bill and the release of strike 
leaders.
Commissions on Industrial Unrest
When the Commissions on Industrial Unrest reported, 
most of the causes of industrial unrest identified by 
them had already been addressed with the exception of 
the implementation of the Whitley Scheme. The Reports 
concluded that unrest was due to a variety of causes 
which included high food prices in relation to wages, 
the restrictions on individual freedom and narrowing 
wage differentials between the skilled and unskilled as 
a result of the MOW Acts, a feeling that Government did 
not intend to honour pledges to restore trade union 
practices, delay in settling disputes, the Military 
Service Acts, housing shortages, restrictions on 
alcohol. The findings of these Commissions were that 
unrest was due to conditions arising out of the war and 
was not revolutionary. 'A comparison of the Reports 
shows that there is a strong feeling of patriotism on 
the part of employers and employed throughout the 
country and they are determined to help the state in
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the present crisis. Feelings of a revolutionary 
character are not entertained by the bulk of the 
men. '15
The Commissioners' recommendations included an 
immediate reduction in the price of food (to be 
subsidised by the Government) and better distribution, 
the adoption of the proposals of the Whitley Committee, 
a change in employers' attitudes such that workers 
should be regarded as partners and not servants in 
industry, the wider publicity concerning the abolition 
of leaving certificates, Government affirmation of its 
intention to restore pledges, the publication of policy 
with regard to housing formulated by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, a bonus for skilled workers and other 
workers on day rates, and the encouragement of closer 
contact between employers and employed. A system of 
food rationing was being set up and reassurance on 
pledges was being given. The Leaving Certificate was to 
be abolished and a 12.5% bonus was to be added to 
skilled workers'wages.16
The Ministry of Labour noted that the features of the 
Commissions' reports which most impressed the workers 
were the evidence of government incompetence, the 
exemption from blame for industrial unrest of the 
workers themselves, the government policy which made 
profiteering possible and even encouraged it, the 
necessity for decentralisation of control, government
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determination to increase tax on workers' wages and the 
deliberate depreciation of the workers' views in the 
press. The reports lent weight to the charges already 
brought against the Government by labour and socialist 
writers namely that the Tyne and Barrow strikes, the 
strike at Tweedale and Smalley, and the Engineers' 
strikes in May were 'due to the dilatory methods of the 
Ministry of Munitions where the interests of the 
workers were concerned.'17 More importantly, the MOL 
added, once the strikes had broken out, the action of 
the Ministry of Munitions in connection with the 
strikes provoked a reaction from munitions workers 
which turned a non- revolutionary situation into a 
potentially revolutionary situation.
The Ministry of Labour and the Shop Stewards
The Shop Stewards Movement had loomed even larger in 
this widespread explosion of industrial conflict than 
in 1914-16 and in September 1917 the MOL took the 
opportunity to offer a 'fuller and more accurate record 
than that prepared in the Intelligence and Record 
Section of the Ministry of Munitions ... which appears 
to some extent to have been framed as an apologia for, 
and an explanation of, the action of the Ministry.18 
The point of view adopted in our history is of course 
different. '19
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In its own account the Ministry of Labour sought to 
reveal the extent to which the approach adopted by the 
Ministry of Munitions towards the shop stewards had 
contributed to the problems it was intended to 
overcome. For the MOL this strike had exceptional 
significance and justified the investigation of its 
causes and the scrutiny of the policy of the Ministry 
of Munitions towards it.
The Ministry's analysis began by outlining the Ministry 
of Munitions' handling of the shop stewards' 
organisation in the industrial conflict of 1917. It was 
noted in the Ministry's favour that the shop stewards 
organisation had proved very troublesome in connection 
with previous labour troubles on the Clyde and 
elsewhere, and that it had, through some of its more 
prominent members, suspicious associations with both 
syndicalism and pacifism. 'The Ministry, therefore, had 
some reason to apprehend that it was in the presence of 
deliberate sedition - a deliberate attempt to exploit 
the prevalent unrest for ulterior purposes.'20 The 
Ministry of Munitions saw itself as having two options. 
Should the shop stewards - men in rebellion against the 
heads of their own organisation - be recognised and 
treated with or should the leaders of the agitation, 
whether shop stewards or not, be arrested and 
prosecuted under the Defence of the Realm Act, for 
impeding the supply of munitions? The Ministry 
rejected the first option in favour of the second and
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the War Cabinet concurred although the information on 
which this decision was based did not amount to legal 
proof. 'This was a direct challenge to a trial of 
strength and it was promptly taken up.'21
For the MOL this was an error of judgement. Firstly 
because 'Before the challenge was thrown down, a 
tendency towards the resumption of work had been 
discernible. It was not a very pronounced tendency, but 
there were reasons for expecting that it would soon be 
accentuated ... work would be resumed while the 
negotiations with the trade union leaders continued.'22
Secondly athough the Ministry believed its position to 
be a strong one it soon became evident that 'the 
Ministry had little prospect of maintaining the output 
of munitions at a satisfactory level as long as the 
arrested men remained in prison, and that it must 
either settle its dispute by discussion with the shop 
stewards or fail to attain a settlement.'23 In this 
situation a rigid attitude could not be maintained and 
eventually the Ministry was forced to recognise the 
shop stewards. 'The modus operandi decided upon was as 
follows:- The shop stewards became "the unofficial 
strike committee". The Executive Council of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers agreed to introduce 
them and the Ministry agreed to receive them under that 
designation.'24
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Thirdly, the Ministry of Labour suggested that the 
measures taken by the state, although aimed at guelling 
unrest and safeguarding the production of munitions, 
were inappropriate. This was because it was not clear 
that the shop stewards acted in opposition to the 
official trade union leaders. In attacking the shop 
stewards the Ministry of Munitions was also attacking 
the trade unions. It was emphasised that although the 
shop stewards had taken the reigns from official union 
leaders this did not necessarily mean that union 
leaders had been discredited. It meant that in 
negotiations union executives were fighting without the 
one effective weapon in their armoury - the strike. If 
the men were dissatisfied with the result of 
negotiations with the Committee on Production, they 
took the matter into their own hands and struck. 'Now 
it is impossible to fight entirely unofficered and it 
is just here that the unofficial shop stewards' 
committee, being the only organisation in a position to 
conduct negotiations, steps in and captures the strike 
... [this]... does not mean that the Labour World has 
been revolutionary but that the normal channels through 
which it acts have been changed by war legislation.'25
It was thought probable that the shop stewards' 
strength and persistence owed more to the support 
unofficially given to the shop stewards by the official 
trade unions and less to their associations with 
syndicalism and pacifism. 'It is now fairly clear that
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however much the executives of the Unions objected to 
the methods pursued by the strikers their sympathies 
were entirely with the objects of the strike.'26 The 
Ministry of Munitions did not investigate the situation 
thoroughly before acting. 'There is a wealth of 
valuable detail as to the activities of the local 
workers' committees which has not been recorded. Their 
action locally and their liaison system both deserve 
and require record ... though an exploration of the 
facts would probably be a matter of some difficulty, 
the relations of the ASE executive to the Unofficial 
Strike Committee call for some examination .... It may 
well be questioned whether relations between them and 
the unofficial strike committee were non-existent. If 
the Executive is in any way representative and is in 
any sort of touch with local organisations, it is 
incredible that no consultations should have taken 
place.27 Further, 'it is rumoured that of those members 
of the strike committee for whom warrants were issued, 
but who were not arrested, one was in hiding under the 
aegis of a permanent official of the Executive. The 
strike was not official, for no strike in a controlled 
industry can be official, but it is safe to conclude 
that at least a considerable section of the Executive 
of the Society is in accord with its main objects.'28
It was acknowledged that the immediate causes of the 
strike were the proposed amendment of the Munitions of 
War Act to legalise dilution on private work and the
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withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme. However for the 
MOL the matter could not be allowed to rest there, 'It 
is however necessary to insist still further on the 
unofficial agency which managed the strike. This was 
composed of committees of shop stewards, and the strike 
is peculiarly important as a demonstration of the 
growing power of these committees.' The shop stewards 
had a more important agenda and the strike enabled them 
to pursue it. 29
In the MOL's view a clear understanding of the strike 
turned on a clear understanding of the development of 
the Shop Stewards' Movement in England. When the 
movement developed in Sheffield in the summer of 1916 
shop stewards had been appointed on a large scale by 
the ASE and were led by J.T. Murphy who had been 
elected as convenor of shop stewards. Murphy founded 
the Sheffield Engineering Shop Stewards Committee which 
later became known as the Sheffield Workers Committee. 
In July 1916 Murphy and other shop stewards influenced 
by the CWC founded a group advocating the control of 
industry by the workers. 'Thus to the original advocacy 
of particular grievances in opposition to trade union 
officials a new principle was added and the Shop 
Steward Movement became connected with a large 
industrial policy; but even in Sheffield the main body 
of the shop stewards do not appear to have been moved 
by a large view of policy.'30
The first success of the Sheffield Workers' Committee, 
it was noted, was in November 1916 when its activities 
secured the release of the engineer Hargreaves from the 
army. This enhanced the Committee's prestige and power 
with the rank and file. During 1917 the SSM spread to 
Coventry, London and Liverpool and the organisation of 
the movement on a national scale was achieved. This was 
accompanied by a modification in the character of the 
movement such that in addition to the organisation of 
workers on the basis of the workshop its stated aims 
included 'a larger policy of revolt against the whole 
of the accepted system of industry'. On the other hand 
this was offset by the fact that 'the mere growth of 
the movement had a steadying effect.' Moreover, 
although increasing numbers of skilled men supported 
the movement and for some time it was posssible to 
identify the rank and file movement with the Shop 
Stewards' Movement even then the rank and file 'were 
not keenly interested in far reaching industrial and 
political programmes. They might accept these as 
desirable and yet they were not willing to act unless 
for guite definite and immediate ends.'31
In April 1917 during the strike at Coventry a Shop 
Stewards Committee appeared for the first time. This 
movement added to the SSM a theory and practice in 
regard to amalgamation of all workers irrespective of 
craft or grade. The MOL acknowledged that *in all of 
the May strikes, independent as they were of official
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trade union authority, the Shop Stewards gained 
prominence.' On the other hand it was noted that they 
were not engineered by the shop stewards and that the 
general disturbance was not in any sense primarily dueii 
to the shop stewards. The strikes were not organised 
but were the result of sporadic discontent among the 
men. The strikes expressed no policy except opposition 
to dilution. The shop stewards were used by the men but 
the Shop Stewards' Movement had little effect on the 
situation. The action taken by the Ministry of 
Munitions was fortuitous for the shop stewards since it 
'appears to have made the situation still more 
difficult, for the rank and file took it as a challenge 
to their right to elect their own representatives.' The 
result was that 'The Shop Stewards' Movement in its 
extreme form, as well as in its permanently 
constructive policy, was thus much assisted by this 
situation ... the widespread strike had now produced a 
tendency to the organisation of shop stewards on a 
national scale and this organisation imperils the 
established official organisation of the trade 
unions.'32
It was clear to the MOL that from the beginning of the 
engineer's agitation in May, the shop stewards 
committees were determined to use the strike to improve 
their own position. Before this their position was 
irregular, ill defined and unconstitutional. They aimed 
'to compel recognition of the shop stewards ... [and]
... to improvise a national bond between committees in 
the various localities. Recognition of the Shop 
Stewards' Committee as a definite authority in matters 
of dispute, whether between labour and capital or 
between labour and the government, had not hitherto 
been accorded. It was obvious to 'the more far seeing' 
that these were their real aims. In the first of these 
aims 'they were actually successful, though their 
success is not admitted. The interview between the 
Minister and the Unofficial Strike Committee, even 
though facilitated by the presence of the ASE 
Executive, in fact amounted to recognition of the 
former to speak for the men. In the latter aim, the 
shop stewards were also successful though in a minor 
degree. The Unofficial Strike Committee was composed of 
representatives of the districts affected. That a 
permanent National Council of shop stewards, 
representative of all areas where shop stewards 
committees exist, has not as yet been constituted, is 
beside the point. The principle of national as distinct 
from local action was enforced, and it is probable 
that, in future, whenever any guestion of more than 
local importance is agitated attempts will be made to 
ensure that it will be dealt with on the side of labour 
by a national body in some form representative of the 
shop stewards committees. Of this there is an instance 
in the action taken recently in connection with the 
Coventry agitation. It is only a question of time for a 
National Council of shop stewards to enter the arena as
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a permanent factor in Labour politics. It appears 
advisable that some workshop authority representative 
of the workmen should be recognised at an early 
date.'33
Finally and most importantly it was emphasised that 
this outburst of industrial unrest was important not 
only because of its numerical size, its widespread 
nature and the danger to the nation from the 
interruption to the supply of munitions of war. It was 
a threat to the state itself precipitated by the ill 
judged intervention of the Ministry of Munitions. 'Its 
chief importance ... lies in other directions. In the 
first place it was a conclusive demonstration of 
contempt of lawful authority. Every one of the strikers 
was guilty of a breach of the law and knew it, but the 
knowledge had no restraining influence. Any restraint 
was due, not to fear of a breach of the law, but in 
part to loyalty to the unions, whom it was felt that 
the shop stewards were attacking, in large part to 
patriotism, to which the Joint Engineering Trades 
Committee appealed in Coventry with great success. The 
Engineer's strike 'differed from the majority of 
strikes occurring at any period in the fact that it was 
not primarily directed against the employers of labour. 
The local strike which brought the dispute to a head 
was indeed so directed, but the more general strike 
which eventually developed was a strike of protest and
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resistance against certain items of policy of the 
government.'34
For the Ministry of Labour much of this need not have 
happened. That it did was evidence of the 
miscalculation of the Ministry of Munitions which 
issued statements prejudicial to the workers and to the 
impotence of the MOW Act. The shop stewards were not 
having much success in interesting workers in fighting 
for a new industrial policy. The workers used them to 
lead their fight for immediate ends because the 
official unions could not. It was the action of the 
Ministry of Munitions which escalated the strike. At 
the beginning of the strike certain clear minded and 
unprejudiced critics 'advocated a policy of trusting 
the workers; abolishing all wartime restriction on 
their independence of action - a procedure which would 
of course have restored their right to strike.' This 
was ignored but was vindicated in retrospect because 
'this strike proved clearly that the penal provisions 
of the Munitions Act are powerless in any case in which 
a general grievance is involved. Further the strike was 
important as a revelation of that weakness of official 
trade unionism to which reference has been made above. 
The officials of the Unions officially deplored the 
strike, officially called upon the members to return to 
work. Their official deploration and invitations were 
disregarded ... Lastly ... the strike was important
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both as an indication of the power of the rank and file 
movement and as a stimulant to its activity.'35
It was concluded that 'the Munitions Acts have 
throttled above-board Trade Union action and forced the 
workers to subterranean methods ... The Trade Union 
leaders are summoned not to argue or bargain or indeed 
do anything directly representative of Labour. They are 
called together and confronted with a fait accompli.'36 
To restore the authority of the official trade unions 
the shop stewards' committee must be recognised. With 
this in mind the Ministry of Labour emphasised 'it is 
necessary that in recognising the Shop Stewards' 
Committee that organisation must be constitutionalised. 
It cannot be recognised as a body detached from the 
unions whose members it represents. To this end it is 
essential, not only that the Trade Union officials 
should be brigaded with the Government and the 
employers in recognising Shop Stewards' Committees but 
also that the Trade Unions should undertake the 
responsibility of overhauling their own machinery so as 
to assimilate those Committees.'37
Meanwhile industrial unrest gathered momentum. On 
November the 26th 1917 a strike broke out at Coventry 
Ordnance (White & Poppe) works over the disparity 
between skilled workers and others pay, the employment 
of Belgian workers in place of discharged men and the 
recognition of shop stewards. Representatives of the
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War Cabinet (GN Barnes and GH Roberts) met a deputation 
from Coventry and the strike ended on December the 4th 
when it was agreed that the Employers Federation and 
the Trade Unions would discuss the status to be 
accorded to shop stewards. The resulting agreement 
recognised that trade unionists in the shops should 
have the right to elect shop stewards. The trade unions 
accepted the new status of shop stewards and the 
employers accepted the policy of negotiation with 
elected representatives of the rank and file in the 
shops. The ASE was not a party to this agreement, 
however, partly because works committees of shop 
stewards from different unions cut across the 
distinction between unions and undermined the authority 
of the ASE.
The Embargo Conflict
In July 1918 Coventry engineers struck again over an 
order issued by the Ministry of Munitions preventing 
three Coventry engineering firms from hiring additional 
skilled men, except discharged servicemen, without 
permission. (This was known as the "embargo" scheme - a 
Min Mun attempt to ration skilled labour). The Coventry 
employers took skilled men to mean those in receipt of 
standard wages. Coventry shop stewards interpreted this 
as an attempt to reintroduce the leaving certificate, 
to wipe out distinctions of skill and introduce 
industrial conscription which boded ill for the
restoration of trade union practices after the war.
10.000 men struck in Coventry and were soon joined by
12.000 in Birmingham. Lloyd George issued a statement 
to the effect that continuation of the strike would 
mean conscription for the strikers and the strike 
collapsed.38
The industrial unrest led to the formation of a 
Commission of Inquiry known as the Committee on Labour 
Embargoes or the McCardie Committee after its chairman. 
In September 1918 this Committee found that unrest was 
caused by the Government's slowness in redeeming 
pledges given with regard to the restoration of trade 
union practices, the fact that skilled workers'wages 
had in many cases been overtaken by others, and the 
promises given regarding womens' wages (they were paid 
less than agreed) and the recruitment of skilled men 
had not been kept. Nevertheless it was pointed out that 
'the Munitions Acts had been passed after full 
consultation with organised Labour and with the full 
approval of the community ... A large measure of 
freedom was left to the worker, and such a degree only 
of regulation was made as was necessarily required by 
the national interest.'39 The Committee approved the 
principle of the embargo and recommended more effective 
means of consultation between employers and workers.
Commenting on the strike and its handling by the 
Ministry of Munitions the Ministry of Labour again
emphasised that the movement emanated from workers and 
not their leaders and that workers' response to 
Ministry of Munitions initiatives should have come as 
no surprise. 'That the embargo scheme should be 
disliked by the workers of this country was perhaps 
natural; that its object should be misrepresented by 
agitators was inevitable; that it should be made the 
occasion of a sudden and widespread strike proves the 
indiscipline of our industrial forces.'40 It was noted 
that the munition makers had a plausible but not 
unanswerable case which could have been put before the 
Government with favourable results 'but a large body of 
munition makers have preferred war to negotiation and 
have sought to extort concessions from the Government 
rather than support it in safeguarding the national 
interests. The people who have made this choice are the 
engineers and toolmakers of Coventry ... a hotbed of 
unrest during the last two years ... While the present 
strike may be regarded from one point of view as 
concerned with wages, from another as concerned with 
dilution and from a third as concerned with workers' 
freedom to choose his employment, it is nevertheless 
probable that the real source of trouble is the demand 
of the workers for a share of responsible functions in 
the conduct of industry.' It was emphasised that this 
was not a demand pressed by the official headquarters 
representatives of the engineering unions 'But their 
inaction has led to the rise of a second and third 
party within the ranks of labour who are prepared to
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push such claims by the exercise of the strike weapon.' 
The first of these were the unofficial shop stewards 
and local Workers' Committees, now organised nationally 
by a National Administrative Council meeting generally 
in Manchester and Sheffield, 'whose aim is 
revolutionary [i.e.] the assumption of responsible 
functions by direct representatives of the men in the 
workshops.'41 An intermediate position was occupied by 
the local officials of the engineering trade unions, 
organised in Joint Committees in a dozen districts or 
more. Their object was to secure a share of local 
control for trade union representatives, organised at 
the time through branches and districts of each union 
and associated in Joint Committees of allied unions.
Again the Ministry of Labour emphasised that the full 
significance of the embargo conflict could only be 
appreciated in the light of the development and spread 
of the unofficial movement for control since May 1917. 
At that time the rank and file party, consisting mainly 
of young and aggressive workers in skilled crafts who 
were unhappy with the conservatism of trade union 
executives in London, came to the fore. They believed 
firstly that the trade union movement was over­
centralised and that officials had ceased to understand 
and sympathise with the views of the men in the 
workshops. Secondly they believed that craft union 
officials were narrowly concerned with craft interests 
and not sufficiently alive to the necessity for
solidarity and common action by all crafts working in 
the same industry and for the same group of employers. 
Thirdly the trade union leaders who had been selected 
by the Government to advise it, were thought to have 
neither the power nor the inclination to enforce 
conditions on the determination of Government policy or 
to secure a share of control in carrying it out. This 
movement aimed therefore at decentralisation, inter­
union solidarity and control in the conduct of industry 
for the workers. An attempt was made to deal with the 
first problem by the creation of unofficial shop 
stewards, the extension of the function of all shop 
stewards and the formation of local Workers'Committees 
based on the unofficial shop stewards organisation. In 
this movement the leadership had definitely fallen into 
the hands of the Sheffield and Glasgow groups notably 
of J.T.Murphy and E.T.Lismer 'who have displayed 
considerable constructive ability and have maintained a 
fairly reasonable attitude during the crisis of the 
war.'42
Simultaneously, it was noted, endeavours were made to 
secure inter-union solidarity and combined action 
through the unofficial "Amalgamation Committee" 
organised by W.F.Watson of London. Among Watson's 
followers at Coventry were T.W.Dingley and J.Read. 
Watson sought to achieve his ends, not through the 
normal constitutional authorities of the unions, but by 
revolutionary means, by referenda to the rank and file.
At Coventry a shorter cut was devised - putting 
pressure on the existing local officials of the craft 
unions and infiltrating existing Joint Committees of 
Allied Trades. In October it was reported at a 
conference of Watson's "Amalgamation Committee" that 
his Coventry followers had gone over in body to the 
Engineering Joint Committee. This body acted as a 
coordinating link for the official shop stewards of 
more than a dozen unions of skilled workers and as it 
came under the control of the revolutionary party, it 
assumed in November the responsibility for the conduct 
of a large scale strike to secure the recognition of 
shop stewards as direct representatives of the workers 
in each shop.
For the MOL the next stage was to provide the means for 
common action by the Joint Committees of Allied Trades 
in the several centres in which they sympathised with 
the "advanced policy". A national conference met at 
Leeds on the 1st of September 1917, to consider the 
question of food control; another was held on the 22nd 
of October when a National Emergency Committee was 
appointed, with Leonard Mason of Leeds as secretary. On 
the 20th of January the Joint Committee again assembled 
at Leeds to deliver an ultimatum to the Government on 
the subject of manpower and the summoning of an 
international labour conference.
In the early part of 1918 the two rank and file 
movements united. They had behind them the prestige of 
the successful strike of May 1917 but their lack of 
standing in the existing organisation of trade unionism 
was a considerable handicap. On the other hand the 
semi-official Joint Committees which were for some 
purposes "recognised" trade union authorities, had 
still to win their spurs as champions of the liberty of 
the workers. They found their opportunity in the 
embargo scheme and the circumstances of its 
introduction - an industrial issue much more convenient 
than either food prices or the Manpower Bill. The 
strike policy is in direct defiance of the Government 
and the motive is workers' control over industry.
Strike leaders have not 'been slow to seize upon the 
incongruity of recruiting skilled men for the army and 
then announcing that there is a shortage of these men 
for providing necessary munitions' and misrepresenting 
it as the revival of the leaving certificate, an attack 
on the status of the skilled worker by promoting 
dilution and an expedient for reducing wages.'43
The MOL concluded that 'the strike leaders have 
consistently and successfully exploited the fundamental 
weakness of wartime labour policy which is the 
selection by the Government of conservative officials 
who do not constitute 'an adequate representation of 
the mind of the men and women in the workshops' to act 
in a purely advisory capacity in London. In conseguence
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'Labour has come to regard itself as having no real 
responsibility either for policy or for administration 
of the industrial matters which concern it. At the same 
time the exigencies of war place in the hands of labour 
unprecedented opportunities for showing its power to 
thwart a policy and hamper administration. The strike 
is the natural outcome of the concentration in 
inexperienced hands of power without responsibility.'44
Against this background the MOL felt it was important 
not place too much faith in the recommendations of the 
Whitley Committee (set up in 1916) which were widely 
believed to offer the solution to industrial conflict 
by offering a measure of control over the running of 
industry to workers. Although it used 'the phraseology 
of far reaching reform' the Whitley Committee 'confined 
its actual proposals to conservative modifications of 
the existing practice of industrial negotiation.' It 
proposed to extend the existing machinery for 
conciliation and arbitration so that it would be 
available at works, district and national level to 
'materially reduce the number of occasions on which, in 
the view of either employers and employed, it is 
necessary to contemplate recourse to a stoppage of 
work.'45
The committee claimed that these recommendations had 
'the effect of conferring on the Joint Industrial 
Councils, and through them upon the several industries,
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a large measure of self government.' Indeed this report 
was popularly taken to have conceded industrial self 
government. In fact it conceded nothing and placed 'no 
obligation on anybody to do anything.' Even those 
officials of trade unions and employers' associations 
who were on the Committee ignored it. Those trade 
unions and employers who did cooperate on industrial 
councils found their rights and powers exactly the same 
as before.46
However the rhetoric of the Whitley Report had caught 
the public imagination which 'was unfortunate since it 
tended both to raise hopes that were certain to be 
disappointed and to divert attention from the need and 
possibilities .for improving the machinery of industrial 
conciliation to which the practical proposals 
pointed.,47
Although the MOL acknowledged that 'In certain places a 
successful method is in vogue in the constitution of 
Joint Trade Committees consisting of union officials 
and dealing on the one hand with the unions and on the 
other with the shop stewards'48 it was concluded that 
'No solution of the problem created by the strikes 
could be obtained without acknowledging the power of 
the shop stewards as representing the rank and file.' 
This the Whitley Scheme did not do. Even if it had done 
so it was emphasised that 'It would be absurd to
238
minimise the great difficulties which will have to be 
overcome.,49
The MOL outlined the difficulties. Firstly it had been 
found that employers objected strongly to any further 
extension of collective bargaining, especially if it 
involved further recognition of the unions by giving 
them some status in relation to works committees and 
secondly there was the danger that other employers, 
egually opposed to an extension of trade union 
recognition but more politic in their methods, would 
attempt to use works committees to "dish" the unions 
and stop the mouths of agitators, without conceding any 
real devolution of authority and responsibility. 
Whitleyism was not welcomed either by the ASE or the 
Triple Alliance and it was recognised that the Shop 
Stewards Movement saw works committees as an 'employers 
dodge' started to take the wind out of the sails of the 
Shop Stewards, and were not intended to improve the 
position of the workers.'50
Although it was embraced by general workers' unions and 
in poorly organised trades many of the well organised 
and established trade unions were fiercely protective 
of their independence and of their sectional interests. 
They suspected the Whitley scheme variously of being a 
device to marginalise trade unions, a way of avoiding 
honouring the pledge to restore trade union practices,
the substitution of the concept of workers' 
participation for
workers' control, and such 'executive powers' as works 
committees were to have eg.,the maintenance of 
discipline, timekeeping etc.,were seen as largely in 
the interests of employers.51 Thus trade union reaction 
seemed to bear out the prediction made in another MOL 
internal memorandum on works committees 'inevitably 
sooner or later (they will) rouse the opposition of the 
keener trade unionists, who could hardly be blamed if 
they were to regard it as a mere bogus scheme. Hollow 
reforms are not merely useless; they are dangerous, for 
they cannot fail to be used to point the argument that 
the government is not sincere in its treatment of 
labour.,52
The situation had been limited and temporarily defused 
in the MOL's view not by the authorities concerned or 
by the promise of the Whitley Scheme but mainly by a 
surge of patriotism engendered by the German Offensive 
which had begun on March 21st 1918 and lasted until 
October 1918. This 'changed the whole industrial 
situation. The Government was enabled to pursue its 
policy without fear of serious opposition and the 
political aims of the leaders in the shop stewards' 
movement became ineffective so far as popular feeling 
was concerned even in their immediate entourage.'53
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined industrial conflict during 
1916-18 from the perspective of the Ministry of Labour. 
The MOL found that the measures taken by the Ministry 
of Munitions in respect of industrial unrest had been 
ill considered and inappropriate. In particular they 
had not taken account of the developments in the 
relationship between the official trade unions, the 
shop stewards and the rank and file and within the shop 
stewards' movement. The MOL believed that there was no 
longer any clear opposition between the official and 
the unofficial movement - that the latter had the 
practical support of the former. Although the shop 
stewards aims were radical the aims of the rank and 
file were not. The workers used the shop stewards to 
represent their interests because they had little 
choice and not because they supported their aims. The 
workers interpreted the intervention of the Ministry of 
Munitions as a challenge to their right to elect their 
own leaders and the state became a clear focus for 
workers' discontent. This was fortuitous for the shop 
stewards who were able to strengthen their own 
organisation but dangerous for the state which now had 
few options left for maintaining control. One widely 
favoured solution was the Whitley Scheme. However, 
although the the MOL believed that its continued 
existence and authority was to a large extent tied up 
with the implementation of the Whitley scheme and the 
status and functions given to structures set up under
it by the state, it was at pains to point out its 
shortcomings as a solution to industrial conflict. The 
climate created by the MOW Act and the Ministry of 
Munitions' handling of industrial unrest during the war 
rendered the MOL's task, the management of industrial 
conflict through conciliation, extremely difficult. The 
Minister of Labour had earlier advised the Cabinet that 
if the war ended before these concerns had been 
addressed 'the outlook for the future of industry is by 
no means bright.'54
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Chapter 7
The National Industrial Conference 
Introduction
The National Industrial Conference was summoned by the 
Ministry of Labour on the 27th of February 1919 to 
consider the question of widespread industrial unrest. 
Across Europe the established political order appeared 
to be disintegrating and in Britain 'the war between 
nations had ended but the war between capital and 
labour seemed to have only just begun.'1 Against this 
background the calling together of both sides of 
industry under the auspices of the National Industrial 
Conference to agree a joint programme of social reform 
was hailed as a great step forward such that there were 
now seen to be 'two methods of making the revolution 
which we feel is happening throughout the world, the 
Russian and the British method.'2 However in July 1920 
hopes for the NIC as the engine of a peaceful British 
revolution - a bloodless victory for labour - expired 
when the government refused to accept its report and 
the Provisional Joint Committee resigned.
The reasons why the government set up the NIC in the 
first place and then did not honour its commitment to 
implementing the PJC's recommendations are widely
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disputed among commentators. Cole3 has argued that the 
National Industrial Conference and the Coal Commission 
(known as the Sankey Commission) were attempts to avert 
serious industrial unrest not by making actual 
concessions but by encouraging trade unions to believe 
that substantial concessions would be made - they were 
government strategies to buy time until the 
revolutionary threat had passed. Charles distances 
himself a little from the idea of a conspiracy by 
arguing that 'The part played by the Conference in 
guelling unrest in the February of 1919 was crucial 
and, whether planned or not, combined with the 
manipulation of the Sankey Commission in what appears 
to be a very subtle strategy.'4
In Middlemas's view the NIC was a development of Lloyd 
George's plan 'to raise up representative institutions, 
or estates, capable of resolving major industrial 
problems among themselves and of meeting government on 
political guestions in the manner of corporations 
addressing themselves to the Crown ... [the NIC was] 
the first attempt to create a formal triangular 
relationship and utilise the tendency referred to here 
as corporate bias.' It was an attempt to promote 
representative employers and workers' organisations 
from interest groups to 'governing institutions.' For 
Middlemas this phrase describes bodies recognised by 
government as bargaining partners, which have been 
granted permanent rights of access and devolved powers
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by the state.6 Middlemas shifts the focus away from 
the state and divides responsibility for the failure of 
the NIC between the trade unions and employers. The NIC 
failed according to Middlemas 'not just because of the 
aloofness of certain unions, whom LLoyd George then 
blamed, but also because the employers' openness and 
goodwill in public ... were belied by their private 
acts as industrial federations.'6
Lowe argues against the view that the NIC, the MOL and 
Whitley would have amounted to the devolution of power 
to industry so that it could govern itself. He 
emphasises that official policy during the war rested 
on two premises - increased industrial organisation 
through Whitley councils and greater industrial 
autonomy through the policy of "home rule for 
industry". However, like Middlemas, Lowe 7 is concerned 
to emphasise that the government was not guilty of 
premeditated duplicity in February 1919 when it 
summoned the Conference. He points out that for the 
first six months it played an important part in the 
negotiations and that in any case the responsibility 
for the success of the NIC rested not with the 
government but with the two sides of industry, 
particularly the trade unions. The fact that employers 
and unions were prepared to cooperate at the conference 
and on the Provisional Joint Committee shows that a 
basis for a consensus policy - for a British rather 
than a Russian Revolution - did exist. The problem was
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that the labour movement as a whole was unable to act 
with enough unity and moderation to dispel the fears of 
employers and government. The employers prevaricated, 
the government was distracted by other urgent matters 
of state and failed to take the bold political stand 
which might have won greater popular support for the 
NIC. When the government turned its full attention to 
the Provisional Joint Council's work it found that 
neither industrial agreement nor ready legislation 
existed to encourage its adoption of what was an 
ambitious social policy. If the government was guilty 
of anything it was not of the failure of the Conference 
but failure to formulate an alternative policy.
Lowe largely accepts at face value the official reasons 
for the state's failure to implement the principal 
recommendations of the PJC and is concerned to analyse 
this failure in terms of the powerful personalities 
involved. However, as a MOL internal memorandum later 
noted 'the official reasons' for the breakdown of the 
NIC which focused on the shortcomings of the PJC and 
not on the state's part in its downfall 'leave a good 
deal to be explained.' 8
This chapter builds on this observation and argues that 
the NIC and the Sankey Commission were part of the 
policy of conciliation which had proved more successful 
in averting serious industrial unrest than 
confrontation.9 It was a policy which had proven
advantages. It bought time, gave the impression that 
something was being done, allowed the state to retain 
control (the state dictated the terms of reference of 
the conference), recognised only responsible trade 
union leaders with "responsible” demands which made it 
easier for "concessions" to be made and at the same 
time emphasised and exacerbated divisions within the 
organised working class.
The NIC was called by the state in response to signs 
that a situation which it had worked long and hard to 
avert had finally arrived. 'This was the old dream of 
using the mass power of organised labour as a means of 
exerting direct pressure on government for what 
Establishment figures, including most leading union 
officials defined as political ends. Government leaders 
considered they had good cause to fear revolutionary 
elements that might succeed in harnessing the power 
generated by large scale industrial stoppages ... The 
Establishment nightmare had already raised its head in 
two minor cases in 1918 but appeared most vividly ln 
connection with the miners' claim in February 1919 for 
higher wages, reduced working hours, state ownership 
and 'democratic control of the pits.'10 For the state 
'the issue was not revolution and socialism but direct 
industrial action for limited and specific purposes.'11
The remainder of this chapter w i n  outline the 
industrial context from which the NIC emerged after the
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end of the war and its analysis by the MOL. From this 
it will become clear that initially, the state felt 
compelled to give way in the face of powerful worker 
organisation but to concede as little as possible as 
gradually as possible. As time passed however deep 
divisions within the ranks of labour showed that worker 
organisation was not as strong as it looked and that 
even this minimum was unnecessary. It was believed that 
the state could safely withdraw and let worker 
organisations shatter themselves in industrial 
conflict. This policy, combined with the relinquishment 
of control over industry made necessary by the war, 
aimed to reassert the distinction, which had become 
blurred, between the industrial and political spheres 
and to relocate the trade unions firmly in the former. 
Industrial conflict in this period, which focused on 
the state instead of employers, was pushing the trade 
unions into the political arena. The state aimed to re­
establish the province of trade unions as industry and 
employers as the focus of conflict and to reinforce 
moderate trade unionism and its authority over the 
organised working class in this province. This was what 
was meant by "home rule for industry".
Industrial Unrest after the end of the War.
The first important dispute after the war ended grew 
out of the movement in shipyards and factories
throughout the Clyde region for a shorter working week 
without loss of pay in order to keep wartime gains and 
avoid post war unemployment. Although there were 
disagreements as to the exact reduction of hours 
required, there was general agreement on the need for a 
shorter working week to be instituted as soon as the 
war ended. The executives of the STUC and the Scottish 
Labour Party sent the Government a memorandum to this 
effect in August 1918.
Within three weeks of the Armistice being signed the 
STUC called a conference on Demobilisation problems 
which passed a resolution calling for the immediate 
reduction of working hours to a maximum 40 per week. 
Failing Government action, the Conference voted to 
'devise such methods of industrial action as will 
enforce this demand. ’ The Parliamentary committee of 
the STUC prevaricated, caught between pressure from the 
factories and shipyards led by the shop stewards 
movement, and criticism from some trade union officials 
who had been trying unsuccessfully to put the brakes on 
the mass movement led by the shop stewards. The shop 
stewards met on the 19th January and prepared a strike 
manifesto. A general strike was to be called on the 
27th January and a Joint Strike Committee was 
appointed, chaired by Emmanuel Shinwell, councillor and 
chairman of the Glasgow Trades and Labour Council.
There was widespread support for this move and offers 
of sympathetic action came from Tyneside and Belfast as
252
well as most other Clyde factories and yards. The ASE 
however had already negotiated a 47 hour week with 
engineering employers (without meal breaks or loss of 
production which was not a great improvement on the 
previous 54 hour week with meal breaks) and was opposed 
to further struggle. Nevertheless, the strike went 
ahead and spread rapidly and 40,000 men were out by the 
second day. Harland and Wolff's shipyards closed down 
and the city was without gas or electricity.12
In a meeting called to discuss this dispute Sir Robert 
Horne (Minister of Labour) noted that the strike was in 
direct contravention of an agreement reached by the 
accredited representatives of the employers and 
workers. In a bid to reinforce the trade unions' 
authority the Minister sent a telegram to the Lord 
Provost of Glasgow with a message to be conveyed to the 
strikers' leaders which read 'the government are unable 
to entertain reguests for intervention made by local 
members of unions if representatives are acting for 
them in conference with employers. Such action on the 
part of the government could only undermine the 
authority of those who have been chosen by the men to 
represent them and would destroy the cooperation 
between employers and employed on which the hope of 
industrial peace depends.'13
By the 29th January 70,000 men were out and sympathy 
strikes began in Edinburgh and Leith. John Brown's
shipyards came to a standstill under the weight of 
massive picketing, power stations were closed in 
Glasgow and by 31st January 100,000 men were on strike 
and all main factories at a standstill.14 Plans had 
been made by the War Cabinet to concentrate sufficient 
force in Glasgow to prevent disorder and protect 
volunteers or others available to take over the 
operation of the generating stations and municipal 
services.15 It was noted that the situation in Glasgow 
had been brewing for a long time, that the disaffected 
were in the minority and that there would have to be a 
conflict to clear the air. Nevertheless 'we should be 
careful to have plenty of provocation before taking 
strong measures. By going gently at first we should get 
the support of the nation and then troops could be used 
more effectively, the moment for their use has not yet 
arrived, (the moment the revolt advanced over the line 
of a pure wage dispute and the strikers were guilty of 
a serious breach of the law, then was the moment to 
act) in the meantime the Defence of the Realm Act is 
still in force and some of the leaders of the revolt 
should be seized.'16
On the 31st of January there was a mass demonstration 
of strikers in George Square which was ultimately 
broken up with baton charges by mounted policemen. 
Overnight, troops were moved to the city, tanks were 
moved in and machine gun posts set up. The strike 
leaders were arrested and by the 3rd February the
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leaderless strikers began to drift back to work - the 
forty hours demand was abandoned and the STUC accepted 
forty-seven hours in the engineering trades.
In the coal industry in 1919 more than 6,600,000 
working days were lost through disputes.17 At the 
beginning of 1919 miners demanded an increase of 30% on 
existing wages less war wage; full discharge of 
demobilised miners; a six hour day and the 
nationalisation and democratic control of the mining 
industry. During the war production and working 
conditions had vastly improved, national wage 
agreements including a' war wage' of three shillings a 
day had been instituted and no other industry had 
received comparable wage increases.18
The state rejected the miners' demands and offered a 
flat rate of one shilling a day. The miners' declined 
this offer and a national strike threatened. A national 
ballot showed a large majority of miners in favour of 
industrial action and notices of a national strike went 
out for 21st February 1919. Lloyd George called the 
Executive of the MFGB to meet him and offered 
participation in a Commission of Inquiry into the 
situation if the strike notices were postponed. The 
MFGB executive had great difficulty in persuading 
miners to accept this offer 19 but accepted it was, and 
the Commission known as the Sankey Commission was 
instructed to present an interim Report by the 31st
March 1919 20 the findings of which the Government 
agreed to adopt 'in the letter and in the spirit'21
The labour movement displayed its potential strength 
and unity shortly after the miners' initiative when its 
attention became focused on the situation in Russia 
where Britain was supporting Poland with money and 
munitions to fight the Red Army.
At this time there was widespread industrial unrest in 
Britain aside from that in the mining industry, on the 
Clyde and in Belfast. Workers in many industries, 
notably the railways, threatened strike action. During 
this time the Cabinet was close to panic due to the 
industrial unrest and uncertainty as to whether the 
armed services would remain loyal in the face of a 
general strike.22 Plans were made to break a general 
strike of the Triple Alliance. During the war a central 
mechanism had been established to secure the supply of 
essential goods and services under the auspices of the 
Committee on Industrial Unrest 1917 which later became 
the Supply and Transport Organisation and this had set 
a precedent for a similar apparatus in peacetime.23 
While deliberations were going on in the NIC and the 
Sankey Commission the organisation of the Industrial 
Unrest Committee, as it was now called, was being 
perfected and the Cabinet debated measures in addition 
to the Defence of the Realm Acts to combat a Triple 
Alliance strike.24
An Analysis of the Industrial Conflict
In a report of the situation to the Cabinet in May 1919 
the Ministry of Labour 25 singled out the most 
disturbing feature of the industrial unrest as the 
movement towards "direct action." The Ministry noted 
that this was 'a movement which has always been in 
existence but has gathered great impetus recently as a 
result of the increase in strength of the forces behind 
it.' It was 'the result of the reaction against 
political as opposed to industrial action which began 
about 1910 and of the teachings of the school whose 
motto is that industrial action precedes political 
action and controls the strength of it. This reaction 
may roughly be said to be the key-note of the whole 
labour situation since that time.' It was noted however 
that even the most extreme upholders of the view that 
economic power is the key to all power had never 
recommended the actual strike except as a last resort 
and this was where they differed from and were less 
dangerous than the French syndicalists for whom the 
strike was an end in itself. Instead 'our more prosaic 
and philosophical pioneers' recommend firstly, 
organisation so as to make the threat of a serious
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strike a real danger to the community. Secondly the 
full use of this threat to strike and lastly, and only 
if necessary, the strike itself. So for the English 
revolutionary socialist a great parade of industrial 
power, even if there is nothing behind it, is of 
immense importance.'26
In the less highly organised industries in Britain, it 
was noted that only the first stage had been reached. 
However a survey of the record of organisation which 
had taken place since 1910 showed that there was little 
room for doubt that the reaction against the political 
weapon had been a force in shaping it. The outstanding 
development from the MOL's point of view was the 
formation of the Triple Alliance created quite 
definitely as a weapon for industrial action in 1915. 
This development showed that in the more highly 
organised trades the first aim had already practically 
been accomplished and that fulfilment of the second aim 
- the full use of the threat of the strike - was 
perhaps reaching its zenith 'and it is here that the 
practical importance of these considerations 
emerges.'27
For the MOL this was illustrated by the miners' who had 
secured the Coal Commission through the strike threat. 
'It is impossible to conceive of an ill organised 
industry playing the part the Miners' Federation did in 
the negotiations which led to the Coal Commisssion and
equally impossible to conceive of their producing such 
an outcome.' However it was emphasised that the Coal 
Commission, whatever its findings, would not placate 
the miners. 'It would be a mistake to suppose as many 
people do, that the more extreme miners' leaders or 
even the more level headed, look upon the Coal 
Commission as an impartial tribunal appointed as the 
best means of settling the future of the industry. They 
look upon it as a means to certain ends envisaged even 
before it was set up and if it does not attain those 
ends, other means will have to be found for doing so.' 
While it had its disadvantages for the miners who 
thought they did not need the Coal Commission and could 
achieve their aims through industrial power alone, the 
MOL pointed out the advantages of the Coal Commission 
for the state, 'it has thrown a great deal of light 
where it was needed. It has spent a considerable amount 
of time during which hot feeling may have had time to 
cool and whatever decision it comes to will have the 
backing of that portion of public opinion in the 
country, even among the miners themselves, which looks 
upon it as an impartial tribunal and this is a very 
real force with which the Miners Federation has to 
reckon.'28 Even from their own point of view the MOL 
believed that the miners had taken the wiser course 
because the strike possesses disadvantages of a similar 
type quite as great if not greater than the 
disadvantages of the Commission. 'Organisation is never 
so strong as it looks.'29
Nevertheless given the fact that for the miners the 
Commission was a means to preconceived ends it was 
likely to provide only a temporary respite and the MOL 
again predicted that if the miners failed to get what 
they wanted from the Commission they would attempt to 
get it otherwise. It was felt that such an attempt 
would be controlled by consideration of industrial 
power alone - whether they thought they were strong 
enough - and not by any feeling that an impartial 
tribunal had pronounced against them except inasmuch as 
such a feeling could create a public opinion 
unfavourable to further action. Even if they got what 
they wanted the MOL believed that it would be a mistake 
to suppose that that would be the end of the matter. 
'Industrial power like any other power grows with 
success and use. It is moreover, a versatile thing 
which can be used in all sorts of ways.' In support of 
this view the MOL pointed to 'a number of experiments 
with a view to subsituting it for older political 
methods. For example a movement had been started to 
deflect the Governments' policy in foreign affairs by 
means of it. The miners had coupled their acceptance of 
the Interim Report of the Coal Commission with a 
threatening resolution on the guestion of the 
withdrawal of troops to Russia and subsequently further 
action was taken in conjunction with the Triple 
Alliance which however, 'as was anticipated, appears 
not to have come to very much.' A similar resolution
with regard to conscription was passed at the same 
time. 'Again the miners of South Wales led, it is to be 
noticed, by two of their political leaders, members of 
the House of Commons - have just resolved to refuse to 
pay further income tax on the present basis and called 
on the MFGB as a whole to take similar action. The 
Northumberland miners, in addition to appealing to the 
MFGB on this matter have resolved to lay the case 
before the Triple Alliance with a view to taking 
industrial action.'30
According to the MOL the same tendency could be found 
throughout the whole area of industrial organisation 
and the only way to diffuse it was to strengthen 
official trade unionism. 'The more such organisation 
and the power which follows it grows, the more varied 
and numerous will be the uses to which that power will 
be put or attempted to be put. There is in the long run 
only one antidote to its abuse, namely a parallel 
growth of the social responsibilities of the 
organisations wielding it.'31
The MOL focused on the miners as the clearest example 
of this trend away from constitutional methods 'because 
theirs is the boldest and most progressive organisation 
in the field, but there are other examples to be 
found.' It was noted that the railwaymen were in the 
same position as the miners. They too had gained their 
recent settlement by the threat of industrial action
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and would not be easily diverted by delaying tactics. 
'That settlement was not final and when a final 
settlement is attempted, as it will have to be sooner 
or later, no doubt the railwaymen will repeat the same 
tactics perhaps with some new devices which by that 
time will have been discovered to be effective. The 
same tendency can be seen too in a more general form in 
the large crop of Commissions and Committees recently 
appointed to settle definite industrial problems.'32
It was concluded that a shift in power had taken place 
such that 'the increased industrial power of labour - 
and it must be added here of employers too - has made 
the ordinary legislative procedure inadequate with the 
result that a sort of devolution into the industrial 
sphere has taken place and with it has gone a certain 
amount of power from the supreme legislative assembly 
which in industrial matters becomes merely a body for 
registering decisions arrived at outside itself.' The 
most important example of this for the MOL was 'the 
inception of a supreme Joint Industrial Council with 
the aim of settling industrial conditions largely 
without reference to Parliament in future. This aim is 
undoubtedly held by strong personalities both on the 
employers' and on the workers' side, and is clearly 
reflected in the Report of the Provisional Joint 
Committee.' For the MOL this was a consequence of the 
temporary increase in power of both sides industry due
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to novel and artificial conditions - the temporary 
economic boom - pertaining at the end of the war.
Proposed strategy
In workers' case legislation had previously been ruled 
out because it was not as effective as "trade union 
discipline and control", and judging from past 
experience it was not certain that workers would abide 
by it and there was also the risk of distancing union 
leaders from local leaders and the rank and file.33 The 
MOL concluded that 'organised industrial power is a 
thing which cannot be abolished any more than a 
physical force can be abolished but can only be dealt 
with by being turned in the right direction and 
harnessed through the superposition of corresponding 
responsibility.,34
Given this it was decided that future strategy must be 
based on restricting the opportunities available for 
exercising it to those who controlled this power. It 
was emphasised that there was little point in relying 
on the findings of Commissions, Committees or 
Conferences 'as these will carry little weight with the 
more advanced controllers of industrial power since 
they look upon them only as so many ways of avoiding a 
strike.'35
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For the MOL the focus of strategy had to be the chief 
organ of industrial power - the Triple Alliance.
'This is exactly the role which its creators foresaw 
for it and it is bidding fair to vindicate their 
foresight with extraordinary accuracy.'36 It was 
thought difficult to predict what this organ might 
achieve in the future because this depended on outside 
forces. It was acknowledged however that it had already 
done what it was intended to do, namely to become the 
focus and machine for the use of the industrial weapon, 
drawing towards itself and overshadowing all other 
activities in the same direction and entirely 
superseding any other organisation which might have 
similar pretensions such as the General Federation of 
Trade Unions.
The Ministry had to think ahead and consider the number 
and importance of the opportunities which forthcoming 
events were likely to provide to the leaders of the 
Triple Alliance for the development and accomplishment 
of their aims. When these were considered it became 
obvious that there was 'considerably more cause for 
anxiety than a superficial glance at the state of 
affairs at the moment might suggest.'37
It was noted that the first of these opportunities was 
likely to be the Coal Commission Report due for the 
20th of June. 'As already noted, if this doesn't give 
the miners' leaders all they think their industrial
power entitles them to they will not be content 
especially if other circumstances favour industrial 
action. While in other circumstances nationalisation 
alone would not be a sufficient plank to obtain solid 
backing for action or the serious threat of it, any 
additional issue of a personal nature might entirely 
alter the situation.'38
In addition another opportunity was likely to arise out 
of the negotiations with the railwaymen. At the time 
they were proceeding satisfactorily but it was believed 
that 'in view of the somewhat uncertain situation as 
regards railway control in general ... they might 
develop dangerous qualities and in any case the wage 
problem had only been postponed.'39
The foregoing were issues in which the Triple Alliance 
was inherently directly concerned but the MOL noted 
that there were a number of other issues in which the 
leaders were directly concerning themselves as a result 
of the industrial power which they were in a position 
to exploit. Conscription, the Blockade, the question of 
Russia, the treatment of conscientious objectors and 
political prisoners, the income tax limit and finally 
the military circular with regard to strikes were cited 
'they are all being used together and separately to 
their fullest capacity. In none of these particular 
cases has anything of great importance happened, but 
together, in an atmosphere otherwise troubled, they
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could all become effective.' This was because they all 
contained grievances and some grievances with guite 
serious implications. 'The income tax and conscription 
issues both affect the individual in a way that makes 
them of some importance. The Army circular is just the 
sort of thing to raise a maximum of indignation as 
results have shown. The questions of the Blockade and 
Russia are closely connected with the question of Peace 
Terms and policy towards enemy countries which, of 
course possesses considerable potentialities.'40
The MOL thought that lessons could be learned from the 
tactics employed by the German Government in dealing 
with this situation. It was noted that the German 
Government was in a strong position with labour and 
socialist organisations generally because although it 
took no action, it purported to represent 'as it takes 
every opportunity for saying, that it does the very 
thing they are striving for. With the presentation of 
the peace terms the time has come for them to take 
action along this line, and they appear to be doing it 
with some success.'41
The MOL focused on another 'quite peculiar' issue in 
which the Triple Alliance was reported to be concerning 
itself. This was the issue surrounding the Police and 
Prison Officers' Union which it was thought would be 
certain to be exploited to the utmost by those who 
intended to make trouble. The trouble over the Police
Union, especially in the light of its reported 
recruiting successes in Scotland, could quite easily 
attract attention in industrial labour circles and 
provoke sympathetic action.
This led the MOL to consider other sources of trouble 
not directly connected with the Triple Alliance. Two of 
these were seen as particularly important. Firstly the 
movement in favour of a 44 hour week was not exhausted. 
It was noted that following a conference representing 
the E and STF, the ASE and the Workers' Union, a ballot 
had been taken as to action in this matter and in the 
case of the E and STF it was reported to have resulted 
in a strong majority in favour of action. In the case 
of the ASE it was thought unlikely that the Executive 
would be allowed to let matters rest even if they 
wanted to. The National Union of General Workers, the 
Cotton trade unions and even a number of smaller 
organisations were also moving in this matter. 'Here 
again is an issue with very personal implications and 
one in which public opinion has already gained 
considerable momentum which the 48 Hour Bill will do 
little to allay and may even aggravate.' Secondly there 
was 'the large and vague question of unemployment.'
This was seen to be so closely interwoven by action and 
reaction with all other issues not only industrial but 
also commercial and connected not only with Britain but 
also with others, that it was impossible to make any 
statement regarding it. All that could be said was that
trouble arising, or even results arising, from 
settlements which avoid trouble, connected with all the 
other issues enumerated above, cannot but have an 
aggravating effect on the problems connected with 
unemployment and that difficulties arising through 
these problems in turn aggravate every other difficulty 
which arises. There seemed to the MOL little doubt that 
certain industrial settlements already made were having 
adverse commercial effects both directly through 
diminution in production and indirectly in a vaguer and 
wider sphere, in the lack of confidence which they tend 
to foster. A movement of this kind was cumulative and 
tended to invade every sphere of social activity with 
corresponding direct reactions in the industrial world 
which was its source. 'If the attitude and position of 
controllers of industrial power, outlined at the outset 
be now recalled it will be seen that the situation is 
hardly one in which all difficulties can be considered 
to have been overcome. It is probably not entirely 
accidental that all these issues may be expected to 
come more or less to a head at about one and the same 
time not very far off.'42
The Demand for Control
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The solution to the rapid growth of industrial power 
advocated by the MOL was 'to give way before the 
concentration of industrial and social power' but 'to 
give way as little and as gradually as possible.'43 
This was where the MOL felt that 'the question of 
"control" emerges as presenting in some form or other 
what appears to be the only adequate solution. The only 
question was - what form and what amount of control, 
for control is a very vague term. The minimum amount 
would appear to be defined by the consideration that it 
must be sufficient to develop such a sense of 
responsibility as will enable labour representatives, 
when considering demands to be put forward, to 
appreciate their possible results not only from the 
individual workman's point of view in the short period 
but from the wider point of view of the general 
welfare, which is the individual's point of view in the 
long run.'44
The MOL emphasised that the extent of control envisaged 
by the Whitley Report was so vague that 'it leaves in 
the mind the assumption that things in this sphere will 
remain more or less as they are.' The situation had 
developed since the Whitley Report was written. Now it 
was not just on control but on "how much" control that 
the big organisations were concentrating all their 
industrial power and which they were forcing into the 
foreground as a matter of immediate concern. This 
opened up a vast area of consideration left untouched
by the Whitley recommendations. 'It is for this reason 
that the Unions most conscious of their industrial 
powers i.e. the miners, the railwaymen and the 
engineers, together with the advocates of State or 
Guild Socialism, have exhibited little sympathy with 
the Whitley Report. Yet even a minimum of control, 
without going so far as any of these recommend, would 
involve a transformation which may be likened to the 
transformation from secret to open diplomacy and 
involves similar difficulties to those encountered in 
that process.'45
In the MOL's view, to meet the threat 'an absolute 
minimum necessary would appear to be throughout the 
whole field of industry the throwing open to 
examination of the workpeople or their representatives 
all the commercial and financial processes of business 
and incidentally in the words of the Report on Trusts 
"the institution of machinery for the investigation of 
the operation of monopolies, trusts and combines." '
The MOL emphasised however that this was a step 
regarded as drastic and even impossible by the majority 
of employers. On the workers' side it was rigidly held 
that shorter hours with unaltered earnings and simple 
time rates without any appeal to extra exertion in the 
way of bonuses did not have an adverse effect on 
output. The fact was however that, 'workpeople being 
after all human, this is simply not true ... Evidence 
is accumulating which goes to show that inflated
industrial power coupled with lack of responsibility 
for any results of action taken are already having 
adverse effects on production. But it is difficult to 
see how such an unpleasant and unpopular fact can be 
adequately driven home by demonstration alone and it 
may be the wiser and in the long run the only stable 
solution of the difficulty to concede something to the 
demands made by labour itself along another line, that 
of control, and leave the truth to demonstrate itself 
by the visible and obvious working of cause and effect. 
Certain organised bodies of workpeople are in a 
position to force certain results. It is only a 
question whether they shall or shall not be exempted 
from responsibility for the consequences both before 
and after the fact. If they are not exempted then the 
gain will be immeasurable in steadying not only their 
aggressive action before but also their resentment 
after, even though such a course is one of very great 
difficulty owing to the commercial considerations 
involved, to which labour is not accustomed.' The only 
logical alternative to this course in the Ministry's 
view was 'boldly to deny that these labour 
organisations are as strong as they appear to be and 
prepare to shatter them in industrial conflict. This 
course must sooner or later lead to a struggle which 
can only be disastrous, whatever its upshot.'46
However divisions began to appear within the ranks of 
labour which exposed weaknesses within the leadership
of the Triple Alliance and the labour movement 
generally, allowed the state to step back from the 
measures outlined above and to revise its estimation of 
the impact of the inevitable struggle.
Firstly, for the MOL there were the events at the 
Miners' Federation Conference at Keswick on the 15th of 
July.47 At the Conference it was decided that the 
Government's offer to defer the proposed increase in 
the price of coal for three months if the Labour Party 
would guarantee no strikes or stoppages and the miners 
agreed to increase output be rejected. No ballot of the 
members had been taken on this issue. The Conference 
believed that this offer was not final and that the 
situation was still subject to negotiation. There was 
suspicion on the part of the miners that the Prime 
Minister's offer was an attempt to postpone a Cabinet 
decision on nationalisation. The Conference decided 
that if the Prime Minister would give an undertaking 
that the Government would decide the guestion within a 
limited time and couple this with an exhortation to the 
miners not to strike and to increase output this would 
be put to the miners by ballot and conference and an 
agreement reached. The MOL was of the view that this 
initiative betrayed a lack of appreciation of the 
situation by miners' leaders - a certain naivety. The 
prospect of an amicable agreement was remote in view of 
the extent to which the miners' strikes in Yorkshire 
had gone and the Government's action in connection with
them.48 The question of nationalisation had been 
settled long before. The final reports of the Sankey 
Commission had been presented to the Government on June 
the 20th. The Commission was split on the question of 
nationalisation. The Yorkshire miners' strike and the 
decline in the output of coal were to be the 
Government's reasons for its decision to reject 
nationalisation. The announcement of this decision had 
been delayed.49
At the Conference an attempt to authorise the executive 
Committee of the Federation to declare a strike without 
taking a ballot of the members was defeated. For the 
MOL this was 'interesting as an indication that the 
rank and file are inclined to distrust a policy which 
gives practically unlimited powers to the Executive.'50 
The proposer of this motion urged that new machinery 
was needed to meet new circumstances that were going to 
arise. The Federation had joined the Triple Alliance 
and it was not desirable in a crisis that they should 
have to stand peacefully waiting until a ballot had 
been taken. This motion was opposed on the grounds that 
it was not democratic but autocratic and W.Brace M.P. 
(member MFGB Executive) characterised it as reactionary 
and said that he objected to being controlled by an 
'oligarchy of his own class.'51 The proposal was 
rejected by a large majority. The MOL noted that in 
recent years extremists had made several unsuccessful 
attempts to give the Executive or a National Conference
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power to call a national strike and that the latest 
effort was not unconnected with the fact that the 
National Union of railwaymen have the power to call a 
strike without a ballot and thus, so far as they are 
concerned, to put into immediate effect any decision of 
the Triple Alliance with regard to direct action.
The Conference displayed considerable anxiety over the 
disciplinary aspect of unofficial strikes. Vernon 
Hartshorn M.P. and Smillie (both MFGB Executive) 
expressed regret at the action of South Wales 
surfacemen who had struck against the hours of work 
fixed by the Sankey Award. Smillie called on the men to 
go back to work saying 'To have men striking against 
conditions accepted by a ballot vote of all the members 
would destroy the Federation.'52 The MOL noted that 
intelligence sources had reported that many of the 
miners' leaders viewed with alarm the prevalence of 
unofficial strikes and freely admitted that the men 
were in some cases getting out of hand.
By late August the MOL was convinced that some 
influential leaders of the labour movement were not in 
favour of direct action.
There were 'signs that the "direct action" issue is 
leading to a sharp cleavage of opinion in the Labour 
world.'53 It was acknowledged that the opinion of the 
rank and file of the Triple Alliance on the policy of 
direct action would not be known until the 25th of
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August when the results of a ballot on the issue were 
released. However the MOL saw as encouraging and 
influential on the results the fact that the Labour 
Party had declined to commit itself on the matter and 
that the President of the NUR and the secretaries of 
the MFGB and the Transport Workers' Federation had 
publicly declared that 'the working class in general 
and the organised workers in particular derive more 
advantage from a clear and unprejudiced presentation of 
their claims and aspirations by and through a Labour 
daily newspaper than by costly strikes and wage 
movements.'54
The Ministry of Labour also attached much significance 
to the TUC conference in Glasgow on the 10th of 
September 1919 which had revealed opposing factions 
within the leadership of the labour movement 55. It was 
noted that much publicity had been given to the fact 
that this Congress was the largest on record 
representing over five million trade unionists - more 
than double the membership before the war - and that 
the Congress now claimed to speak for a larger body of 
opinion than any national gathering in the world. Its 
publicity notwithstanding, the MOL discerned 'much 
dissatisfaction among the Unions affiliated to it on 
the grounds that its actual effective power, when 
compared with its enormous latent potentialities, is 
very much less than it ought to be.'56 The Ministry 
acknowledged that this criticism was not new but it was
observed that it had become very prominent in 
connection with the Triple Alliance's demand that the 
Congress declare its stance on the Government's policy 
in regard to Russia, conscription and so on. The TUC 
stood accused by the intelligentsia of the Labour 
movement of being fettered by its history and of making 
little attempt to address itself to the task that 
urgently awaited it, namely the constitution of a body 
able to give shape to the expressed policy of the trade 
union movement and of a general staff to coordinate the 
forces of Labour in the industrial field, especially as 
regards the problem of industrial and craft unionism.
It was generally believed by its critics that the TUC 
should devote itself to an effort in the industrial 
sphere to link up the sectional efforts and programmes 
of labour into a common policy and scheme of action.
The Triple Alliance found fault with the TUC on the 
question of direct action. The definite movement in 
favour of direct action had been inaugurated at a 
Conference of the Alliance at Southport on the 16th of 
April. It took the form of a resolution urging the 
Parliamentary Committee of the TUC to convene a special 
National Conference to consider whether industrial 
action should be taken to compel the Government to 
accede to the abolition of conscription, the withdrawal 
of British troops from Russia, the raising of the 
blockade and the release of conscientious objectors. At 
this time the Alliance was flushed with success at
275
obtaining from the Government most of the concessions 
demanded in the national programmes which two of the 
constituent bodies formulated on the conclusion of the 
armistice. Subsequent events brought the Alliance into 
sharp conflict with the Parliamentary Committee.
Instead of supporting the Alliance the Parliamentary 
Committee sent a deputation to the Prime Minister and, 
in view of his assurances, decided not to call a 
National Conference. At this all the constituent bodies 
of the Alliance endorsed the policy of direct action at 
their annual conferences. At a full delegate conference 
on the 23rd of July the Alliance
pledged itself to pursue its policy of direct action 
and recommended a ballot of Triple Alliance members to 
ascertain whether they were prepared to take industrial 
action to enforce their demands.
While the whole industrial and political situation was 
overcast waiting for the decision of the members of the 
Triple Alliance on direct action there was an 
unsuccessful attempt at coordination and exploitation 
of strikes by extremist elements. Against a favourable 
background characterised by a general spirit of 
discontent, the unsettled miners strike in Yorkshire 
and the dispute in the baking trade, the Police Strike 
erupted. The latter 'deliberately and secretly 
organised by agitators in the Police Union, was sprung 
on the country and was followed by riots in Liverpool 
and the sympathetic strike by L&SW railwaymen and
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others.' The MOL was of the view that 'There can be 
little doubt that if the police strike had succeeded, 
the events which occurred in Liverpool would have taken 
place elsewhere also and that extremists in various 
branches of industry might have attempted to call 
sympathetic strikes on a large scale. It is not 
intended to maintain that there was a causal connection 
between all the strikes and events that have been 
mentioned, but it is probable that their coexistence 
was not purely fortuitous.'57
In the wake of this abortive coup the rank and file of 
the Triple Alliance reacted against the policy of 
direct action. The MOL concluded that this reaction was 
not unconnected with the complete failure of the 
revolutionary police and sympathetic strikes and that 
it had exerted a sobering effect on the Alliance. Its 
executive postponed the ballot and the full delegate 
conference homologated the decision and agreed to 
adjourn the whole matter until a meeting of the TUC was 
convened to consider the issue. The MOL concluded 'that 
from the point of view of the Alliance, the policy of 
Direct Action was wrecked by the conservative 
constitutionalism of the Parliamentary Committee of the 
TUC, for if it had consented to convene a National 
Conference in June or July when the revolutionary 
elements in labour were at the height of their power, 
it is not impossible that that policy might have been 
endorsed.'58 For the MOL the threat of direct action
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had dissipated and further proof of this was to be 
found in the railway dispute.
The Railwaymen
The railwaymen, like the miners, presented a programme 
of demands to the Railway Executive Committee in March 
1919. The' Leicester Programme 'had been drafted by the 
NUR in 1917 and included demands for egual 
representation both locally and nationally for the NUR 
in the management of all UK railways; standardised 
conditions of service for all railwaymen; an eight hour 
day ; the conversion of war wages to permanent wages. 
The eight hour day had come into operation on February 
1st 1919 but the remainder of the Leicester Programme 
met with resistance. "The Times" reported on March 18th 
1919 that the Railway Executive and the Board of Trade 
'had been pursuing the usual policy of haggling over 
every point , trying to make the smallest possible 
concession and grudgingly giving way by degrees.' There 
was growing unrest among railwaymen at the delay and 
resistance to their demands and on 20th March the NUR 
voted to ask for Triple Alliance support in calling a 
strike. The Triple Alliance were against a strike at 
that time but their leaders were summoned by Lloyd 
George and informed of the dangers inherent in a 
confrontation with the state. The leaders of the Triple 
Alliance confirmed that an attack on the state was not 
their intention and the NUR was given an undertaking
that wages would be "standardised upwards." The NUR 
called off the strike pending negotiations.59 Meanwhile 
a settlement 'unparallelled in the history of British 
locomotivemen'60 had been awarded to ASLEF. This 
settlement was reached on August the 20th, the day 
after the Government rejected coal nationalisation.
This move was widely seen as 'one way of weakening the 
railwaymens' forces' ie., settling the locomotivemen's 
claims generously so that they might be less inclined 
to support other grades' claims with strike action. The 
NUR wanted this "standardisation upwards" to be awarded 
to all grades to prevent local and sectional strikes.
On 19th September the Board of Trade forwarded 
proposals to the Executive of the NUR which included a 
list of swingeing wage cuts with the message that they 
were 'not a basis for negotiation ' but 'a definitive 
offer of the Government'.61 A national railway strike 
began on the 26th September 1919 which the Prime 
Minister labelled 'an anarchist conspiracy.'62 The NUR 
made no appeal to the Triple Alliance for support.
Emergency arrangements on a huge scale came into 
operation for the transport and distribution of food 
etc., and six thousand servicemen and military vehicles 
were deployed to maintain order and supplies. Civilian 
volunteers provided a skeleton railway service and were 
paid standard rate plus bonuses of 50% of earnings.
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In early October 1919 the MOL reported on the strike to 
the Cabinet.63 This report began by singling out the 
distinguishing features of the strike as its size and 
the reluctance of those directing it to further extend 
the area of the strike. It was noted 'Usually it is of 
advantage from the strikers' point of view so far as 
possible to extend the area of a strike. Hence the 
policy of federation and amalgamation and the policy of 
"sympathetic action." ' The reasons why the leaders had 
not extended the strike were analysed by the MOL.
Firstly it was noted that the extension of the strike 
was unnecessary 'because the National Union of 
Railwaymen were by their size and position already able 
to bring sufficient pressure to enforce any demand that 
mere pressure can enforce.' This had been well 
illustrated by their ability to carry matters to the 
supreme head of the Government whenever they had a mind 
to. The Ministry however was careful to point out that 
this did not mean that the Triple Alliance was an 
unnecessary organisation but that its limits had become 
clear. 'It is a first class manoeuvring weapon, but how 
far it is useful through its mere capacity to strike as 
a whole is another matter.' There was another important 
consideration which was exercising the minds of the 
railwaymen's leaders and which guided their activities.
This could be most clearly illustrated through a 
comparison of the positions of two key figures in the 
railway dispute, Mr Cramp and Mr Thomas.64
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Intelligence received by the MOL revealed that Mr Cramp 
and Mr Thomas had made their positions clear at 
Carlisle on the 25th of May. Cramp was reported to have 
consulted other members of the Triple Alliance over the 
progress of the strike and presented the situation in 
revolutionary terms. Cramp expressed doubt as to 
whether the rank and file understood what was happening 
- revolution. The guestion for Cramp was 'were the 
people clear eyed and conscious of the fact which was 
involved, because it meant either revolution or defeat? 
Whenever they said they were ripe for industrial 
revolution, he was with them, but not for them to enter 
it merely under the belief that they were out for a 
trade dispute. Let them approach it with their eyes 
open and be prepared to carry it through, but do not 
let them through false pretences, engineer a thing of 
this kind unless the people they were calling upon to 
follow them knew what they had to go through.' Despite 
his rhetoric, the Ministry noted Cramp's hesitation and 
his reluctance to extend the strike and concluded that 
he was not a serious revolutionary. 'If he is thinking 
in terms of revolution and not of a trade dispute, [he] 
should be all for the extension still farther of the 
area of the strike. He should want to completely 
disorganise and finally paralyse the present system of 
government. For this no more effective means could be 
devised than the simultaneous strike of all the members 
of the Triple Alliance, the Postal Federation and the 
ETU and the newspaper compositors. In the complete
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breakdown which would ensue Mr Cramp might have an 
opportunity of establishing a social order more in 
consonance with his ideals.'65
Although the attitude of Mr Cramp appeared more 
threatening, Mr Thomas's attitude was the more 
interesting and more important in the MOL's view 
because it was 'more on the plane of practical 
politics.' It was noted that Mr Thomas was a strong 
opponent of direct action and an upholder of the ballot 
box method of revolution. Mr Thomas hesitated to extend 
the strike area because he was aware that he had 
already applied sufficient pressure 'to do anything 
that pressure will do.' Mr Thomas explained his 
restraint in terms of the interests of the community. 
The MOL commented 'this may be guite sincere, though 
hardly in just the way Mr Thomas suggests.' The reason 
for Mr Thomas's forbearance according to the MOL was 
that he understood the limits placed on trade union 
action by the working class. 'He is indeed much 
concerned at the attitude of the community but the 
reason is he stands or falls by that attitude and this 
is the consideration which must govern his policy as 
regards the extension of the strike. Unless he wishes 
forcibly to overturn the whole existing order, beyond a 
certain point public opinion must decide the issue. No 
single body can stand against an overwhelmingly hostile 
community. But this consideration applies equally to 
the attitude of the Government. The Government also in
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a matter such as this must be ruled by public opinion, 
and since much of this opinion is labour opinion, it 
has been desirable to do nothing in the course of 
measures taken in connection with the strike which 
involves principles to which labour is solidly hostile 
without making abundantly clear that it was necessary 
and why. This is why it was desirable to concentrate 
rather on organising emergency means of transport than 
a direct attack on the Union e.g. through its funds, or 
on forcibly carrying on the railways with soldiers &c. 
It has also been desirable in appealing for volunteers 
to be careful that appeals should not be so framed as 
to appear to be applicable to one social class in the 
community, as for example, an appeal for all to lend 
their motor cars. This brings the conception of the 
class war dangerously into prominence.'66
The strike was settled on 5th October on the basis of 
no wage reductions till the 30th September 1921, 
negotiations about new standard rates, wages tied to 
the cost of living and repayment of wage arrears. 
Bagwell (1963) notes that the strike successfully 
frustrated the attempt to reduce railwaymens' wages but 
did nothing about the problem of the future 
organisation of the transport industry and the Railway 
Act 1921 avoided nationalisation by forcing the 
majority of existing lines into four companies to be 
privately owned and run for profit.
By mid March 1920 the MOL could report to the Cabinet 
that agitation for industrial action on a considerable 
scale to secure political ends was at an end and that 
'interest has been transferred from schemes for the 
control of industry to claims for further wage 
advances. '67
Summary and Conclusion
The National Industrial Conference was summoned by the 
Minister of Labour (Robert Horne) on the 27th of 
February 1919 to consider the question of industrial 
unrest. On a resolution proposed by the Prime Minister 
a Provisional Joint Committee consisting of sixty 
members with Sir Thomas Munro as chairman was 
appointed. The Triple Alliance and the ASE abstained 
from participation in the Joint Committee and the 
National Union of Railwaymen took the view that 'no 
useful purpose is served by collusion with the 
employers through the Government to maintain the 
existing order of society,'68
The Committee appointed three sub committees dealing 
with wages, hours and legal minimum wages and 
unemployment. On the 4th of April 1919 they produced a 
report recommending legal minimum wage rates, the 
extension of trade boards and the continuance of the 
Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act. The last two
recommendations were accepted but the extension of the 
trade boards was held to make a national minimum wage 
unnecessary. The Committee also recommended a maximum 
working week of forty eight hours for all employed 
persons. To address unemployment they recommended 
organised short time, regulation of Government orders, 
housing schemes and the maintenance of unemployed 
workers. The Committee reported back to the conference 
which passed the following resolution. 'That this Joint 
National Industrial Conference welcomes this report of 
the Provisional Joint Committee and agrees to submit it 
for the acceptance of its constituent organisations 
immediately the Government officially declares their 
readiness to proceed at once with the legislative and 
other steps necessary to carry the report into effect.
That the Provisional Joint Committee remain in being 
until the National Industrial Council and the Standing 
Committee have been brought into operation.'69
The Prime Minister received the report and stated 
'Though I cannot commit myself to every detail, as many 
of them are technical, I may say at once that I fully 
accept in principle your recommendations as to the 
fixing of maximum hours and minimum rates of wages ...
As regards wages I accept the principle that minimum 
rates of wages should in all industries be made 
applicable by law ... I gladly accept your suggestion 
that the Government should in the first place set up a 
commission with wide terms of reference to report on
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the whole matter ... I welcome your proposal to set up 
a National Council and hope that you will take steps to 
bring it into being as quickly as possible, as I assume 
it will be of great value in assisting the Government 
to improve industrial conditions.'70
On the 29th of April Sir Robert Horne (the Minister of 
Labour) called a meeting of representatives of the 
Provisional Joint Council to take place on the 1st of 
May. At this meeting three of the recommendations of 
the Report were qualified. The government wanted to 
exclude agricultural workers and seamen from any 
legislation on hours and to advise that there would be 
no legislation on minimum wages. Instead an enquiry was 
to be set up on minimum wages. It was made clear that 
the setting up of a National Industrial Council was to 
be the responsibility of the PJC and not the government 
and the government agreed to extend the Wages 
(Temporary Legislation) Act for six months. The meeting 
adjourned to meet again on the 29th of May when the 
government proposed new exceptions to proposed 
legislation on hours - clerks and post office workers.
Beyond this no other matters were settled but Horne 
emphasised 'I am speaking absolutely from my heart ...
I expect you to believe that the government in this 
matter is determined to carry out your wishes and make 
fruitful and put into legislative enactment the 
principles you have enunciated.'71 The Committee was 
prepared to accept exemptions but only if these were
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negotiated after the legislation was in force on the 
conditions laid down in the Report. Legislation was 
introduced into the House of Commons in August 
concerning the establishment of a Committee of Enquiry 
on wages and a maximum 48 hour week with the exception 
of agricultural workers, seamen etc,. The Wages Act 
lapsed while the Bill on hours and wages was being 
considered. In November 1919 the labour side of the 
Conference called a meeting of the PJC where it was 
concluded that the government's position had been made 
clear by the Minister of Labour who had emphasised that 
the government had no intention of handing over 'to any 
body of people, however eminent'72 its responsibilities 
in the matter of legislation. The PJC had exceeded its 
authority as far as the state was concerned.
The Government sounded the death knell of the NIC when 
on the 17th of June 1920 the new Minister of Labour,
T.J. Macnamara, presented the Joint Committee with a 
redrafted Hours Bill which deviated appreciably from 
the Report of the Joint Committee. In July 1921 hopes 
for the NIC as the mechanism for a British revolution 
finally died when the Government refused to accept the 
Committee's report despite Lloyd George's assurances 
that the government would give it" immediate and 
sympathetic consideration".73 The PJC resigned.
By way of explanation, LLoyd George communicated with 
those concerned through the Ministry of Labour saying
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that the Provisional Joint Committee had not been fully 
representative of the important industries of the 
country, the miners, the railwaymen, the transport 
workers and the engineers and that it had not been 
possible to give legislative effect to all the 
recommendations of the Joint Committee.74 He thanked 
the PJC for the 'good work it had done to inculcate a 
spirit of cooperation between employers and employed at 
a crucial time' and appreciated its role in 'creating a 
steadying influence' during reconstruction.75
The claim that the PJC had not been fully 
representative of the important industries of the 
country is undermined by Wrigley76 who notes that at 
the first meeting of the conference Lloyd George showed 
no anxiety about whether the conference was 
representative of all shades of opinion and even 
brushed aside arguments that those present did not have 
a mandate. Also to argue that a cause of the 
conference's failure was that labour's demands were too 
great is to overlook the fact that this was the major 
reason for calling the conference in the first place.77 
The claim that the failure of the NIC was due to lack 
of unity on the labour side is also questioned by 
Wrigley who points out that this may have been one of 
the reasons why it was called. There was every 
likelihood that the conference would emphasise and 
exacerbate the divisions within the labour movement - 
that its activities would 'divide and rule' the labour
movement. For instance the fact that the conference was 
made up of trade union and Labour Party leaders who 
believed in constitutional methods together with the 
fact that its proposal for a National Joint Industrial 
Council attracted workers who did not have the 
industrial muscle of the powerful unions in the Triple 
Alliance, highlighted the divisions within the 
organised working class. In addition the state's 
actions surrounding the recommendations of the PJC - 
its delaying tactics and its
internal deliberations reveal that its main concerns in 
calling the conference were the threatened strike of 
the Triple Alliance, the disregard of trade union 
authority displayed in the strikes involving the 
engineers and power workers and the need to publicly 
shift responsibility for serious industrial unrest back 
to both sides of industry and away from the state.
From May onwards the state adopted the approach 
favoured by the German government and took no action on 
the key recommendations of the PJC while purporting to 
represent everything it was striving for. At the same 
time the state took care to restrict the opportunities 
available to the Triple Alliance for exercising its 
industrial muscle. By late September 1919 it had become 
apparent to the MOL that the threat of direct action 
had receded, that the labour movement as a whole was 
fragmented and that a strike of the Triple Alliance was
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions
This study has attempted to chart continuity and change 
in the character of state industrial relations policy 
and the role of trade unions and trade union leaders in 
that policy in the period 1910-21. These objectives 
have been pursued through an analysis of the papers of 
state agencies responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of industrial relations policy at this 
time. In this chapter I will summarise the conclusions 
of each chapter and discuss some of the main themes 
which have been examined in the study. Finally I will 
analyse the implications of the study for the rank and 
filist perspective.
The first chapter defines the study as one in the 
sociology of industrial relations because its central 
focus is the role of trade unions and their officials 
in the state's management of industrial conflict in 
1910-21 and the core of industrial relations is trade 
unionism. With this in mind I detailed the 
contradictory role of trade unions and outlined those 
theories of trade unionism which inform the analyses 
which influenced the thesis. This provided the 
theoretical context for the empirical examination of 
the relation between the state and trade unions in the
management of industrial conflict. This chapter, after 
assessing these theories, concluded that the key to 
continuity and change and the role of trade unions in 
industrial relations policy in this period was the 
state's assessment of the temper of the working class 
and the nature of worker organisation.
Chapter two outlines the development of trade union 
organisation from the late 19th century in Britain and 
assesses the impact of syndicalism and industrial 
unionism on this development. It concludes that the 
conflation of the two separate movements under the 
rubric syndicalism by influential analysts has given 
rise to a misunderstanding of the nature of worker 
organisation and industrial conflict at this time. It 
was a peculiarly British hybrid of industrial unionism 
and syndicalism which, combined with widespread worker 
discontent and disillusionment with established trade 
unionism, caught the imagination of workers.
Chapter three sketches the historical development of 
the relationship between the state and trade unions and 
analyses the process by which the state came to promote 
and participate in conciliation with a view to reducing 
industrial conflict. It focuses on the understandings 
of industrial conflict and of trade unionism on which 
the policy of the Labour Department of the Board of 
Trade and its successors rested and on exploring the
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distinctiveness of this apparatus of state 
intervention.
This chapter concludes that the state's understanding 
of industrial conflict, of trade unions and of trade 
union leaders corresponded with rank and filist 
premises. These are firstly that workers have a 
reservoir of latent power which is contained by well 
organised and responsibly led trade unions, secondly 
that a clear line of demarcation can be drawn between 
the leadership of trade unions, activists and the rank 
and file and thirdly that trade union officialdom is 
synonymous with moderation. It was believed that the 
conservatism of trade union officials in industrial 
relations inclined them towards constitutional methods 
rather than industrial action and that they tended to 
prioritise their own role in negotiations with 
management at the expense of mass participation in 
union activities. These conceptions underpinned the 
state's enthusiasm for conciliation, which was based on 
the promotion, as opposed to the repression of trade 
unionism, in the management of industrial conflict.
This chapter provided a standpoint from which to view 
the state's management of industrial conflict 
throughout 1910-21
The "Great Unrest" began in 1910 and chapter four 
highlights the concerns of the state in managing the 
industrial conflict. It confirms that the aim of the
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state in the field of conciliation was not to redress 
the balance in favour of the working class in 
industrial bargaining but to prevent the development of 
worker organisation of a scale and coherence which 
could dislocate the country.
The state's analyses of industrial conflict found that 
the aims of the workers were not revolutionary in the 
sense that they did not subscribe en masse to any 
particular radical agenda. Workers were primarily 
interested in wage issues and, with these uppermost 
they adopted the methods of syndicalism being promoted 
by the new generation of union leaders rather than its 
aims. The methods of syndicalism - direct action - 
combined with a critique of moderate trade unionism 
borrowed from industrial unionism lent a new coherence, 
scale and efficacy to worker organisation, and the 
leaders of the established trade unions, who subscribed 
to traditional bargaining procedures, lost influence 
with their members. This new pattern of organisation 
was most apparent in key industries and constituted a 
potential "national danger" which could be realised 
through ill considered action on the part of the state. 
The danger lay in the fact that in itself this 
organisation could dislocate the economy and produce a 
major degree of civil disturbance.
Against this background both legislation and force were 
seen as problematic. It was not certain that workers
would comply with any legislation and it was thought 
possible that the use of force would inflame the 
situation and make the state the focus of the conflict. 
However state intervention was needed to avert the need 
for further state intervention.1 The state's response 
was to set up the Industrial Council which bought time 
during which existing conciliation machinery for 
curtailing disputes could be strengthened and directed 
with increased vigour towards disorganising the 
"wonderful combination" which underpinned the threat.
Chapter five presents an account of the origins and 
conseguences of the MOW Act. It concentrates on the 
ways in which worker organisation and resistance 
constrained the measures taken by the state to 
discipline workers, increase productivity and prosecute 
the war. Initially recruitment to the armed services 
caused an increasingly serious labour shortage and a 
corresponding increase in workers' bargaining power, 
and the state called on trade unions to cooperate in 
preventing strikes and implementing dilution. This 
measure failed because trade union leaders proved 
unable to deliver their members' cooperation and 
industrial conflict began to escalate. The MOW Act was 
passed to prohibit strikes and impose dilution. In the 
event however, the MOW Act generated and provided a 
focus for industrial conflict, increased resistance to 
dilution, reinforced the belief that union leaders had 
betrayed workers' interests, turned many workers
against responsible trade unionism and provided further 
impetus for the changes already taking place in worker 
organisation. Trade union leaders' apparent cooperation 
with the state adversely affected their relationship 
with their members many of whom believed that they had 
come to represent employers and the state against them.
This provided the impetus for the formation of rank and 
file movements in munitions, engineering and 
shipbuilding and provided a platform and a focus for 
the new ideas and new organisation which aimed to 
supersede them. It was the unofficial movement which 
had the confidence of the workers, and this was 
realised by state agencies.
The state sought to address the situation by modifying 
the MOW Act and relying heavily on the cooperation of 
the ASE in the implementation of labour policy. The 
price of its cooperation was however high in terms of 
both the reorganisation of production and the 
management of industrial conflict. Leaders of the ASE 
saw their priority as their members' interests which 
were not the same as the "national interest" as defined 
by the state. As a result the relationship between the 
state and this trade union deteriorated and the 
implementation of war time labour policy was further 
impeded.
Chapter six examines industrial conflict during 1916-18 
from the perspective of the Ministry of Labour. This
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chapter highlights the fragmented nature of the state. 
It shows that the state is a set of heirarchical 
institutions, some in ascendance, some in decline, with 
overlapping responsibilities and contradictory 
objectives. It illustrates that the role of the Cabinet 
is to at least formally resolve departmental dispute 
and maintain a facade of unity while executing policy 
which may often be an amalgam of policies formulated by 
more than one department. The MOL found that the 
measures taken by the Ministry of Munitions in respect 
of industrial unrest had been ill considered and 
inappropriate and provided a clear example of the 
disadvantages of direct state intervention. In 
particular, action had been taken without sufficient 
regard to developments in the relationship between the 
official trade unions, the shop stewards and the rank 
and file and within the shop stewards' movement. The 
MOL believed that the confrontational approach adopted 
by the Ministry of Munitions and the provisions of the 
MOW Act had decreased the divisions within trade 
unionism. There was no longer any clear opposition 
between the official and the unofficial movement and 
the latter had the practical support of the former. 
Nevertheless although the shop stewards' aims were 
radical the aims of the rank and file were not. The 
workers used the shop stewards to represent their 
interests because they had little choice and not 
because they supported their aims. The workers however, 
interpreted the intervention of the Ministry of
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Munitions as a challenge to their right to elect their 
own leaders and the state became a clear target for 
workers' discontent. This was fortuitous for the shop 
stewards who were able to strengthen their own 
organisation but dangerous for the state which now had 
few options left for maintaining control. A widely 
favoured solution was the Whitley Scheme which aimed to 
institutionalise and therefore neutralise the shop 
stewards and promote responsible trade unionism. 
However, although the the MOL believed that its 
continued existence and authority was to a large 
extent tied up with the implementation of the Whitley 
scheme and the status and functions given to structures 
set up under it by the state, it was at pains to point 
out its shortcomings as a solution to industrial 
conflict. Despite its rhetoric the Whitley Scheme 
offered an expansion of conciliation - the 
consolidation of the status quo in industrial relations 
- when those powerful, because well organised, sections 
of the working class at which it was aimed were 
demanding the control of industry by the workers. The 
climate created by the MOW Act and the Ministry of 
Munitions' handling of industrial unrest during the war 
rendered the MOL's task, the management of industrial 
conflict through conciliation, extremely difficult. The 
situation was temporarily defused by an upsurge of 
patriotism but there were fears of a resurgence of 
serious industrial conflict once the war was over.
These fears were realised. Chapter seven outlines 
industrial conflict after the end of the war and the 
state's response to it with particular reference to the 
National Industrial Conference. This chapter suggests 
that initially the industrial unrest was seen as a 
revolutionary challenge and preparations were made on 
two fronts. The state prepared for a war against labour 
manifest in the deployment of troops and meetings of 
the Industrial Unrest Committee and at the same time 
set up conferences, committees and commissions in a bid 
to negotiate the threat away. Meanwhile the progress of 
worker organisation was closely monitored and state 
agencies soon developed the view that divisions within 
the trade union movement had re-established themselves 
and that with judicious state intervention the strength 
of worker organisation could be diminished. The state 
adopted the approach favoured by the German government 
and took no action on the key recommendations of the 
Provisional Joint Committee of the National Industrial 
Conference while purporting to represent everything it 
was striving for. At the same time the state took care 
to restrict the opportunities available to the Triple 
Alliance for exercising its industrial muscle. By late 
September 1919 it had become apparent to the MOL that 
the threat of direct action had receded, the labour 
movement as a whole was fragmented, the workers less 
enamoured with their leaders and "direct action" and 
that a strike of the Triple Alliance was unlikely. The 
NIC served no purpose for the state against this
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background, the Government disengaged itself and the 
Conference eventually broke up.
Continuity and Change
The central proposition of this thesis is that an 
analysis of industrial relations policy from above in 
this period reveals consistency in that policy and that 
to a large extent this was due to how the state 
perceived the strength and character of worker 
organisation. Throughout the period the state 
formulated industrial relations policy with one eye on 
worker organisation and the other on the "national 
interest". State analyses of industrial conflict 
throughout this period suggest that workers did not 
subscribe in any consistent or informed way to the 
tenets of syndicalism, industrial unionism, pacifism or 
trade unionism. Workers were primarily interested in 
wage issues and allied themselves to leaders who proved 
their usefulness in this respect. In this period 
younger and more militant leaders drew on a mixture of 
syndicalism and industrial unionism to good effect. 
Worker organisation in Britain in the period 1910-21 
was influenced by both of these movements as this study 
has shown. However trade union leaders such as Tom Mann 
superimposed some of the strategies and tactics of 
these movements on the traditions and models of 
organisation of the craft societies. They did not 
envisage revolution. One of the more influential
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commentators, Eric Hobsbawm, rightly suggests that at 
best syndicalism was 'a slogan of the struggle and not 
a programme for social transformation' but wrongly 
concludes that there was no revolutionary threat at 
this time. 2 As this study has shown, workers were 
enamoured of this "new policy" because gains were 
achieved by it and the stock of leaders who subscribed 
to it rose. Leaders were carried along on the wave. For 
the state the strategies and tactics of syndicalism and 
industrial unionism added a new and threatening 
dimension to worker organisation because of their 
emphasis on empowering the rank and file of trade 
unionism rather than its officials - this was 'power 
without responsibility' - a potentially disastrous 
combination.3
This was the "national danger" which forced the state 
to intervene but limited the forms which intervention 
could take. The state could intervene by means of 
legislation but this further diminished the power of 
official trade unionism and there was the possibility 
that workers would not comply. This was borne out by 
the experience of the MOW Act. Industrial conflict 
could be forcibly suppressed by the police or the armed 
forces but this could bring 'the conception of the 
class war dangerously into prominence.'4 and in some 
cases the loyalty of the police and the army was 
uncertain. The form of intervention with the fewest 
repercussions was conciliation involving the promotion
of responsible trade unionism and collective 
bargaining.
The state did not however envisage allocating a share 
of state power to the trade unions at any point in this 
period. This is illustrated in the deliberations 
surrounding the Industrial Council in 1911, where the 
idea of any devolution of state power was dismissed as 
a crude and unrealistic suggestion. Again in the 
aftermath of the MOW Act it was emphasised that the 
role of established trade unions was not to concern 
themselves with the detail of government policy but to 
impose it on their members - 'to exert all their force 
to remove these suspicions and to encourage the men and 
indeed I will not say coerce but bring every influence 
to bear on them.'5 The MOL, commenting on the Whitley 
Scheme during 1916-18 noted that the problem with the 
latter as far as providing a solution to industrial 
conflict was concerned was precisely that it offered no 
executive powers to the trade unions. Lastly the 
negotiations surrounding the NIC and the MOL's 
analysis of it can be summed up in the statement to the 
Provisional Joint Committee by the Minister of Labour 
who emphasised that the government had no intention of 
handing over 'to any body of people, however eminent'6 
its responsibilities in the matter of legislation.
The aim of industrial relations policy during 1910-21 
was, then, to fragment the organised industrial power
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of labour. Throughout this period worker organisation 
displayed a combination of features which were defined 
by the state as a threat to the national interest. It 
was characterised by the potential for concerted action 
on a large scale which threatened economic and civil 
disturbance, a disregard of the methods of moderate 
trade unionism, widespread support among the working 
class and indifference to the law. The state's 
interpretation appeared to take seriously the warnings 
of Bagehot 7 that 'a political combination of the lower 
classes, as such and for their own objects, is an evil 
of the first magnitude.' In opting for conciliation it 
also adopted his view that this evil could only be 
averted by 'the greatest wisdom and the greatest 
foresight in the higher classes ... [who] ... must 
avoid, not only every evil, but every appearance of 
evil; while they still have the power they must remove, 
not only every grievance but where it is possible every 
seeming grievance too; they must willingly concede 
every claim which they can safely concede, in order 
that they may not have to concede unwillingly some 
claim which would impair the safety of the country.'
The trade unions were seen as the key to the management 
of industrial conflict at this time. They provided a 
channel of communication between the state and workers 
which was invaluable for the implementation of policy, 
for information on workers' concerns and for defusing 
potential sources of conflict. Most importantly it was
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believed that moderate trade unions or to be more 
accurate, responsibly led trade unions, acted as a 
discipline and control on their members - they could 
prevent industrial conflict from reaching the point 
where repressive state intervention became inevitable.
However this thesis has highlighted the problems with 
the rank and filist approach during the period under 
study.
The state's perceptions of trade unions and trade union 
leaders were refined and tested by the experience of 
industrial conflict during these years and corresponded 
with a more sophisticated and qualified rank and 
filism.
Firstly it became clear that although there was a 
difference of interests between trade union officials 
and their members this had more to do with their 
functions and their role in collective bargaining than 
personal idiosyncracies or reformist political 
allegiances. Officials had to respond to mass sentiment 
to retain their position. 'The problem for the leaders 
is, on the one hand, to get their followers to do what 
may be necessary from the national point of view, 
without on the other either alienating their loyalty 
and jeopardising their interests ,'B Secondly officials 
did not always favour conservatism at the expense of 
industrial action. Thirdly rank and file trade union 
members were not always prepared to fight militant 
struggles nor were they always passive or in awe of
their leaders (pace Michels). As Bramble emphasises, 
trade union officials' role is to conduct negotiations 
over the price and conditions under which labour power 
will be sold to employers. Union members however have 
no direct role in the collective bargaining 
arrangement. For them it is a means to an end and not a 
rationale for their existence.9 In the period under 
study workers took action to achieve wage increases 
which transcended the procedures of collective 
bargaining when these did not achieve their aims. This 
action challenged the arrangements established by their 
leaders. This placed officials in a difficult position 
since their existence was predicated on their role in 
collective bargaining but their power depended on 
responding to pressure from their members. 'It is not 
generally realised what a delicate and difficult 
problem this is for such men in their official capacity 
to handle.'10 They became less "responsible." Trade 
union officials' conservatism was therefore contingent 
on the pressure placed on them by their members as 
critics of the rank and filist perspective suggest.
At the beginning of the period moderate trade union 
leaders were challenged by new younger leaders more in 
tune with the mass enthusiasm of the rank and file for 
militant action. The reaction against established 
leaders persisted and was strengthened by war 
administration and legislation. This enhanced trade 
union officials' role in collective bargaining but
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further weakened their standing with their members. 
Aware of the source of their power, officials, notably 
within the ASE, exploited the former to resist and 
modify the impact of dilution in their members' 
interests rather than the national interest. The state 
revised its view of trade union leaders. By 1918 it was 
concluded that, far from disciplining and controlling 
their members, officials were covertly supporting 
industrial action and colluding in their members' 
defiance of the law. After the end of the war it was 
believed that trade union leaders were now the 
controllers of organised industrial power which they 
were directing towards influencing state policy. The 
limits to trade union action, however, ultimately 
became clear when workers decided against "direct 
action" and trade union officials complied. For the MOL 
both government and trade union action was constrained 
by the working class. It was 'ruled by public opinion 
... much of which was labour opinion' and 'public 
opinion must decide the issue ... no single body can 
stand against an overwhelmingly hostile community.'11
1 Lowe, 1986 p.130.
2 Hobsbawm 1984.p.277.
3 See chapter 6 p.14 this thesis.
4 PRO MUN 5/55 Report from the Ministry of Labour 1st 
October 1919.
5 See chapter 4 this thesis.
6 PRO LAB 2/556/WA 7809. Sept 1919.
7 Bagehot, 1949 p.272.
8 PRO MUN 5/55 Report from the Ministry of Labour 10th 
of September 1919.
9 Bramble, 1993. pp.39-61.
10 PRO MUN 5/55 Report from the Ministry of Labour 10th 
of September 1919.
11 PRO MUN 5/55 Report from the Ministry of Labour 1st
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of October 1919
Appendix : Methodology
This thesis is based on the following archival materials; 
Cabinet papers, the papers of the Board of Trade, the 
Ministry of Munitions, the Ministry of Labour, the 
Admiralty, the Ministry of Aviation and the Treasury at 
the Public Record Office, Kew. In addition I have 
consulted the papers of the the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions 1867-69, the Royal Commission on Labour 1891-94, 
the Ministry of Labour and the Official History of The 
Ministry of Munitions at the Modern Records Centre, 
University of Warwick together with newspapers and 
material on syndicalism and industrial unionism in 
Britain held at the Bodleian Library, Oxford and the 
Working Class Movement Library, Salford. It is a study of 
industrial conflict from above not below. It is concerned 
with the way in which industrial conflict shaped 
industrial relations policy in a particular historical 
period. It could be argued that it relies too heavily on 
government records at the expense of trade union records 
but this is indispensible for a study of the evolution of 
policy.
In the course of research for the thesis it became 
apparent to me however, that some sources, invariably 
cited as useful and reliable in those analyses which rely 
on government records, should be looked at more 
critically. The sources most heavily used in studies of 
industrial relations policy are Cabinet papers, the
private papers, biographies, diaries and memoirs of key 
political figures of the time and the Official History of 
the Ministry of Munitions. Although I too have used these 
sources directly and indirectly through the use of 
secondary texts, I have approached them with the 
following provisos in mind.
I have used Cabinet records in conjunction with others, 
following Davidson's observations, as noted in the 
introduction, that before 1911 industrial unrest was 
rarely discussed by the Cabinet and after this time the 
initiative in formulating industrial relations policy 
remained with the Board of Trade. The part played by the 
Cabinet in policy making is restricted. Firstly because 
of the limits of time and human reason, it can never 
intervene in practice at more than an infinitesimally 
small proportion of points at which decisions are 
reguired. A second difficulty arises out of the political 
functions of the Cabinet. Its business is to govern not 
the Civil Service but the nation. The Cabinet is made up 
of a group of party leaders who represent different 
interests within the party, the party itself is sensitive 
to the danger of failure at the next election and the 
Cabinet is constantly under pressure from public opinion. 
The Cabinet is less a central directing authority than an 
organ of co-ordination for the different departments of 
state which acts as a final court of appeal in specific 
controversies but which can do little to lay down in 
general terms forms of organisation for the
administration as a whole. Even during war or times of 
emergency when the Cabinet may appear to offer 
comprehensive central direction it remains the case that 
the small group of individuals who make up the Cabinet 
and their advisors can grasp only some of the 
complexities of the situation. Their leadership is 
largely political and directed to the nation as a whole. 
The Cabinet can affect administration directly only by 
limited and judicious intervention at key points.1
Cabinet Minutes are the organised record of decisions by 
the British government on all matters of importance and 
they provide a continuous record of policy decisions and 
the main reasons for them, together with a network of 
cross references which ensure that nothing will be 
discussed in ignorance of action in related fields. 
However they were designed as an instrument of 
administration and not as a historical record.2 Mowat 3 
acknowledges that Cabinet papers 'will deepen our 
knowledge of what happened and of the information on 
which ministers or Cabinet decided to act' but warns that 
'what the papers do not say, about motives or passions, 
the information they failed to supply to the government, 
will remain important, and light on these things will 
still have to be sought elsewhere.'4
Many writers have sought this information in the private 
papers, biographies, diaries and memoirs of politicians 
and civil servants. However these sources vary widely in
their reliability and usefulness. Turning to collections 
of private papers it must firstly be noted that they are 
of historical value and many collections have been 
published. However they rarely contain original 
government documents since these have to be returned to 
the Cabinet Office. LLoyd George refused to return 
important documents after writing his memoirs5 as did 
Addison6 but after his death in 1945 the more important 
documents were returned.
Biographies, while useful to the historian, are 'not a 
good way of writing history.' This is because the 
biographer's priority is to tell the story of someone's 
life bringing out his personality and importance and not 
to detail the individual's times except in as much as 
they affect him or her. Biography 'tells us much personal 
and inner detail that would otherwise be lost, but it 
consistently turns the hero's face to the sun.'7
To a much greater extent the same is true of diaries and 
memoirs. The reliability of diaries as sources turns on 
several factors - whether they were written up each day 
or some time after the events, whether the entries were 
altered when hindsight changed an impression or an event. 
In addition no diary has been published in its entirety 
and we have to trust the judgement of the individual who 
selected what was published. The status of diaries 
ultimately rests on whether the evidence of the diary is 
supported by evidence from other sources. A diary much
used by historians of the First World War is Thomas 
Jones' "Whitehall Diary". Its status as a source derives 
from its author who was Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet 
Office from 1916 and it is therefore 'a first hand record 
of a privileged observer.'8 Nevertheless while this work 
adds considerably to our knowledge and understanding of 
political figures and events at the time and the working 
of the Cabinet Office it must be approached with the 
above reservations in mind.
As with diaries the usefulness of memoirs depends on 
whether the author prefers 'frankness to discretion' and 
on freedom with his own manuscript. Ex-ministers and 
civil servants must have their manuscripts vetted by the 
Cabinet office. Their reliability turns on the author's 
memory of events, on the wisdom of hindsight, the desire 
to justify oneself and on whether they were written by 
the author, co-written or ghosted. As Mowat points out 
the historian must use memoirs but with rigorously 
enforced safeguards, verification, confirmation from 
other sources, common sense and a general knowledge of 
the history of the time.9
The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions is the 
only official history of any part of the civilian side of 
World War 1 and is the standard reference for many 
writers on the latter half of the war. The Ministry of 
Munitions was set up in June 1915. In the first year of 
its existence it was proposed by a high ranking official
in the Department of Requirements and Statistics 10 that 
a record of its organisation and executive activity be 
kept because the Ministry's work was of 'peculiar 
significance to the political and social history of the 
country' and would contribute to 'the political 
intelligence of the nation'11
The Cabinet however, had already approved a plan to 
maintain a complete record of administrative action 
during the war to be used for the compilation of a War 
Book and saw the role of the proposed history of the 
Ministry of Munitions differently - as a reference work 
which would be useful in preparing for future wars and 
for the solution of problems in peacetime. It was to be 
'the basis of any evidence to be laid before commissions 
of enquiry and as a guide for future action.'12
Heads of branches of the Ministry of Munitions were 
requested to provide statements of their work based 
'partly on personal recollections ... partly on reports 
and memoranda recorded in the current papers of the 
department.'13 Initially the work was primarily in the 
hands of the heads of the branches concerned who were 
left to decide for themselves what topics should be dealt 
with and how the emphasis should fall. There was no 
general plan and no attempt to cover large areas of 
ground which did not fall specifically within any single 
branch. Later the work became the responsibility of the 
Statistical Department of the Ministry which directed
other branches to specific topics. It was found however 
that departmental accounts were badly written and that 
they reflected the preoccupations of their heads of 
department e.g. "the Economic Structure of the Post War 
World" or "Trench Warfare Supplies". Skilled researchers 
were recruited to plan the work, to widen its perspective 
and cover all the ground for which the Ministry was 
responsible so that a History would be produced which 
could form the basis of useful research.
By the end of the war however, the work was not complete, 
many of the skilled personnel left, the Ministry faced 
dissolution and 'the scramble to get the work printed 
clearly led to serious faults in the History.'14 In 
January 1920 the Treasury agreed to the employment of 
individual contributors, many of whom were students, on a 
piece work basis which turned the history into 'a system 
of indoor relief' which had 'all the disadvantages of 
complicated administration and unco-ordinated effort.'15
After the Armistice the Cabinet decided against the 
publication of the History. It was emphasised that 'there 
would be a good deal in the History which it would not be 
judicious to lay before everyone.' The work was to be 
made available to officials for official purposes only 
and it was decided that expenditure on it would end with 
the expiration of the Ministry at the end of 1921. In 
March 1920 the Cabinet decided in favour of publishing 
those parts 'recording the activities in regard to
industrial labour.'16 The Ministry of Labour objected on 
the ground that this would lead to industrial conflict.
It was agreed that these sections would be vetted by the 
Ministry of Labour before publication. In the event the 
Ministry of Labour required the revision of the entire 
text and the removal of all direct references to official 
documents.
The History was not published. Two hundred and fifty 
copies were made available to Ministries and official 
bodies. Its usefulness as a source of information on 
government policy has been diminished due to 'its 
dependence on one group of papers [which] somewhat 
unbalances the text.'17 References are sparingly given 
and cannot be checked since the schedule of destruction 
prepared by the Master of the Rolls put a time limit in 
no case longer than seven years on the papers used by the 
Ministry to compile the History. In consequence 'there is 
no comprehensive and reliable body of documents to verify 
the story which was compiled and 'into the framework 
prepared for an economic and institutional discussion was 
fitted a description of administration.''18
My main aim in reviewing some of the most heavily used 
sources for the analysis of industrial conflict during 
1910-21 has been to show that they should be used in 
conjunction with the papers of the departments of state 
from which industrial relations policy derived in this 
period in order to avoid the confusion of political talk
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with administrative action. It has been a central 
contention of this thesis that a more accurate view of 
industrial relations policy in the period 1910-21 can be 
gained from a study of the papers of the departments from 
which it originated. These departments were the Board of 
Trade, the Labour Department of the Ministry of Munitions 
and the Ministry of Labour which inherited the powers and 
responsibility for the management of industrial conflict 
conferred by the Conciliation Act 1896.
This insight was the result of a study of the evolution 
of the state's practical involvement in industrial 
relations from the mid 19th century to the passing of the 
Conciliation Act 1896. My work in this area has relied to 
a great extent on the reports of the Royal Commissions of 
1867-69 and 1891-94. Before it became the reponsibility 
of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade these 
Commissions gathered vast amounts of information, 
statistics and evidence from many sources including trade 
unions, workers, employers and state departments such as 
the Board of Trade, the Treasury and the Local Government 
Board (Poor Law Commissioners). While it is true that the 
findings and recommendations of Royal Commissions do not 
always help to formulate policy and lead to action and 
that they are sometimes appointed to avoid a crisis by 
delay and postponement (e.g. The Coal Industry Commission 
1919), reports from both kinds of Commissions are sources 
in themselves and are also historical facts. Inaction on
their recommendations is as much a decision of government 
as action.19
Locating the information on which ministers and Cabinet 
acted was however not simply a guestion of identifying 
the departments empowered to manage industrial conflict 
by the Conciliation Act. It is important to note here 
that some government papers do not reach the Public 
Record Office and many are accidentally or intentionally 
destroyed whilst others, in spite of the thirty year 
rule, are unavailable. In addition, not all of the 
available papers of state departments charged with 
responsibility for the formulation and implementation of 
industrial relations policy are egually useful. Documents 
which are ultimately published as official papers are 
usually the result of many drafts. These drafts are 
generally far more detailed and revealing than published 
papers in terms of how government policy developed. In 
the case of the Cabinet, drafts are difficult to locate 
and many no longer exist. Fortunately the archives of the 
agencies listed above contain much internal 
correspondence on policy with regard to industrial 
conflict and many drafts of documents either for 
publication, submission to the Cabinet and for briefing 
Ministers.
Access to these documents however, is made difficult by 
other factors. Documents, especially in the LAB 2 class 
list, (which include papers of the Board of Trade) are
difficult to use because they cover the whole range of 
Ministry business including general policy, industrial 
relations, establishment and trade boards and have been 
preserved in an uneven and disorganised way. There is an 
index to the LAB class at the PRO named LAB 7 which 
consists of many docket books of subject indexes which 
then have to be used with the indexes to LAB 2 which take 
up many volumes. As a result research in the LAB 2 class 
list can be time consuming and unrewarding and may 
contribute to the failure of analysts of this period to 
appreciate the richness of material available concerning 
the state's relationship with organised labour and the 
nature of industrial disputes in Britain at this time. 
Fortunately, while browsing among dictionaries and 
reference works in the field of industrial relations in 
Warwick University Library I discovered guite by chance 
that a listing and guide to LAB classes LAB 2, LAB 10,
LAB 27, LAB 31 and LAB 34 had been compiled and a 
selection of the documents relating to industrial 
relations committed to microfilm, a copy of which had 
been deposited on the first floor of the library.20 This 
saved much time at the Public Record Office.
1 Mackenzie & Grove 1957 pp.334-341.
2 Ibid.
3 Mowat,C .L. Great Britain Since 1914 Hodder & Stoughton 
1971.
4 Ibid p68.
5 LLoyd George 1933-36.
6 Addison London 1934.
7 Mowat 1971 p90.
8 Ibid pl02.
9 Ibid.
10 Godfrey LLoyd, Associate Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Toronto seconded to the 
Ministry of Munitions in 1915.
11 AVIA 46/288 6th of April 1944.
12 Ibid p3.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid p8.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid pl2.
17 Ibid pi 3.
18 Ibid pl4.
19 Ibid p35.'
20 Harvester Microfilm Collection, 1985.
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